

Boris Sokolov Who fought in numbers and who fought with skill

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* BEST SAILERS

WHO fought in numbers, 9 WHO fought with Skill

The monstrous truth about the losses of the Soviet Socialist Republic in World War II

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Sokolov B.

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"Out of a hundred enemy soldiers who attacked us, two hundred were killed." This historical anecdote is not so far from the truth: at all times, in all wars, enemy losses are considered "in a Suvorov way" - they say that when, after another victory, the adjutant asked Alexander Vasilyevich how many dead Turks should be included in the report to mother - Empress, he replied: "Write more! Why pity them, adversaries!

During the years of World War II, the bloody Stalinist regime applied this principle to its own people — the Red Army fought as if the "fathers-commanders" set the goal of exterminating as many Soviet soldiers as possible by the hands of the Nazis...

Taking into account all the known data, including recently declassified ones, using original methods for calculating the losses of the USSR and the Third Reich (both the armed forces and the civilian population), the author of this sensational book comes to shocking conclusions, clearly, in numbers and facts, demonstrating who fought in numbers and who fought with skill. In addition, for the first time, full information is published about the losses of other countries - not only the allies of the Soviet Union and Germany, but also those that did not officially participate in hostilities, but their volunteers fought in the armies of the warring states, their merchant ships died from submarine attacks. boats, so that almost all countries suffered losses in the Second World War, although these figures are not comparable - from 3 people in Ceylon to more than 40 million in the USSR! But they continue to hide this monstrous truth until now ... UDC 355/359

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Foreword

The purpose of this study is to try to determine the human losses of all countries affected in one way or another by the Second World War. There is no doubt that the loss of mankind in this war was the greatest compared to any other war in history, however, determining the exact amount of losses both in the world as a whole and in individual countries faces a number of difficulties that have not been fully overcome until now. So far. The absence of population statistics in a number of countries, primarily Asian ones, the absence of reliable reports on the losses of a number of armies, as well as the absence of any reliable current account of the losses of the civilian population in most countries, do not allow us to accurately determine the losses of a number of states. And all countries in general. Therefore, we refused to compile a summary table of losses for all countries and obtain the final figure of losses for the world as a whole. The reason is both the deliberate inaccuracy in the calculations of the losses of a number of countries, and the inevitable double counting associated with the changes in the borders of many states that took place during the war.

Another important circumstance hinders the determination of the true magnitude of losses in the Second World War. In many countries, not excluding Russia, the problem of determining military losses, and especially the losses of their own armed forces and their correlation with the losses of the enemy, has long been a political problem. During the war years, the underestimation of their own losses and the overestimation of the losses of the enemy were dictated both by propaganda considerations and by the desire of the military themselves to present to the higher authorities, military and political, the results of their activities in the best possible light.

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But even after the war, when it was already possible to approach the determination of the magnitude of losses as a purely scientific task, its solution was influenced by the ideological and political views of researchers, and this influence turns out to be in principle irremovable.

We have tried to approach the definition of magnitude as a purely scientific task, abstracting as much as possible from the action of all political and ideological factors. In the first part of our study, we tried to determine the size of the losses of the two states that suffered the greatest losses in the war - the Soviet Union and Germany. In the second part of the study, an attempt is made to determine the losses of other countries that participated in the war in one way or another. We also tried to calculate the ratio of the losses of the armed forces of the parties for various theaters of military operations. In order to more accurately calculate losses, we tried, whenever possible, to refer to primary sources to verify existing loss estimates. Probably, many of the results of the study will seem sensational to readers and turn their ideas about the magnitude and nature of the losses of certain countries, not excluding our country. However, sensationalism in itself was not the goal of our study. We aimed only at the maximum accuracy in determining the losses and the scientific correctness of the calculations.

In order to determine as accurately as possible the losses of all countries that participated in the Second World War or in one way or another affected by it, and to accurately distribute them into categories, it is necessary to carry out an international project to calculate the losses in the Second World War by a group of scientists independent of state structures and represent - covering all the main countries participating in the war that suffered the greatest losses. They must calculate all losses by primary source, with a clear statement of the methodologies used. The loss figures for each country should be considered established only when there is a consensus among all project participants. Such a project would require significant funding from public and private

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structures and many years of hard work. Let's hope that someday it will be implemented.

I would like to express my warmest gratitude to the historian Yeorgy Borisovich Brylevsky, who provided me with data on the losses of the Japanese army from Japanese sources.

I dedicate my book to the memory of all those who died during the Second World War.

Part 1

LOSSES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND GERMANY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: CALCULATION METHODS AND THE MOST PROBABLE RESULTS

CRITICISM OF THE OFFICIAL FIGURES OF IRRETURNABLE LOSSES OF THE RED ARMY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The Soviet Union and Germany suffered the greatest losses among all participants in the Second World War. Establishing the magnitude of the irretrievable losses of both the armed forces and the civilian population of these two countries, even today, 65 years after the end of the war, remains a difficult statistical task, and here the estimates of various researchers differ quite significantly. This is especially true of estimates of the losses of the Red Army, where the figures of various researchers differ by several times.

It should be borne in mind that the calculation of the population and, in particular, the calculation of casualties is not just the solution of some mathematical problem. After all, we are not talking about the calculation of inanimate objects, but about living people with free will. This circumstance makes all calculations fundamentally less accurate than in the case of any calculations of inanimate objects or the solution of abstract mathematical problems. The accuracy of calculations, when we are dealing with population statistics, is affected both by the properties of the array that needs to be calculated, and so. and properties of those people who consider. In the case of counting military people, the object of calculation is not living people who themselves can answer the questions of interest to us, as is the case ideally, for example, during population censuses, but people who died

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or missing, those. at the very moment of counting, obviously inaccessible to counters. The calculation of military casualties is made on the basis of reports of different levels, and the primary reports of losses (usually these are reports of platoon commanders), as a rule, are not stored in the archives. These reports were based both on the personal impressions of the commander, who observed the alleged death of his fighters, and on the testimony of subordinates about the death of one of his comrades, as well as on the fact that one of the fighters was absent after the battle. There is also a subjective factor. The author of the report usually sought to downplay data on deadweight losses or report them late. This made it possible to receive additional rations and improve the idea of the authorities about the results of combat activities. However, the underestimation of the level of losses could mainly take place in those instances where the initial reports of losses were received. Each of these authorities, from the company to the front (army group), were interested in presenting the results of their own combat activities in the best possible light. This was achieved by downplaying their own losses and exaggerating the losses of the enemy. The degree of distortion of loss reports was determined both by the level of culture and existing traditions, and by the absolute value of one's own losses. The larger they are, the greater the level of their underestimation.

Both objective and subjective difficulties in determining Soviet military losses lead to the fact that the existing estimates differ by several times. The adherence of researchers to one assessment or another is often determined by ideological reasons. Higher ratings are held by those who are more critical of the Soviet past. Supporters of more moderate assessments in most cases are those who are inclined to find certain merits in the Soviet project. With particular zeal, representatives of the military department defend the name of the assessment of the losses of the Red Army. They seek to prove that the Red Army fought no worse than the Wehrmacht, and thereby justify the preservation of the basic principles of the construction of armed forces.

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military forces, largely unchanged since the Great Patriotic War.

The official figures of Soviet military losses in the Great Patriotic War, first published in the form of a monograph in 1993, do not withstand any scientific criticism, and all the absurdities noted in the first edition have not been corrected in subsequent editions! Meanwhile, the data contained in these publications themselves refute the figure, established with comical accuracy, of 8,668,400 Red Army, Red Navy and NKVD troops who died during the war years. True, the second edition added another figure of 500 thousand people called up for military training in May-June 1941 and missing at the beginning of the war. The authors are still inclined to attribute this figure, which is not clear from where, to the losses of the civilian population and leave the figure of irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War at 8,668,400 people unchanged?

GF. Krivosheev, defending the General Staff figure of losses, said in an interview with the Itogi magazine: "I am surprised by the strange desire of some of our fellow citizens to denigrate the army and increase the number of its losses during the war. You already know the names of these people without me - Boris Sokolov, Alexander Rutskoï, Dmitry Volkogonov. Govorukhin in his film "The Russia We Lost" says that we suffered losses 10 times greater than the Germans. Rutskoï said - 14 times more. Believe me, all this contradicts the archival documents of the General Staff"³. Those researchers who are trying to objectively approach the study of the problem of Soviet military losses and try to understand the inconsistencies that are available in official publications are accused of falsification. Meanwhile, back in the anniversary year of 1995, I happened to meet Krivosheev and his team at a public performance at the State Public Historical Library in Moscow. When Krivosheev announced the official figure of casualties calculated by him and his collaborators, I directly asked what his grade in arithmetic was at school. The general was sincerely indignant and, foaming at the mouth, began to prove that

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graduated from high school with a gold medal. The public shushed that the question was incorrect. I objected that the question was correct, and gave an example of the losses of the Central Front in the Kursk defensive operation in July 1943, proving at least a threefold understatement of losses in the collection "Secrecy Removed" (this example is given below). The audience was shocked, and Krivosheev and his associates were confused. Only a few minutes later, one of the members of the collection's authors, the late captain of the 1st rank M.V. Filimoshin, who directly calculated the losses in the Great Patriotic War and to whom I had earlier in a private conversation cited the same example of the Central Front as proof of the absurdity of their calculations, rushed to the microphone and shouted in confusion that they, they say, cannot be responsible for other people's numbers that someone once indicated in the reports. Nevertheless, the team of authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" continued and continue to insist on the correspondence of their total figure of 8,668,400 dead to the true value of losses. They do not hear criticism, because they have a certain ideological task.

As participants in the war I.A. Dugas and F.Ya. Cheron, "Oh, how many untruths and half-truths have heaped up Krivosheev and his team! The authors engaged in myth-making with the hope that the younger generation would not understand the events." Refuting with the help of German figures the obviously underestimated data of the collection "Secrecy Removed" about the death rate of Soviet prisoners of war - as if 1.4 million people in total, Dugas and Cheron also cite the testimony of F. Setin, who worked in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense: "Once, on the eve of a lunch break, a group of young people came out of a separate reading room, fenced off from us by a blank wall. People with especially secret documents worked in this hall.

As it turned out later, they were officers of the General Staff, mostly colonels, good-looking, widely educated and cultured, who knew their own worth. As a retired officer and a front-line soldier, I reached out to them: in the dining room, in the smoking room or in the rest room, every now and then I joined in

conversation with colleagues. From snatches of conversations, I realized that they were counting the irretrievable losses of our troops during the war years, for which they looked through all the archival funds related to this. The previous group, I was told, calculated a figure of more than thirty million. "Upstairs" did not accept this figure. "Too much," they said. And they formed a new group. Obviously, the group of M.A. Gareeva and G.F. Krivosheeva and became the group that considered it the way the "tops" needed.

It is characteristic that on the air of Vladimir Pozner's program "Times" the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army M.A. Gareev, defending the official loss figure, involuntarily let it slip when he said, addressing the audience gathered in the studio, that "you don't need to know all these numbers"⁵. The trouble is that the official loss figure has already become an integral part of the myth of the Great Victory, designed to justify the Soviet progloe.

Meanwhile, the official loss figures are easily refuted by the information that is contained in the collection "The Classification Removed" itself (in all its editions). According to this collection, on July 5, 1943, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central Front numbered 738 thousand people and during the defensive battle from July 5 to 11 inclusive lost 15,336 people killed and missing and 18,561 people wounded and sick. By the time the Red Army went on the offensive on Orel, on July 12, the composition of the troops of the Central Front had hardly changed: one armored brigade arrived and two rifle brigades left. At that time, the tank brigade numbered 1300 people, and in one rifle brigade there were 4.2 thousand people. With this in mind, by the beginning of the Oryol operation, the Central Front was supposed to have 697,000 personnel. However, according to the authors of the book "Secrecy Removed", at that moment there were only 645,300 people in Rokossovsky's troops." This means that the true losses of the Central Front in the defensive battle near Kursk were at least 51.7 thousand more than official statistics confirm, with the bulk of the underestimation falling on irretrievable losses. If

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If we assume that the underestimation of losses related mainly to irretrievable losses, then the latter are underestimated by about 4.4 times. And this is only on the condition that the troops of the Central Front did not receive marching reinforcements during the defensive operation. If such reinforcements were received, then the real losses should have been even higher (there were reinforcements to the neighboring Voronezh Front during the defensive battle)%. Such a number of people could not immediately desert or simply disappear to no one knows where, and even in the conditions of fierce fighting. Although we had to repeatedly point out this discrepancy to the authors of the book "The Classification Removed" both in print and in personal conversations, they did not give any explanation for this fact, and all the indicated figures remained unchanged in all editions?.

Another example concerns the defense of Odessa, which lasted from August 5 to October 16, 1941. The official figures for Soviet losses in this operation are 16,578 killed and missing. However, it is known that during the battle for Odessa, the Romanian army took about 16 thousand prisoners. It is absolutely unbelievable that in more than two months of fighting, the defenders of Odessa lost only 578 killed.

An equally serious proof that the data of the book "Secrecy Removed" about the irretrievable losses of the Red Army are many times underestimated is the comparison of the data on the losses of two armies of the Polish Army in separate operations contained in this collection with official Polish data. In total, Polish losses on the Soviet-German front amounted to 17.5 thousand killed and 10 thousand missing?

In the East Pomeranian operation, which lasted from February 10 to April 4, 1945, the 1st Army of the Polish Army lost, according to official Russian data, 2575 killed and

missing! 3. However, according to Polish data, the losses of this army amounted to 5.4 thousand killed and 2.8 thousand missing. "This gives 8.2 thousand people of irretrievable losses, which is 3.2 times more than the official - Russian calculation of Polish losses in the East Pomeranian operation.

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The Russian estimate of all Soviet and Polish irretrievable losses in this operation should be increased by 3.2 times - from 55,315 to 176,149 people. The ratio of irretrievable and sanitary losses for the 1st Polish Army will be 1.35:1, and for all Soviet and Polish troops participating in the East Pomeranian operation - 0.98:1, which, as we expected, turns out to be close 1:1.

In the Berlin operation, which lasted from April 16 to May 8, 1945, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops are determined by the authors of the book at 81,116 people, including the losses of the 1st and 2nd armies of the Polish Army. At the same time, the irretrievable losses of the two Polish armies, according to the official publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense, amounted to only 2825 people. However, official Polish data show that the irretrievable losses of the two Polish armies in the Berlin operation amounted to 7.2 thousand dead and 3.8 thousand missing, which gives irretrievable losses of 11 thousand people, i.e. 3.9 times more than the official Russian data claims. troops participating in the Berlin operation. Then they should amount to about 316.4 thousand people, which probably exceeds the irretrievable losses of the German troops opposed to the Soviet troops in the Berlin operation. After all, the main part of this grouping surrendered to the American-British war By the way, General A. V. Gorbatov, who commanded the 3rd Army in the Berlin operation, told critic V. Ya. Lakshin that at least 100 thousand Soviet soldiers died during street fighting in Berlin alone. and an officer." The ratio of irretrievable and sanitary losses for the Polish armies turns out to be 1.8:1, and for all Soviet and Polish troops participating in the Berlin operation - 1.13:1, those. irretrievable losses turn out to be even somewhat greater than sanitary ones.

There are other figures of Polish losses in the Berlin operation, which also differ significantly from the figures of the "Classified Classified". According to A.V. Isaev archival data 2nd Army of the Polish Army

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ryal in the Berlin operation 4902 killed, 10 532 wounded and 2798 missing. The losses of the 1st Army of the Polish Army amounted to 2014 killed, 7010 wounded and 516 missing. "This gives us 6.9 thousand killed and 3.3 thousand missing, which is less than the Polish data on no return losses by 0.8 thousand people If we use the Polish data on irretrievable losses and the data of A.V. Isaev on the number of wounded Poles, then there will be 1.6 wounded per one killed or missing, which is also far from the traditional ratio of 3: 1. To the question of why such a non-standard ratio between irretrievable and sanitary losses was observed in the Red Army, we will return a little lower.

It is curious that the authors of the book "The Classification Removed" in their book give data close to reality on the irretrievable losses of two armies of the Polish Army for the entire period of hostilities on the Soviet-German front - 24,707 people! , the question is how these data can be correlated with such small losses in the Berlin operation, where the Poles just suffered the greatest losses.

An analysis of the data from the collection "Secrecy Removed" also shows that the Berlin operation turned out to be a serious underestimation of the irretrievable losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front. According to the data of the collection, the troops of the front at the beginning of the operation on April 16, 1945, numbered 550,900 people and consisted of 44 rifle and three cavalry divisions, as well as 4 mechanized and 5 tank corps, two separate tank brigades and three self-propelled artillery - Leri brigades.

At the same time, it is indicated that the 3rd and 5th guards, 13th and 52nd combined arms and 3rd and 4th guards tank armies, as well as the 2nd air army 20. I would like to note that the weakness of the collection "The Classification Removed" is that for some reason artillery divisions and brigades are not included in the list of formations. After all, artillery divisions in terms of the number of personnel (7-10 thousand people) exceeded, for example, cavalry divisions and often did not concede to riflemen.

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you m. Meanwhile, from the book "The Last Assault" it follows that 4 rifle divisions that participated in the Berlin operation were in the 1st Ukrainian Front only taking into account nine divisions of the 28th Army, which was transferred to the front on April 20, 1945, i.e. after the beginning of the Berlin operation. In addition, the authors of Grif for some reason forgot to count one airborne division as part of the 5th Guards Army. For the sake of completeness, we also note that the authors of "The Classification Removed" underestimated the number of rifle divisions on the 2nd Belorussian Front by three, showing only 33 divisions there and pointing out that the 19th and 5th Guards Tank Armies did not participate. In fact, one of the rifle corps of the 19th Army did participate in the Berlin operation, which increases the number of rifle divisions at Rokossovsky to 36. In addition, he actually had two, and not one separate tank brigade, as it is shown in the "Vulture"⁷¹.

It can be assumed that the number of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front as of April 16, 1945 is given correctly in the collection "Secret Classified Removed" and this number also includes the 9th Guards Airborne Division not shown in the "Vulture". division. Note that, taking into account the underestimation of nine rifle divisions at Konev and three rifle divisions and one tank brigade at Rokossovsky, the total number of Soviet troops participating in the Berlin operation is underestimated by 135 thousand. In reality, it is probably, was about 2040 thousand people, and taking into account the two armies of the Polish Army - about 2.2 million people.

By the beginning of the Prague Offensive on May 6, the grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front increased to 71 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 4 mechanized and 5 tank corps, three separate tank and three self-propelled artillery brigades. Obviously, there was also one airborne division there, which the authors of Grif let through. There were also a number of artillery divisions and brigades, the number of which we take for our calculations in proportion to the numerical

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sity of rifle formations, assuming that they were attached to rifle and other formations in approximately the same proportion.

Let's try to estimate what would have been the size of the grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the Prague operation, if not for the losses in the Berlin operation, which ended for the troops of the front immediately before the start of the Nrazh operation. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the strength of an airborne division was approximately equal to the strength of a rifle division, and the strength of one cavalry division was about a third of the strength of a rifle division. In the same way, the tank and mechanized corps were each approximately equal in size to a full-fledged rifle division. And two separate tank brigades and three self-propelled artillery brigades, taken together, were approximately equal in size to one rifle division. Then the total strength of the grouping of the 1st Ukrainian Front before the start of the Berlin operation, without the nine divisions of the 28th Army, can be estimated at about 47 calculated rifle divisions, and the strength of the grouping of the same front by the beginning of the Prague operation can be estimated at 83.2 calculated rifle division. Taking into account the number of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, by the beginning of the Berlin operation, the number of front troops involved in the Prague operation can be estimated at 975.2 thousand people, while in fact at the time of the start of the Prague operation it amounted to 806.4 thousand people⁷². The losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Berlin operation, according to the "Secrecy Removed" amounted to 86,245 wounded and

sick and 27,580 dead and missing. If you subtract them from 975.2 thousand people, you get 861.4 thousand people. This is 55,000 more people than actually remained in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front by the beginning of the Prague operation. 55,000 is the approximate amount of underestimated irretrievable losses, without taking into account possible reinforcements received by the troops of the front by the beginning of the Prague operation. Then the total irretrievable losses of the front in the Berlin operation can be estimated at 82.6 thousand people, which is 3 times more than the figure given by the authors of Grif.

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However, to estimate the total amount of irretrievable losses of all Soviet troops in the Berlin operation, we consider it more appropriate to use a coefficient of 3.9, obtained on the example of the Polish armies. First, in the case of the Poles, we are dealing directly with data on deadweight losses. Secondly, there is a high probability that the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which suffered heavy losses in the Berlin operation, received reinforcements before the Prague operation. Moreover, during the Berlin operation, many prisoners of war and "ostarbeiters" of military age were released. It should also be said that the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front already after the beginning of the Berlin operation, on April 20 and 30, received a centralized replenishment with a total number of 16,900 people²³. Most likely, the 1st Ukrainian Front received a similar number of replenishment during the Berlin operation. For example, the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was part of the front, was withdrawn from the battle on April 30, before the start of the Prague operation, received replenishment of people and equipment. 6600 people²⁵. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that on the 1st Belorussian Front, which suffered the heaviest losses, the coefficient of underestimation of losses was even greater than on the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Even before the Berlin operation, in the period from February 1 to May 20, 1945, over 40,000 reinforcements from among "Soviet citizens of military age released from German captivity" were poured into the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, it was the "Ostarbeiters" who prevailed among the liberated, and not the former prisoners of war. So, as reported on April 7, 1945, the head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Major General F.V. Yashechkin, "among the 3,870 people who arrived in February to replenish the units of the formation, where the head of the political department, Major General Voronov (i.e., in the 13th army. - B.S.), former servicemen, 873 people, again - 2997 people called into the army, including 784 women"²⁶ Thus, the proportion of former prisoners of war among

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new replenishment did not exceed 23%. And the fact that 20% of the conscripts were women from "Ostarbeiters" proved that the human resources of the Red Army were close to exhaustion. Women were sent to the rear units to release the "active bayonets" from there for the last battles.

Those of these first-time recognized "Ostarbeiters" who died in the battles for Berlin were most certainly not included in the database of irretrievable losses of the Russian Ministry of Defense, "because they were called up directly to the units. When working with the Memorial OBD, I have never met dead or missing servicemen, about whom it was indicated that they were called up directly to the unit. In post-war calculations, these people were most likely included in the losses of the civilian population, which is illegal, or they were not taken into account at all as irretrievable losses.

EVALUATION OF THE TRUE VALUE OF THE IRRETURNABLE LOSSES OF THE RED ARMY

The official figures of Soviet irretrievable losses turn out to be several times less than the actual value, because the accounting for irretrievable losses in the Red Army was

very badly placed. Commanders of all levels sought to embellish them. And this was reflected in the wartime documents.

The order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense dated April 12, 1942 stated: "Recording of personnel, in particular, accounting of losses, is carried out in the army in a completely unsatisfactory way ... The headquarters of the formations do not send in a timely manner to the center the personal lists of the dead. As a result of untimely and incomplete submission of lists of losses by military units (so in the document. - B.S.), there was a large discrepancy between the data of numerical and personal accounting of losses. At present, no more than one third of the actual number of those killed is on a personal record. Inadequate data

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the personal account of the missing and taken prisoner is even more far from the truth. And in the future, the situation, taking into account the personnel and losses, did not undergo significant changes. In the order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated March 7, 1945 "On the unsatisfactory work of registering the dead and missing privates and sergeants and measures to improve it", two months before the end of the war with Germany, it was stated: "Checking the work of the Office for registering the dead and of the missing privates and sergeants, serious shortcomings were revealed in the work on letters received by the Office from workers - relatives of military personnel ... In 1944, 40% of the letters received were returned back to the senders with a request for additional information ... Together After careful analysis of incoming letters on the search for military personnel, the Directorate established the wrong practice of referring them to the number of missing people only because they lost contact with their families. Control over the passage of letters on the search for military personnel is not organized. During 1944, the Directorate received answers from military units for only 26% of their requests. The order also noted that "that the commanders of military formations and units, as well as the military commissariats, do not respond to the requests of the Directorate for months, give unsatisfactory answers; military councils of fronts, armies and military districts do not pay due attention to this important issue and do not control the setting of the case to search for military personnel in military formations, units and institutions?

Since the official figures for Soviet military losses are far from reality, it was necessary to find alternative ways to calculate the irretrievable losses of the Red Army.

For an alternative estimate, we used higher numbers of irretrievable losses of the Red Army than those given in the collection *Classified Removed*. Thus, the authors of this collection determine the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942 as killed and missing in 2 888 8372. Meanwhile, a much higher value

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on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942, D.A. Volkogonov - 5,888,236 people, according to him - "the result of long calculations according to documents." This figure is 2.04 times higher than the figure given in the book *"Secrecy Removed"*, and, apparently, it does not include non-combat losses, but also those who died from wounds. With a similar monthly accounting of irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht, those who died from wounds are included.

Most likely, the calculation of irretrievable losses for 1942 was made at the beginning of 1943. YES. Volkogonov gives a breakdown of losses by months. For comparison, we have the monthly dynamics of the losses of the Red Army in battles for the period from July 1941 to April 1945 inclusive. The corresponding schedule is reproduced in the book of the former head of the Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army E.I. Smirnov "War and military medicine"? !. Monthly data for 1942 on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces are given in the table.

LOSSES OF THE RED ARMY IN 1942

Losses hit in battles (in % of the average monthly level

130

November in | 5885 E

Sources: Smirnov E.I. War and military medicine. 2nd ed. M.: Medicine, 1979. S. 188; Volkogonov D.A. We won despite the inhuman system // Izvestia, 1993, May 8. S. 5.

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Here it should be noted that the index "thrown in battles" includes the wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbite. And the indicator "wounded", which is most often used in statistics, usually includes only the wounded and shell-shocked. The proportion of the wounded and shell-shocked among those killed in battles for the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War is 96.9932. Therefore, without a large error, it is possible to attribute the indicators for the wounded to all those injured in battles and vice versa.

Comparison of the data in the table allows us to conclude that the data of D.A. Volkogonov significantly underestimate the true size of irretrievable losses. So, in May 1942, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops supposedly amounted to only 422 thousand and even decreased by 13 thousand people compared to April. Meanwhile, it was in May that German troops captured about 150,000 Red Army soldiers on the Kerch Peninsula³³ and about 240,000 in the Kharkov region." In April, Soviet losses of prisoners were insignificant (the largest number of them - about 5 thousand people were taken during the liquidation of the group of General M.G. Efremov in the Vyazma region). It turns out that in May the losses of those killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and accidents did not exceed 32 thousand people, and in April they reached almost 430 thousand, and this despite the fact that the indicator of the number of those killed in battles from April to May fell only 3 points, or less than 4%. It is clear that the whole point is in the colossal underestimation of irretrievable losses during the period of the general retreat of the Soviet troops from May to September inclusive. After all, it was then that the overwhelming majority of the 1,653,000 Soviet prisoners of 1942 were captured by the Germans³. According to D. A. Volkogonov, during this time, irretrievable losses reached 2,129,000 against 2,211,000 in the four previous months, when the loss of prisoners was insignificant. It is no coincidence that in October the irretrievable losses of the Red Army suddenly increased by 346,000 compared to September, with a sharp drop in the number of those killed in battles by as much as 29 points and the absence of any large encirclement of Soviet troops at that time. Probably ok

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October losses were partly included underreported losses of the preceding months.

The most reliable data seems to us on irretrievable losses for November, when the Red Army suffered almost no losses in prisoners, and the front line was stable until the 19th, when the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Therefore, we can assume that the losses in the dead were taken into account in this month more fully than in the previous and subsequent ones, when the rapid movement of the front and headquarters made it difficult to count, and that the irretrievable losses in November fell almost exclusively on the dead, since the Soviet troops almost never - if the loss of prisoners. Then, for 413 thousand killed and dead, there will be an indicator of 83% of those killed in battles, i.e. for 1% of the average monthly number of casualties in battles, there are approximately 5.0 thousand killed and died from wounds. If we take January, February, March or April as the baseline, then the ratio there, after excluding the approximate number of prisoners, will be even larger - from 5.1 to 5.5 thousand dead per 1% of the average monthly number of those killed in battles. The December figures clearly suffer from a large underestimation of irretrievable losses due to the rapid change of the front line.

The ratio established for November 1942 between the number of casualties in battle and the number of those killed seems to us close to the average for the war as a whole. Then the irretrievable losses of the Red Army (without prisoners who died from wounds and non-combat losses) in the war

with Germany can be estimated by multiplying 5 thousand people by 4656 (4600 is the sum (percentage) of casualties in combat for the period from July 1941 to April 1945, 17 is the loss of casualties in combat in June 1941, 39 is the loss of casualties in the battles for May 1945, taken by us for one third of the losses, respectively, in July 1941 and April 1945). As a result, we come to the figure of 23.28 million dead. From this number, one should subtract 939,700 military personnel who were reported missing, but after the liberation of the respective territories, they were again drafted into the army. Most of them were not captured, some escaped from captivity³⁶. So

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Thus, the total number of deaths will be reduced to 22.34 million people. According to the latest estimate of the authors of the book "Secrecy Removed", non-combat losses of the Red Army amounted to 555.5 thousand people, including at least 157 thousand people who were executed by tribunals³⁷. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Soviet armed forces (without those who died in captivity) can be estimated at 22.9 million people.

To obtain the final figure for military losses, it is also necessary to estimate the number of Soviet prisoners of war who died in captivity. According to the final German documents, 5,754,000 prisoners of war were taken on the Eastern Front, including 3,355,000 in 1941, 1,653,000 in 1942, 565,000 in 1943, and 147,000 in 1944. ., in 1945 - 34 thousand. At the same time, the authors of the document presented to the Western allies in May 1945 stipulated that for 1944-1945 the account of prisoners of war was incomplete. At the same time, the number of deaths in captivity was estimated at 3.3 million people. However, according to earlier data from the OKW, between June 22 and December 1, 1941, 3,806,861 prisoners of war were captured on the Eastern Front, and according to a statement made by government official Mansfeld on February 19, 1942 in the Economic Chamber of the Reich, Soviet there were 3.9 million prisoners of war (almost all of them were captured in 1941). The 3.8 million prisoners of 1941 probably included approximately 200 thousand prisoners from the occupied territories, released from the camps back in 1941." Taking into account approximately 450 thousand prisoners who were underestimated in 1941, as well as prisoners taken by the allies of Germany (Finland captured 64,188 prisoners, of which 19,276 - 30% died, Romania - about 160 thousand prisoners, of which 5.2 thousand died) * 1, I estimate the total number of Soviet prisoners of war at 6.3 million people. Of this number, the allies of Germany account for about 220 thousand people. 1 million 836 thousand people returned to their homeland from German (as well as Finnish and Romanian) captivity, and about 250 thousand more, according to the USSR Foreign Ministry, made in 1956, remained in the West after the war. The total number of those who died in captivity, adding here 19.7 thousand Red Army men who died in Finnish captivity, and 5.2 thousand who died

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in Romanian captivity, I estimate about 4 million people. This is 63.5% of the total prisoners.

Such a high mortality of Soviet prisoners of war was caused both by the non-applicability of the terms of the Geneva Convention to them, the deliberate destruction of Jews and political workers by the Nazis, and by objective reasons, primarily an acute shortage of food. The number of Soviet prisoners of war in 1941 was half a million larger than the German land army in the East, which numbered 3.3 million people and itself felt a shortage of food. So the Germans, with all their desire, could not feed such a number of prisoners, which doomed most of them to death in the winter of 1941/42. It was also not possible to quickly take them to the deep rear in Poland due to the lack of wagons and the low capacity of the railways.

Taking into account the dead prisoners, the total losses of the Soviet armed forces can be estimated at 26.9 million people. It should be taken into account that the difference between 4 million and 3.3 million dead prisoners recorded by the Germans is about 700 thousand people. This includes both prisoners, the dead. after being taken prisoner without registration by German authorities, so were prisoners who fled from the camps and later died either in partisan detachments or simply in the villages where they hid from the Germans. IN

The number of 700,000 dead also includes those prisoners of war who served in the Wehrmacht, the SS and auxiliary police units and died in battles with the Red Army or partisans.

To determine the true value of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army, another method can be proposed. Considering that in smaller battles the underestimation of losses could be small, let us assume that the total underestimation of irretrievable losses in the collection "Classified" was at least three times. Its authors, as the head of the Historical and Memorial Center, General A.V. Kirilin, worked with the database of personal data on the reports of the fronts about irretrievable losses. And on the personal account, as the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense admitted in April 1942, there were no more than

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one-third of irretrievable losses. In the "Secret Classification Removed", the total amount of irretrievable losses, including the prisoners who returned home and the missing, is defined as 11,444 thousand people. Of these, it is necessary to exclude 1658 thousand who died from wounds, diseases and accidents and were shot by tribunals and committed suicide (these losses are not included in the number of those killed and missing)." If we multiply the resulting number by 3 and subtract 2,776,000 returned prisoners and missing, and again add 1,658,000 dead, it turns out that about 28,240,000 soldiers of the Red Army died in total. From this we must deduct approximately 250,000 Soviet prisoners of war who ended up in exile. The total number of dead will decrease to 27,990 thousand, which is only 1,090 thousand more than the figure of 26.9 million dead Soviet servicemen, obtained using data on the monthly dynamics of those killed in battle⁴⁵.

There is another option for calculating Soviet military losses - but the ratio of the losses of officers of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. After all, officers were considered more precisely, and in the USSR, accounting for their irretrievable losses after the war took many years and was basically completed only in 1963. From June 1941 to November 1944, the irretrievable losses of officers of the German land army in the East amounted to 65.2 thousand dead and missing. From June 1941 to November 1944, the German ground forces lost 2417 thousand dead and missing in the East, including 65.2 thousand officers, which gives a ratio of soldiers to officers in irretrievable losses of 36.07: 1%. Such a high value of this indicator indicates a high accuracy of accounting, since officers were counted more accurately than privates, especially since it is close to the ratio of soldiers and officers in the personnel of the active land army. There were 81,314 officers out of 2,741,064, which gives a ratio of 32.71:1 (the decrease in the indicator is obviously due to a larger proportion of officers in the higher headquarters) "".

Red Army for the same period (without the Navy and Air Force, with the exception of the political, administrative and legal composition of the ground forces, represented in Germany

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not by officers, but by officials) lost about 784 thousand officers only who died and did not return from captivity. This gives a ratio of about 12:148. In the German army in the East, the proportion of irretrievable losses of officers until the end of 1944 amounted to about 2.7%. It is rather difficult to determine the share of officers in the combat irretrievable losses of the Red Army. It fluctuates significantly in different battles and depends on which formation, rifle or tank, participated in the battles. Thus, for the period of December 17-19, 1941, in the 323rd Rifle Division, the loss of commanding personnel among the dead and missing amounted to 3.36%^{7°}. For the 5th Guards Army in the period from July 9 to July 17, 1943, the ratio of losses of privates and officers was 15.88:1, with the exception of political and other "bureaucratic" compositions - 18.38:15¹. For the 5th Guards Tank Army, the corresponding ratios for the period from 12 to 18 July 1943 will be 9.64:1 and 11.22:152. For the 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army in the period from July 1 to July 16, 1943, these ratios reach 17.17:1 and 19.88:153. It should be borne in mind that the main losses in manpower during the war were incurred by combined-arms armies, and not by tank armies (in the latter, the proportion of officers was much higher). Therefore, the general

the ratio of irretrievable losses of officers and ordinary Red Army soldiers as a whole will be much closer to what was established for combined arms, and not for tank formations. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the used Soviet reports contain a significant underestimation of irretrievable losses, and to a greater extent due to privates, not officers. This underestimation was very significant. Thus, according to reports, the 183rd Rifle Division of the 48th Rifle Corps lost 398 killed and 908 wounded during the indicated period (the missing were not counted), and for those killed, the ratio of soldiers and officers was 25.5: 1. However, the number of personnel of the division, even without taking into account possible replenishment, decreased from the beginning of the fighting and until July 15 from 7981 people to 2652, those. real losses were not 1300, but 5329 soldiers and officers. Obviously, the difference of 4029 people was formed mainly due to unaccounted for missing persons, among whom

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of which, for sure, the soldiers sharply prevailed over the officers. For comparison, we can take other divisions of the 48th corps, for which there is data on missing propagators. In the 93rd Guards Rifle Division, the ratio of soldiers and officers among those killed was 18.08:1, and among the missing - 12.74:1, in the 81st Guards, respectively, 12.96:1 and 16 , 81: 1, in the 89th Guards - 7.15: 1 and 32.37: 1, in the 375th Rifle - 67.33: 1 and 31: 1. In the latter case, such large numbers apparently resulted from the small amount of irretrievable losses - 3 officers and 233 enlisted men, which increases the risk of statistical error. I will also note that in the 375th division there was a huge underestimation of losses. During the fighting, its numbers decreased from 8647 to 3526 people, which gives real losses of not 236, but 5121 people. In cases where the proportion of officers among the missing is greater than among those killed, this should indicate that there was a huge underestimation of the missing soldiers, since the fate of officers is usually determined more precisely. Therefore, in the case of divisions where the proportion of officers among the missing was greater than among those killed, we will take the same ratio for the missing as was established for the dead, and exclude the 375th division from the calculation. In this case, calculations for the 48th Corps without one division will give the ratio of soldiers and officers in irretrievable losses, equal to 21.02:1. With the exception of the political staff, legal and administrative, the ratio will be equal to 24.16:1. It is interesting that this is practically equal to the ratio that is obtained for the German formation - III of the motorized (tank) corps of General Eberhard Mackensen, but over a longer period of time. This corps operated on the Eastern Front from June 22, 1941 to November 13, 1942, and during this time lost 14,404 people, including 564 officers, who were killed or missing, which gives a ratio of 24.54 soldiers and non-commissioned officers per officer. I note that in the German motorized corps, the share of tank units and subunits was significantly lower than in the Soviet tank army, therefore, in terms of the ratio of the losses of soldiers and officers, it was close to

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the same to army corps than Soviet tank armies to combined arms armies. By the way, the number of dead soldiers per dead officer in the German corps is lower than in the Eastern Army as a whole. The difference probably arose due to the fact that in the corps there was a higher proportion of tank units, where the proportion of officers was higher than in the infantry. In addition, the corps reports did not take into account the wounded and sick who died in hospitals, among whom the proportion of officers was lower than among those killed and missing.

If we accept the final ratio between soldiers and officers in irretrievable losses, which I established for the 48th Rifle Corps during the Battle of Kursk, close to the average ratio between soldiers and officers in irretrievable losses of the Red Army ground forces for the entire war, and extend it to loss of officers until the end of November 1944, i.e. per 784 thousand officers who died and did not return from captivity, then the total losses of the ground forces of the Red Army who died in the period from June 1941 to November 1944 can be estimated at 18 94] thousand people. If we add here the losses of the ground forces over the last six months of the war - at least 2 million people and the losses of the fleet and aviation for the entire war - at least 200 thousand people, then we get about 21 million dead, which is within the accuracy of our estimates. conducted by another

method. Taking into account the fact that in our assessment we were dealing with deliberately underestimated reports of losses, and underestimated mainly due to soldiers, then the true value of losses, in all likelihood, should be greater than what turned out to be carried out according to the method of comparing officer losses.

Here is another example related to the loss of officers. If the number of irretrievable losses "The classification has been removed" is correct, then in the irretrievable losses of the Soviet ground forces, which amounted to about 8459 thousand people, including 973.3 thousand officers (taking into account the fact that the losses of the fleet amounted to about 155 thousand dead and missing, and the loss of the Air Force - about 54 thousand)⁶, per one dead officer (including here political workers

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and persons of administrative and technical staff) should account for 8.7 dead privates. However, in reality this figure was much higher. Thus, the 193rd Guards Regiment of the 66th Guards Division from July 10 to October 9, 1943, without taking into account possible replenishment, lost 56 officers and 1554 sergeants and privates⁵⁷ killed and wounded, which gives a ratio between soldiers and officers of 27, 8:1. Meanwhile, on July 10, by the time the regiment entered the battle, there were 2022 sergeants and soldiers for 197 officers, which gives a ratio of 10.3: 1. Taking into account the fact that by the beginning of the fighting there were more officers in the regiment than required by the state, the share of officers in the possible replenishment was probably lower than their share in losses, so the actual ratio of soldiers and officers in losses could be higher than 28:1.

Calculation of the real value of the irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War on the basis of the Generalized Computer Data Bank, containing information about the defenders of the Fatherland, who died and went missing during the Great Patriotic War, as well as in the post-war period (OBD Memorial), created by the Ministry of Defense of Russia in accordance with the presidential decree of January 22, 2006 "Issues of perpetuating the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland", is not possible, since it is not yet possible to establish, on the one hand, the number of twins contained in the database, and most importantly, it is almost impossible to determine the percentage of deaths that are not included in the database. Note that, according to the estimates of the former assistant to the head of TsAMO S.A. Ilyenkov, based on the exclusion of understudies from the card index, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amount to at least 13,850 thousand people.

It should be noted that it is not possible to estimate the total amount of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the number of those buried, since the vast majority of burials took place in mass graves, and in some cases it is impossible to say with certainty whether we are dealing with burials of prisoners of war or "Ostarbeiters". At the same time, many burials are not marked at all.

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were used as burial places, many soldiers remained unburied at all, and the exact number of persons buried in a mass grave was often not known. Thus, in the order to the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on shortcomings in the burial of servicemen dated February 5, 1945, it was specifically noted: "The corpses of servicemen are buried out of time, special graves are not torn off, but are used for graves: trenches, trenches, funnels. The graves are not filled up and covered with sod. There are no grave columns indicating the names of the dead, there are no diagrams of the geographical location of mass and individual graves.

During the war with Germany and Japan, 1,104,110 military personnel died from combat defeats, and 267,394 died from diseases. - validami@!. It can be assumed that at least part, if not the majority, of the 1222.2 thousand military personnel demobilized due to injury or illness, but not recognized as disabled, was re-conscripted. We are conditional

We accept that approximately 0.6 million of the 1.2 million people demobilized but not disabled were re-conscripted into the armed forces.

The total loss of the Soviet Armed Forces in the course of the war with Germany in killed and dead from wounds, diseases, accidents and other causes, as well as prisoners and invalids, is, according to our estimates, about 31.1 million people. This contradicts official data on the total number of citizens of the USSR called up for military service - 34,476.7 thousand people (including the peacetime army), of which 3,614.6 thousand people were transferred to work in the national economy and in military formations of other departments. The net call is then equal to 30.9 million people. Let us note that the military formations of other departments are, first of all, the troops of the NKVD, which actively participated in the war. It is unclear whether the figure of 34,476.7 thousand was obtained by any calculations or taken from any document, so it is not possible to verify its authenticity. In the collection "Secrecy Removed", where she

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was first made public, there is no indication of how it was obtained. Neither calculation methods nor data sources are indicated.

K | July 1945, 11,390.6 thousand people remained in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and, in addition, 1,046 thousand people were treated in hospitals⁶⁷. It should also be taken into account that, according to the certificate of the Office of the Commissioner for Repatriated Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated July 10, 1945, out of 918 thousand prisoners of war repatriated by that time, 425 thousand were returned to the Red Army, and out of 1046 thousand who were in hospitals, up to 100 thousand probably accounted for the disabled, and some of them returned from captivity. But in any case, if our estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army is close to reality, the total number of those mobilized should have exceeded the official figure by 12 million people, which corresponds to a net conscription, minus those sent to the national economy, of 42.9 million Human. If we take into account the former prisoners returned to service, as well as the number of potential invalids among the wounded who were in hospitals to | July 1945, the difference with the official net draft will decrease to 11.5 million people. It should be taken into account that about 1 million women were called up or enlisted as volunteers in the USSR. It is possible that up to 1 million people were mobilized or voluntarily entered the Red Army, belonging to ages that were not drafted into the Wehrmacht (meaning people born before 1890).

The difference between official and actual conscription could be formed due to conscripts sent to the NKVD troops and other paramilitary formations, underestimation of persons called up in a centralized manner, and also mainly due to conscription directly in the unit, for which there are no consolidated data and where, in particular, it includes a voluntary-compulsory conscription as "volunteers" of residents of Transcarpathian Ukraine, annexed in 1945. Major General P.G. Grigorenko, who served on the 4th Ukrainian Front, recalled how the mobilization and call-up of "volunteers" took place directly in the unit in Western Ukraine and neighboring

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Transcarpathia was with her in the autumn of 1944: "From the 4th Ukrainian Front they demanded the search for human resources on the spot - the mobilization of the warring ages in Western Ukraine, the recruitment of volunteers in Transcarpathia and the return of the wounded and sick to recover. The lack of people was so palpable that the mobilization was turned, in fact, into catching people, just as slave traders used to catch blacks in Africa. Volunteering was organized in the Soviet way, approximately in the same way as a 109 percent "voluntary" turnout of Soviet citizens to the ballot boxes is organized. By the nature of my service, I didn't have to engage in either "mobilization" or recruitment of "volunteers", but troops were allocated from the division to the disposal of mobilizers and recruiters of "volunteers", and, returning back, officers and soldiers told about the nature of their actions. Here is one of those stories. "We cordoned off the village at dawn. It was ordered that anyone who tried to escape from the village should be shot after the first warning.

After that, a special team entered the village and, going around the houses, drove all the men, regardless of age and health, to the square. Then they were escorted to special camps. A medical examination was carried out there and politically unreliable persons were seized. At the same time there was an intensive drill drill. After checking and primary military training in special camps, the "mobilized" were sent in parts: always under escort, which was sent from those units where the corresponding groups of "mobilized" were sent. The replenishment collected in this way was further processed in parts. At the same time, strict liability was established, up to the court-martial, of the officers from whose units the escape was made. Therefore, the supervision of the "mobilized" Western Ukrainians was extremely strict. In addition, they were kept from escaping by the fact that the families of "deserters" were also subjected to repression. The situation in the front line, where any "dangling" lingered, also interfered with escapes. The cruelty of punishments also kept them from escaping - deserters from among the "mobilizo

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bathrooms" and "volunteers" were shot or sent to penal companies.

"Volunteers" were recruited somewhat differently. They were "invited" to a "meeting." They were invited so that no one could refuse. At the same time, arrests were made in the settlement. At the meeting, speeches were organized by those who wish to join the ranks of the Soviet army. The one who spoke out against was forced to explain why he refused, and for the first unsuccessfully spoken or deliberately perverted word, he was declared an enemy of the Soviet regime. In general, the highly experienced KGBists ended any such "meeting" with the fact that no one went home free. All turned out to be either "volunteers" or arrested enemies of the Soviet regime. Further, the "volunteers" were treated in the same way as the "mobilized". Our division received reinforcements from both of these sources. And I think everyone understands that this replenishment was not reliable enough. In order to turn the "mobilized" Western Ukrainians and "volunteers" from Transcarpathia into reliable warriors, it was necessary not only to train them and subject them to general discipline, but also to rally them into a combat team, giving them the backbone of experienced soldiers devoted to the Soviet Union. These were the actual composition of the division and the replenishment arriving from the hospitals" 4.

Former Soviet prisoners of war Iosif Dugas and Yakov Cheron, one of whom was captured in 1942 near Kharkov, note: "As a rule, having freed a certain territory from the Germans, the Soviet command gathered all the population liable for military service and, often without weapons and military -noy form, drove him into battle. So, for example, it was in the Kharkov offensive in May 1942. The soldiers called those hastily mobilized "ravens" (according to their dark civilian clothes). In the offensive, the "crow" could be armed with a shovel, a bayonet, in rare cases a rifle, from which she did not know how to shoot. The question is: who should consider these "ravens" who were taken prisoner - soldiers, civilian lines or partisans? The Germans acted like this: if the "crow" had a head cut bald under the typewriter, or if she had a rifle, the "crow" was considered a prisoner. Sometimes
Germans

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"Raven" was simply kicked out, without even considering the hairstyle. It was a crime on the part of the Soviet command to send these people." There is no doubt that they must still be considered Red Army soldiers. After all, the Germans equally spent ammunition to repulse the attacks of both the unfortunate "ravens" and the Red Army soldiers in uniform. Over time, the surviving "ravens" received both rifles and uniforms, but they had little chance of finishing the war before the end of the war. And, as a rule, those who died in the very first battles from among those called up directly to the unit did not fall into the general base of the mobilized, as well as into the general base of irretrievable losses.

Separate examples show that the conscription directly in the unit amounted to a significant amount. Thus, a member of the Military Council of the Southern Front and former Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Personnel E.A. Shchadenko wrote on October 6, 1943 to a member of the GKO GM. Malenkov that the troops of the front

in September 1943 alone, 115,000 people were called up directly to the units, of which 18,675 people (18%) are conscripts who had not previously served in the Red Army, and the rest were former Red Army soldiers who remained in the occupied territory. It can be safely assumed that a significant part, if not the majority, of those who identified themselves as former military personnel did not actually serve in the Red Army, but preferred to call themselves former Red Army soldiers in order to avoid charges of draft evasion and desertion in 1941. As we have already seen, in the last months of the war, when hostilities were conducted in the countries of Europe, it was mainly former "Ostarbeiters" of draft age who were called up directly to the unit.

The total number of mobilized 42.9 million people will be about 20.8% of the pre-war population. It should be noted that the volume of the German conscription during the Second World War turned out to be quite comparable with the Soviet one. In total, 17.9 million people were called up to the Wehrmacht (including the peacetime army), of which about 2 million people were recalled to work in the national economy. Thus, the net conscription of 15.9 million people amounted to 19.7% of the population.

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Germany's population of 80.6 million people in 1939 (including the population of Austria and the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia)".

At the beginning of the Second World War, in 1939, there were approximately 140,000 women in the German Army, of which 50,000 women were actually civil servants, and 90,000 were considered civilian auxiliary personnel (He{Neppen) which, however, was subject to some army disciplinary regulations and certain uniforms. In 1944, about 300,000 women, both employees and support personnel, served in the reserve army and other rear establishments of the land army on the territory of the Reich, and about 20.5 thousand female support personnel served in active army and in the occupied territories. There were about 130,000 women in the Luftwaffe, and 20,000 in the Navy (the latter only served on the shore). In total, about 470 thousand people served in the German armed forces. In November 1944, the number of women in the Luftwaffe, due to mobilization, increased to 300-350 thousand people, and the total number of female personnel - up to 640-690 thousand people, but most of the newly called up could not be used due to lack of the influence of a sufficient number of women leaders, as well as sufficient time and funds for training. Women were not used in combat units and were not armed. At the end of February 1945, Hitler changed his principled position on not involving women in combat operations and allowed the formation of one women's battalion, whose significance, however, was to be more propaganda than military. However, already in March, the OKW issued an order canceling all other orders for the arming of women, so the battalion was never created. Only anti-aircraft gun crews and women who were assigned to the guards could have weapons. In the last months of the war, weapons were no longer enough to arm the male conscripts.

In Germany, unlike the USSR, women were never sent to combat units, but served only in the rear - as staff clerks and clerks, radio operators, typists and telegraph operators, nurses,

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as well as observers at VNOS posts and in the meteorological service. Therefore, the losses among them in killed and dead were minimal and were the result of diseases and air bombardments, and in the occupied territories - also the result of partisan attacks. The irretrievable losses of women hardly exceeded several thousand people. On the other hand, thousands of German female soldiers ended up in captivity, but usually as internees, since almost all of them were demobilized in April 1945.

The mobilization capacity of the USSR and Germany turned out to be practically equal in relation to the total population. The Soviet Union could mobilize a somewhat sick share of the population thanks to the help of the Western allies in the form of lend-lease, which made it possible to release additional labor from industry for the needs of the front, and also due to the almost complete cessation of all civilian production already in [1941, then as in Germany, even in 1943, a significant part of the industry produced products to meet the needs of the civilian population. In addition, in the USSR, on a much larger scale, women, the elderly and adolescents were recruited to work in the national economy. In Germany, the mobilization capacity increased due to the use of the labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war (5655 thousand people in September 1944). However, in the USSR, older people were drafted into the army to a greater extent.

In the Red Army, the number of dead and the number of wounded were close to each other. The remarkable Belarusian front-line writer Vasil Bykov, the author of really honest books about the war, in his memoirs explains very well why in the Red Army there were significantly fewer wounded per one killed than in the Wehrmacht, and in other armies of the Second World War: "Our losses in the offensive were monstrous, the greatest number of them, of course, accounted for the wounded. Lightly wounded from the battlefield were chosen by themselves; the seriously wounded were often in the zone of fire for a long time, receiving new wounds, and even dying.

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Only fighters specially appointed for this purpose — orderlies and medical instructors — had the right to take the wounded out of the battlefield. No one else was allowed to escort the wounded to the rear; attempts of this kind were regarded as evading the battle. Of course, the instructor girls did their best, but the medical instructors were supposed to be one per company, while dozens were always recruited on the battlefield. How was it to be in time with all the desire? And they didn't make it; The wounded had to wait a long time for help and, bleeding to death, died on the field or on the way to the medical battalion.

Until now, it is not known exactly who owns the "brilliant" idea of using women in the war. It seems that this is a purely Soviet innovation; nothing like this was observed in the German army until the end of the war. With the obvious shortage of human (male) material in the war, what was the need to send under fire young girls, little adapted to the uniqueness of the combat life of the girls? What was the use of them? Except perhaps in brightening up the leisure and life of senior commanders and political workers who have temporarily lost their wives and girlfriends in the rear."

Due to the fact that in our country the wounded were pulled out of the battlefield not by human medics, like the Germans, but by fragile girls, yesterday's schoolgirls, as well as due to the fact that the wounded in battle (i.e. those who did not die immediately as soon as he was hit by a bullet or shrapnel) in the Red Army there were several times more than in the Wehrmacht, the chances for a Soviet wounded man to be taken out of the battlefield and taken to the hospital were an order of magnitude smaller than their German comrades in misfortune. Therefore, among the Soviet wounded, there was a much larger proportion of those who died on the battlefield even before they had time to help him. Due to the action of these two factors, there were much more wounded per one killed in the Wehrmacht than in the Red Army. As a result, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army increased sharply, which exceeded the losses of the Wehrmacht by an order of magnitude.

Here is just one example. For July 1943, during the Battle of Kursk, the losses of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, according to the calculations of L.N. Lopukhovsky on the Don

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reports of losses amounted to 189 thousand people, including 70.1 thousand killed, captured and missing. During the same period, Army Group South, which opposed them, lost 46.2 thousand soldiers and officers, including 9.3 thousand people - killed and missing. Of this number, at least 4 thousand people were lost in battles against the Soviet Southwestern Front. Then the share of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts accounts for approximately 42 thousand

retired German servicemen, including about 8.5 thousand - irretrievably". Thus, the ratio of total losses is 4.5:1 in favor of the Germans. And for combat irretrievable - already 8.25:1. This proves that the share of sanitary losses among the Germans in the total losses was much greater than in the Red Army.

It is rather difficult to establish the exact number of wounded in the Soviet Armed Forces, since different sources contain different figures, and it is not always clear to which category of the wounded this or that figure belongs. It is possible that the figure of 19.7 million wounded is closest to the truth. It is obtained if we take the data that as a result of injuries 16% of the wounded were dismissed from the army. These data are contained in a 1946 report on the work of the rear during the war years. If we take the data on the number of Red Army soldiers dismissed due to injury from the "Gif of secrecy removed" in 3050.7 thousand, then the total number of wounded will be 19,066.9 thousand. True, if we take the data of "Grif" on the number of deaths from wounds 1104 1000 people and suppose that those who died from wounds account for 6.5% of the total number of wounded, as shown in the 1946 report, then the total number of wounded will be only 16,986.2 thousand. But we assume that the figure of dismissed disabled people is more reliable, since if they underestimated, then in the first place - the number of those who died from wounds. In this case, we are actually talking about the number of wounds, and not the wounded, since many fighters were wounded more than once. The number of patients shown in the "Secrecy Removed" at 7641.3 thousand people, of which 86.7% returned to duty, seems to me close to the truth (according to the report of 1946, more than 85% of patients returned to duty) . In this case, the total number of wounded and sick can be

estimate

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in 26,708.2 thousand people. At the same time, the number of wounded turns out to be even less than the number of those killed on the battlefield, which, according to our estimates, amounted to 22.34 million people. The ratio is not 3:1, as is traditionally believed, but 0.85:1. This paradox is easily explained. The fact is that due to the huge losses in the Red Army, it often turned out that during the attack the vast majority of its participants were killed or wounded. Under these conditions, the wounded had little chance of being carried from the battlefield, and most of them died without waiting for help. As noted in the report of 1946, "the losses of porters in some units reached 80-85% killed and wounded from enemy fire"². It is clear that with such losses among the orderlies, the losses among the attackers could generally approach 100%, so that most of the wounded could not be taken out of the battlefield. In addition, unlike the Wehrmacht, in the Red Army, a significant part of the porters were women, who found it very difficult to pull out a wounded soldier. The women were sent to nurses in order to release the men as active bayonets to take part in the attacks.

There are other data about Soviet losses in the wounded and sick. In the archives of the Military Medical Museum in St. Petersburg, more than 32 million records of servicemen who entered military medical institutions during the Great Patriotic War have been preserved. We are talking here about those who were evacuated to field and rear medical facilities, since there are no personal registration cards for those who died or recovered in medical battalions and regimental medical posts"³. If we assume that the undercount equally applied to both the wounded and the sick, then the total number of the wounded can be estimated at 22.8 million, and the sick - at 9.2 million. Then the number of wounded and killed will be almost equal to each other - 1, 02:1.

It is known that in the medical battalions and regimental medical posts 10.5% of all wounded, 10.9% of frostbitten and 49.3% of patients were returned to service, and in total - about 23.8% of all those injured in battles and sick (including 20.5% in medical battalions)"⁴. The proportion of those killed in battles, who died on the PMP willows

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medical battalions can be estimated at no more than 5%, since it was 2-2.5 times less than the proportion of those returned to service. The number of patients who died in the PMP and in the medical battalions was negligible. Thus, approximately 27% of all those killed in battle and sick of the Red Army during the war years

were not evacuated. If the 32 million casualties and patients on whom registration cards have been preserved is about 73% of their total number, then all sanitary losses can be estimated at 43.9 million people.

An alternative calculation of sanitary losses can be made in terms of the average workload of the final network of evacuation hospitals during the war - 85-87 killed in battles for every 10 beds out of the maximum number deployed. The indicator of the maximum deployment of the end network is 1,719,450 beds⁶. It is also known that during the war years 51.5% of the total number of wounded passed through evacuation hospitals. Since the wounded and shell-shocked soldiers of the Red Army accounted for 96.9% of all those who were wounded in battles,⁷⁷ the indicators for the wounded can be attributed to all those who were wounded in battles and vice versa without much error. Therefore, the total number of those killed in battles can be estimated at 28.7 million people (including 27.8 million wounded and shell-shocked). The number of patients can be estimated at 15.2 million people, taking into account that the patients were about 34% of all those who passed through medical institutions." In total, this gives 43.9 million sanitary losses - a figure that does not differ from the one we received above from the data on the number of personal registration cards of military personnel admitted to military medical institutions. The number of evacuated patients can be estimated at 50.7% of the total number (including those who died in medical battalions), or 7.7 million people, and the number of evacuees injured in battles, at 25.8 million people, or 89.9% of the total (this includes those who died in medical battalions).

It is obvious that the figures of casualties given in the book "Secrecy Removed" take into account only those who were evacuated, but the number of these latter is most likely underestimated here. If

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if we take the ratio of the losses of the wounded and the dead, including the lightly wounded, then it will turn out to be 1.2: 1.

The exact size of the losses of the Red Army wounded (or defeated in battle) is not possible at the moment to establish, but various methods of estimation give the total number of wounded, even with the inclusion of the lightly wounded remaining in the ranks, only slightly exceeding the number of those killed.

MILITARY LOSSES AND POPULATION CENSUS OF THE USSR

Let's see what the size of the underestimation of the population according to the 1939 census should be in order for our estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army at 26.9 million people to be correct.

A careful study of the Soviet censuses leads to the conclusion that their accuracy gradually increased in the period from 1926 to 1979. As an indicator of the degree of underestimation of the population, we use the size of the male and female preponderance in different age groups.

According to the 1926 census, in the cohort of 10-19 years, the female preponderance amounted to 516,155 people, which was equal to 3.08% of the number of men in this cohort. Note that if purely biological factors were at work, up to the age of 29 years, the male predominance would be preserved, which only starting from the age group of 30 years would be replaced by the female predominance. Cohort 10-19 years old, i.e. persons born in 1907-1916, could not be affected by either the First World War or the Civil War and the repressions associated with them, i.e. factors that contribute to the emergence of female preponderance. Therefore, it can be assumed that the female preponderance at the age of 10-19 arises mainly due to the underestimation of the population in the course of the census. After all, men are more socially and territorially mobile than women, and therefore they are less accounted for by statistics than women.

In the cohort of 20-29 years old, the 1926 census shows a female preponderance of 1,425,832 people, which is 11.68% of

number of men in this cohort. However, the female preponderance at the age of 25-29 was clearly affected by the consequences of the First World War and the Civil War. Therefore, we determined the female predominance in the group of 20-24 years old, which was practically not affected by the influence of the First World War and the Civil War, at least in terms of the factors contributing to the creation of the female preponderance. Men of these ages almost did not participate in hostilities and did not become victims of terror. For this group, the female preponderance amounted to 389,000 people, or 5.80% of the male population.

According to the 1939 census, in the cohort of 10-19 years, the female preponderance amounted to 234,030 people, or 1.27% of the number of men. The relative value of this excess turns out to be 2.4 times less than according to the results of the 1926 census. This speaks in favor of the fact that the population count in 1939 could be significantly more accurate than in 1926.

In 1939, the female preponderance for the 20-24 year old cohort was 455,298, or 6.60% of the male population. Thus, its relative size was even slightly higher than in 1926. The difference could have formed due to the victims of the repressions of 1937-1938, for whom the male preponderance in this group could be up to 50 thousand people.

The presence of such a large female preponderance in the 20-24-year-old cohort indicates that the 1939 census was also characterized by a significant underestimation of the population.

According to the 1939 census, for the cohort aged 20-29, the female preponderance amounted to 836,396 people, or 5.56% of the number of men. Most of it probably fell on the underestimation of the male population. In the cohort of 30-39 years, the female preponderance reached 817,754 people, or 6.62% of the number of men. This cohort includes those born between 1900 and 1909, so there could be no impact on the female preponderance of World War I, and the impact of the Civil War was minimal.

In the cohort of 40-49 years, the female preponderance reaches 1216,863 people, reaching 17.24% of the number of men. Here the influence of the First World War and Citizens is already perceptible

sky wars. Comparison of the same ages, according to the 1939 and 1959 censuses, does not give much, since in the first case, the female preponderance is largely a consequence of the First World War and the Civil War, and in the second, the Second World War. Therefore, we use the data of the 1979 census, where the cohort of 40-49 years old was no longer affected by the consequences of World War II. Here, the female preponderance amounted to 1,411,545 people, or 8.25% of the number of men. This indicator can be considered the closest to the indicator of natural female preponderance in this cohort in the absence of demographic catastrophes. For the 10-19 year old cohort in 1979 there is a male preponderance of 968,277, which is 4.33% of the male population, and for the 20-29 year old cohort, this preponderance is 272,387, or 1.21% of the male population. It is probable that the same male preponderance would have existed in these cohorts in 1939 if there had not been an increased underestimation of men compared to women. In order to assess what was the increased undercount of men compared to women in the 1939 census in the 40-49 year old cohort, let's try to determine what was the total female (or male) preponderance in the 10-39 year old cohorts during the 1979 census of the year. It turns out to be male and is 717,563, which is equal to 1.17% of the male population in these cohorts. Let us compare this figure with the figure for the female preponderance for the cohorts of 10-39 years of the 1939 census, when it amounted to 1,888 [80 people, or 4.12% of the male population. Thus, the increased underestimation of men in 1939 could have amounted to about 5.29% of the male population for ages 10-39. It can be assumed that for the 40-49 cohort in 1939 this figure was also approximately equal to 5.29% of the male population, or 373,381 people.

But the underestimation of the male population in cohorts aged 10-49 in most regions of the USSR was further intensified by the 1939 census due to the fact that in a number of Muslim regions, as well as in

some other regions where the positions of traditional religions and traditional

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way of life, at these ages there was a significant male preponderance, due to the underestimation of the female population. The female predominance in these regions usually starts at the age of 50 years. In this case, it is difficult to assume that in Central Asia and the Caucasus the population was counted much more accurately than in other regions of the USSR, so that they showed a real male preponderance at the age of 10–29 years. In fact, the male predominance in this case was formed due to a significant underestimation of the female population. The fact is that Muslims are reluctant to show their women to strangers, including census takers, and their underestimation is typical for most Muslim countries. For the Azerbaijan SSR, the male preponderance at the age of 10 to 49 years was 107,519 people; for the Armenian SSR (at the age of 10–39 years) — 11,493 people; for the Turkmen SSR — 42,782 people; for the Uzbek SSR — 206,736 people. , for the Tajik SSR - 60,014 people, for the Kazakh SSR - 267,001 people, for the Kirghiz SSR - 30,648 people. In addition, for the Kizlyar District of the Ordzhonikidzevsky (now Stavropol) Territory of the RSFSR, the male preponderance was 3723 people, for the Aginsky National District of the Chita Region (aged 10–39 years) - 945 people, for the Buryats of the Mongolian ASSR (aged 20–49 years).) - 11,787 people, for the Dagestan ASSR (aged 10-39 years) - 8945 people, for the Kalmyk ASSR - 3842 people, for the Republic of Germans along the Volga (aged 10-39 years) - 5945 people, for the Chechen- Ingush ASSR (aged 10-39 years) - 7625 people. Finally, for the indigenous population of the Yakut ASSR (Yakuts and other peoples of the North), the male preponderance was, according to our estimates, 9159 people. In total, at the age of 10–49 years, for the Yakut ASSR, the male preponderance amounted to 30,526 people (the female preponderance in 1939 began only at the age of 97), but for the non-indigenous population, this preponderance is not the result of an underestimation of women, but of a real sharp predominance of men among gold miners. Interestingly, due to the huge losses of the male population during the Great Patriotic War, after

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During the war, prison camps had to be set up in Yakutia in order to provide labor for the extraction of gold and other minerals. Although the first prisoners appeared in Yakutia as early as 1940-1941 in connection with the start of road construction and the extraction of tin ores.

If we take the 1959 census data, we will see that for Azerbaijan and the republics of Central Asia, the male preponderance at the age of 10-29 has decreased or been replaced by a female preponderance. Thus, in Azerbaijan, at the age of 20-29, a male preponderance appeared in the amount of 4.95% of the number of women, while in 1939 the male preponderance in this cohort was 12.25% of the number of women. And in the cohort of 10-19 years old, the size of the male preponderance in 1939-1959 decreased from 14.80 to 4.26%. For the Turkmen SSR, the male preponderance at the age of 10-19 in 1939 was 14.31%, and in 1959 - 12.45% of the female population. For the cohort aged 20-29, the male predominance in 1939 at 11.29% of the number of women in 1959 was replaced by a female preponderance of 3.38%. For the Uzbek SSR in 1939, the male preponderance in the cohort of 10-19 years old was 10.32% of the number of women, and in the cohort of 20-29 years old - 6.11%. In 1959, in the cohort of 10-19 years old, the male preponderance decreased slightly - to 10.19%. On the other hand, in the cohort of 20-29 years old, a female preponderance of 7.54% appeared. In the Tajik SSR in 1939, for the cohort of 10-19 years old, the male preponderance reached 18.75%, and for the cohort of 20-29 years old - 9.24%. In 1959, for a cohort of 10-19 years old, the male preponderance was 18.47%, and in the cohort of 20-29 years old, a female preponderance of 11.96% of the female population appeared. In the Kirghiz SSR in 1939, the male preponderance at the age of 10-19 years was 7.36%, and in the cohort of 20-29 years old - 0.69%. In 1959, for the cohort of 10-19 years old, this figure remained almost unchanged - 7.64%, but in the cohort of 20-29 years old, a female preponderance of 6.50% appeared. In the Kazakh SSR in 1939, in the cohort of 10-19 years old, the male preponderance was 3.13%, and in the cohort of 20-29 years old - 26.92%. In 1959, here, in the 10-19 year old cohort, the male preponderance increased to 6.22%, but in the 20-29 year old cohort it fell to 5.08%. These facts indicate that during the

The census of 1959 significantly improved the accuracy of the count compared to the 1939 census.

In total, for the 1939 census, in the cohorts of 10-49 years, the male preponderance for Muslim and other "traditional" regions was 778,164 people. In this case, it is important for us that the female preponderance in the remaining regions of the Soviet Union in the cohorts of 10-49 years old, formed due to the underestimation of men, should be increased by approximately this number.

According to the data of the 1959 census, in the cohort of 10-19 years, the male preponderance was 323,499 people, or 2.01% of the number of men. In the cohort of 20-29 years old, there was a female preponderance of 577,261 people, which amounted to 3.04% of the number of men. These cohorts were practically not affected by the influence of the Second World War, therefore, a decrease in the relative value of the female predominance by 1.83 times in the cohort of 20-29 years old and a change in the female preponderance to a more natural male predominance in the cohort of 10-19 years old, which meant a decrease in the relative value female preponderance by 2.58 times, indicate a significant increase in the accuracy of registration compared with the 1939 census. And there is nothing surprising in this. The 1939 census was conducted in conditions when the peak of repression had just passed. The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 26, 1938 "On the All-Union Population Census of 1939" (p. 15) stated that citizens who evade giving information or who knowingly give false information should be prosecuted. But this could just be an additional reason to avoid meeting with the counter. On the contrary, the 1959 census was carried out at the height of the Khrushchev thaw, when the fear engendered by the Stalin era had significantly weakened. People now had much less reason to fear contact with the state. Moreover, the gradual expansion of the pension system and other social benefits, the start of large-scale housing construction encouraged people to register more actively with government agencies. In addition, the educational level of the population has increased, and accordingly

spontaneously - and the level of preparation of counters. If we take the men of the main contingents who participated in the war, then in 1939 they were from 10 to 49 years old, in 1959 - from 30 to 69 years old, respectively. As a result of the war, their numbers dropped sharply. In addition, a significant part of war veterans in 1959 moved to older contingents, in which people have much less territorial mobility and are much more willing to register. Therefore, it can be accepted without great error that the entire undercount of male conscripts, determined due to the presence of a female preponderance, refers entirely to the difference in the accuracy of counting these contingents in the 1939 and 1959 censuses.

Thus, in the cohort of 10-19 years, the difference in the increased undercount of men between the 1939 and 1959 censuses can be estimated at 3.28% of the number of men in this contingent in 1939, or 604.4 thousand people, and in cohort 20-29 years old - 2.52% of the number of men in this contingent in 1939, or 1293.7 thousand people. For the cohort of 30-39 years, the female preponderance in 1939, as we have already established, was 6.62% of the number of men. In 1959, this preponderance in this cohort was largely formed under the influence of the Second World War. Therefore, let us take the 1979 census data for comparison. Then, in the cohort of 30-39 years, the female preponderance amounted to 523,101 people, or 3.52% of the male population. Assuming that the relative size of the female preponderance in this cohort in 1959 would have been approximately the same if the influence of the war could be excluded, the size of the female preponderance in 1939, due to the difference in the accuracy of counting the male population in 1939 and 1959, in this cohort can be estimated at 3.10% of the male population, or 382,936 people. Earlier, in the cohort of 40-49 years old, the underestimation of the male population for the 1939 census was estimated by us at 5.29% of the male population, or 373,381 people. Also, the size of the male preponderance in Muslim and other traditional regions is estimated by us at 778,164 people. Thus, the overall increased undercount of the male population in the conscription contingents in the census

1939, established on the basis of the female preponderance, we estimate at 3,432.6 thousand people. But this figure also includes the female preponderance, which was formed due to the victims of the terror of 1937-1938, when 681,692 people, mostly men, were sentenced to death. There are no data on the age and sex structure of this contingent. But we can try to extend to the entire population the data on the victims of the Great Terror buried at the Butovo range. A total of 20,761 people were shot and buried here, including 19,903 men (96%) and 858 women (4.13%). If we assume that the sex ratio was approximately the same for all the victims of 1937-1938, then the male preponderance will be approximately 625.4 thousand people. But they also shot people aged 50 and older. There were only 342 people born in 1870 and older out of 20,222 people for whom age data are available, those. 1.69%. 524 people born in 1888, or 2.6% of the total number, were also shot, while more than 1200 people, or more than 5.9%, were shot in total. If we assume that for each of the years 1871-1883, as well as for 1889, at least 1% of the victims on average, the total proportion of victims born before 1890 can be estimated at 24.2%. They could account for about 151.3 thousand male preponderance among all the victims of 1937-1938. In this case, those among the executed, who in [1939] would have been from 10 to 49 years old, will account for about 474.1 thousand people of the male preponderance.

In addition, 40,137 people were sentenced to death in 1930-1936, including 30,852 people in 1930-1931. Among these victims could be a significant number of men who in 1939 would have been 30-49 years old. Their share could be one third less than the share of men aged 20-49 among the victims of the repressions of 1937-1938, i.e. only about 46% of all those shot, which gives a male preponderance of about 18.5 thousand people.

Then the total underestimation of men in cohorts aged 10-49, determined on the basis of female preponderance, can be estimated at 2,940.0 thousand people.

The population of the territories annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940 at the beginning of 1940 was estimated in June 1941 at 23,501.0 thousand people (taking into account approximately 31 thousand inhabitants who remained in the territory of Finland annexed in March 1940) ⁸². How the assessment was made is still unclear. It should also be taken into account that the Moldavian ASSR was included in the Moldavian SSR, which until July 1940 was already part of the Ukrainian SSR. According to the 1939 census, the population of the Moldavian ASSR was 599,156 people. Taking into account that in 1940 the population growth rate of the USSR was 1.4%⁸³, and assuming that in 1939 it was the same, by the beginning of 1939 the population of the annexed territories can be estimated at 23,176.5 thousand people, and for minus the population of the Moldavian ASSR - 22,577.3 thousand people.

The male population in the cohorts aged 10-49, according to the 1939 census, was 52,900,711. There are no data on the size of the male population of these ages in the territories annexed in 1939-1940. If we assume that it was approximately the same proportion among the entire population as on the territory of the USSR within the borders at the beginning of 1939 (the population of the USSR then was 170,557.1 thousand people), then the number of men in the cohorts is 10-49 years at the beginning of 1939 in the territories annexed to the USSR can be estimated at 7002.6 thousand people. If we assume that the undercount of men in the annexed territories was approximately the same as in the main territory of the USSR, then the number of men aged 10-49 in the annexed territories should be increased by another 389.2 thousand people. A sign that in 1941 there was a significant underestimation of the population in the annexed territories can be the fact that the second version of the calculation for the Moldavian SSR gave the population of the republic 2515.7 thousand people, which is 108.9 thousand. person, or 4.52% more than the original calculation included in the summary table.

The total number of men aged 10-49 years on the territory of the USSR within the borders of June 22, 1941 at the beginning of 1939 can be estimated at 63,232.5 thousand people.

According to the 1959 census, the number of males between the ages of 30 and 69, those cohorts who were actually drafted into the army during the war amounted to 32,857,854 people. However, it must be taken into account that between 1941 and 1959 there were some changes in the Soviet borders. In October 1944, the previously formally independent Tuva People's Republic became part of the USSR. The population of Tuva in 1941 was just over 80 thousand people, and by the beginning of 1944 - 96 thousand people. The bulk of the conscripts were from among [2 thousand Soviet citizens living in Tuva. The vast majority were Russians and representatives of other nationalities of the USSR. In addition, 220 Tuvans and representatives of other indigenous peoples of Tuva volunteered for the front. In total, about 8 thousand residents of Tuva visited the front. About half of them died, i.e. about 4 thousand, including 69 Tuvan volunteers®. The population of the Tuva Autonomous Region in 1959 was 171.9 thousand people, and the number of men aged 30-69 years was 25.7 thousand people. The size of the male population of the USSR in 1959 in the corresponding cohorts must be reduced by this value for their correct comparison with 1939.

In November 1945, Transcarpathian Ukraine also became part of the USSR. In 1959, the population of the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine amounted to 920.2 thousand people, and the male population aged 30-69 years was 161.2 thousand people. The size of the male population of the USSR in 1959 in the corresponding cohorts must also be reduced by this value for their correct comparison with 1939. It should be noted that during the war there was a "voluntary" mobilization of the population of Transcarpathia into the Red Army. In addition, some of the natives of Transcarpathia were mobilized into the Hungarian army.

The inclusion in the USSR in 1944-1946 of the Kaliningrad region, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, as well as

Petsamo (Pechengi) had virtually no effect on the demographic balance, since almost the entire German, Japanese and Finnish population was repatriated, and among the few remaining there were no persons of military age.

In 1944-1951 there was an exchange of territory and population between the USSR and Poland. As a result, the regions of Przemyśl, Sanok and Białystok with adjacent territories were transferred to Poland. Taking into account the fact that the population of the Białystok region at the beginning of 1940 was estimated at 1348.3 thousand people, up to 60 thousand people lived in Przemyśl and its environs, and up to 40 thousand people lived in Sanok, by the beginning of 1939 the population of these territories can be estimated at 1.4 million people. In addition, 518 thousand people left Poland for the USSR in 1945-1946, and 1,090 thousand people left the USSR for Polyna. In 1946, 24 thousand people left Czechoslovakia for the USSR, and 33 thousand people left in the opposite direction. In addition, about 14,000 Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jews repatriated to Romania. Also, about 100 thousand people left the USSR for Politsa in 1956-1958. Taking into account these exchanges of population and territory, the population of the USSR decreased by about 1.1 million by the beginning of 1959.

Human.

Significant groups of Russian emigrants from Europe and China were forcibly and voluntarily repatriated to the USSR - up to 50,000 people. In addition, up to 250,000 Armenians voluntarily returned to their homeland." On the other hand, about 620,000 former Soviet prisoners of war and civilians who were taken to work in Germany, as well as those who left with the German army, preferred to stay in the West. Due to this, the population of the USSR, compared with the pre-war period, should have decreased by another 320 thousand people. The general decrease in the population of the USSR compared with the pre-war level due to changes in post-war borders and

external migrations can be estimated at about 1.4 million people. In 1959, the male population aged 30-69 years for this population can be estimated at about 237 thousand people.

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lovek. This value should be added to the male population aged 30-69 in 1959.

Now it is necessary to estimate how much excess mortality during the war years among the civilian population falls on those who in 1939 were from 10 to 49 years old. The excess death rate of prisoners in Soviet camps during the war years (in comparison with the pre-war level of 1940) amounted to at least 391 thousand people. The proportion of women in the Gulag? during the war years increased from 7 to 26% due to the mobilization of male prisoners into the army. Incidentally, at least 975,000 prisoners were sent to the front, as well as 117,000 camp guards." It is not clear whether these 1,092,000 people were counted by the authors of the book "Secrecy Removed" among those mobilized into the Red Army.

The average proportion of women among the deceased prisoners can be estimated at 11.5%, or 45 thousand people. The proportion of men of military age in excess mortality in prisons and camps should be less than the proportion of men of these ages in the total number of those executed in 1937-1938, since among the latter there was a lower proportion of women and a higher proportion of those who by the beginning of 1939 should have been 10-49 years old. Indeed, during the war, many prisoners were drafted into the army, which significantly increased the proportion of non-conscription ages in the camp population. Therefore, the total share of men of military age in the excess mortality of the GULAG can be estimated at three-quarters of the total number of dead men, i.e. about 260 thousand people.

In total, in 1941-1945, 476,615 people were convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes, of which 42,139 people were sentenced to death (this does not include people sentenced to death by tribunals in the army)???. Probably at least 40,000 death sentences occurred during the war period. Three-quarters of them may have been men of military age, which is about 30 thousand people.

Direct losses from the deportations of approximately 2.3 million Germans, Ingrian Finns, Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens

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tsev, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Crimean Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Turks and Iranians are estimated at 0.5 million people?. Since the elderly, women and children predominated among the deportees, there were hardly more than one-fifth of the men of military age among those who died during the deportation, i.e. about 100 thousand people.

It is also necessary to estimate the number of dead civilian men from the draft cohorts in the occupied territories. The most common estimate of the number of Soviet Jews killed by the Nazis is 1.5 million. Considering that the vast majority of victims of the Holocaust, as in the case of the deportations of the "punished peoples" carried out by the NKVD, were women, children and the elderly, it can be assumed that the proportion of military age hardly exceeded 20%, or 0.3 million Human. The number of victims of the genocide of the Roma carried out by the Nazis is estimated on the territory of the USSR at 30 thousand people. Among them could be up to 10 thousand men of military age.

The total losses of Soviet partisans in dead and missing are estimated by us at no less than 100,000 people. Perhaps the losses of the collaborationist formations that opposed them were the same. Suppose that half of the dead partisans did not serve in the Red Army and that the same proportion of those who did not serve there were among the dead collaborators. Then it is possible to estimate the number of victims of hostilities among men of military age in the occupied territories at 100,000 people. It can also be assumed that the irretrievable losses of the fighters of the Polish Home Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and

Also, the losses of anti-Soviet partisans in the Baltic states, who had not previously served in the Red Army and lived on Soviet territory by June 22, 1941, during the Second World War and post-war years totaled at least 100 thousand people. It is very difficult to estimate the casualties of mainly German, but also Soviet punitive expeditions among men of military age who did not serve in the Red Army and did not directly participate in hostilities.

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Let's assume that there were at least as many of them as dead Soviet partisans, i.e. about 100 thousand people.

Thus, the total number of victims of violent death among male conscripts who did not serve in the Red Army can be estimated by summing up the victims of excess death in the Gulag, the Holocaust and partisan struggle, at 1.1 million people. By this number, the number of draft contingents according to the 1939 census should be reduced.

The men who, at the time of the 1939 census, constituted a cohort of 10–49 years old, perished not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the two armed conflicts that preceded it, the clash with the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol in May–September 1939. of the year and in the Soviet-Finnish war in November 1939 - March 1940. At Khalkhin-Gol, Soviet losses amounted to 9,703 killed, missing, died from wounds, diseases, and accidents. In the Soviet-Finnish war, the Red Army lost about 164.3 thousand people. For these losses, which amounted to 174 thousand people in total, it is necessary to reduce the number of the male population of military age according to the 1939 census.

It should be noted that a large number of women served in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. At least 800,000 women were called up as volunteers, and many served in combat units as pilots, anti-aircraft gunners, snipers, machine gunners, mortar and submachine gunners.⁷⁷ And at the final stage of the war, women from the liberated territories and from the number of Ostarbeiters. Probably, in total, at least 1 million women served in the Red Army, of which up to 100 thousand could die or die from diseases and in captivity. V.S. Murmantseva also believes that more than 1 million women served in the Red Army.”

Unlike the German database of irretrievable losses, the Russian OBD "Memorial" has a significant number of cards for the dead female soldiers. For example, there is such a card for sniper Roza Shanina

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Born in 1924, even two, and in the second, describing her burial in the Kaliningrad region, her middle name is indicated - Sergeevna, which does not coincide with her traditional middle name - Egorovna in published biographies. The biographies also mention that Roza Shanina died in battle on January 28, 1945, while the biographies state that she died of her wounds on that day.”

In total, 16 personalities were found for the name of Shanin in the Memorial OBD. With the exception of duplicates and the survivors, there are four Shanins who are definitely dead servicemen, as well as one Shanina, who is a missing civilian employee of the military department, and another Shanina is a deceased nurse without a military rank. In addition, Natalya Shanina, aged 20, was buried in Germany on August 24, 1944. It is impossible to say with certainty about her whether she was a prisoner of war or belonged to the "Eastern workers".

Considering that a significant number of female personalities were found when requesting the far from the most common Russian surname Shanina, it can be assumed that the number of female personalities in the database is significant. However, in response to requests for

For individual years of birth, in particular 1920 and 1924, the OBD issues 1,000 exclusively male personalities. This is probably due to the peculiarity of the program, which primarily gives out male personalities. Therefore, it is not possible to assess what part of the Memorial database is made up of female personalities.

More than 500 or even 1000 personalities are issued in the United Data Bank of Irrecoverable Losses "Memorial" for requests for the most common Russian surnames "Ivanova", "Smirnova", "Kuznetsova", etc. (this is the maximum number of personalities that can be issued by in response to one request, this computer program)!⁹. Of course there is a double count in the database. In addition, the database sometimes contains "Eastern workers" buried in Germany who did not serve in the Red Army. But what is the victim

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there are tens of thousands of women in the military, there is no doubt. Taking into account losses among women, the total number of men who died in the Red Army should be reduced to 26.8 million people.

Now it is necessary to estimate what part of the men from the cohorts aged 10-49 in 1939 could have died of natural causes before the beginning of 1959. To do this, we use the method of approximate calculation of natural expected mortality for these age cohorts for the selected period, using age-specific mortality rates for 1938-1939 and for 1958-1959!. To do this, we multiply the male population of each of the cohorts by the value of the average mortality for this cohort in the period 1939-1959, and then multiply by the number of years in the period (20). For men in a cohort of 10-19 years of about 21,714.0 thousand people, the expected natural mortality for the period will be approximately 1,194.3 thousand people. For a cohort of 20-29 years of about 18,598.9 thousand people, this figure will be approximately 1,441.4 thousand people. For a cohort of 30-39 years of about 14,620.4 thousand people, natural mortality will be approximately 1,535.1 thousand people. Finally, for a cohort of 40-49 years of about 8,763.1 thousand people, the natural mortality rate can be estimated at about 1,384.6 thousand people. In total, natural mortality for men of the cohort 10-49 years old in the period 1939-1959 can be estimated at 5555.4 thousand people. However, this number seems to be significantly overestimated, since the men of the conscript contingents, due to the outbreak of World War II, were much less likely to die of natural causes than could be judged on the basis of pre-war theoretical calculations. As we have already established, among the men of the contingent of 10-49 years old, about 28.1 million people by the middle of 1945 had died not of natural but of violent death. These men make up about 44.4% of the total number of cohorts aged 10-49 years. Therefore, the natural mortality rate for 1939-1959 must be reduced according to this proportion to 3088.8 thousand people.

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Now let's try to calculate the balance. From the difference in the number of men aged 10-49 years in 1939 and the same contingent in 1959, it is necessary to subtract as the number of those men who died in the period 1939-1959 not in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, and losses in the battles at Khalkhin Gol and the Soviet-Finnish war. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the change in the balance due to external migrations and changes in borders. The total number of dead Soviet soldiers of the Red Army in the cohorts of 10-49 years of the 1939 census can be estimated at 26,062.1 thousand people.

For completeness of calculations, the number of Soviet military losses of 26.8 million people must be reduced by the losses of the population of Transcarpathia and Tuva, as well as by the losses of older and younger ages. You can find out what ages were actually drafted into the Red Army using the Memorial database. So, in response to a request for the surname Ivanov, born in 1930, Memorial issued 12 surnames, of which 2 really turned out to be Red Army soldiers who died or went missing in 1942-1944.

For the surname Ivanov born in 1889, the Memorial OBD has 53 personalities, including 36 military personnel, including 2 senior and 1 junior officer, and since 1888 - 39 personalities, of which the dead and missing military personnel are at least 23 people, including 2 officers. The Ivanovs with the year of birth 1887 are represented in the database by 32 surnames, 20 of which turned out to be dead or missing ordinary Red Army soldiers, and one - a dead senior officer. 1886 is represented by 10 surnames, of which 7 are Red Army soldiers. In 1885, there are 17 families, of which 8 are dead or missing Red Army soldiers, and 2 are officers. The year 1884 in the surname "Ivanov" is represented by 14 entries, behind which are 4 dead or missing Red Army soldiers. Since 1883, one of the Ivanovs' list turns out to be a missing Red Army soldier, and since 1882 there are even two of them. The oldest of Ivanovs

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The former is a Red Army soldier Fedor Ivanovich Ivanov, who was born in 1876 in the village of B. Kolotilovo in the Porkhov district of the Leningrad region, was drafted by the Kirov RVC of Leningrad and died of an illness in a hospital on March 13, 1942. By the way, at the end of October 2010, there were 313 persons born in 1876 in the OBD, of which at least 37 dead and missing privates and sergeants and 3 officers, including one major, were military personnel. It must be said that for many persons born in 1876, as well as other elderly people buried in Germany and Austria, it is generally impossible to say with certainty whether they are prisoners of war or "Ostarbeiters", therefore it is not excluded that even in There are significantly more OBD soldiers who died in captivity, born before 1890. There were even more persons born in 1875 in the OBD - 328, among whom, however, there are many victims of the First World War and the Civil War. Of these, at least 29 people died or went missing in the Red Army, including 3 officers. For the 1874 year of birth, the card file contains 261 personalities, but those who died there are mostly senior officers, for 1873 - 251, for 1872 - 196, for 1871 - 159 and for 1870 - 145. For 1869, the OBD contains 97 personnel, in 1868 - 100 and in 1867 - 82. Of these last 3 dead are ordinary Red Army soldiers, and one is a dead officer. In 1866, out of 94 personalities, 5 belong to the dead and missing Red Army soldiers and 1 - a dead Red Army woman. In 1865, out of 61 personalities, only one was a Red Army soldier. But in 1864, out of 84 personalities, 4 who died turned out to be ordinary Red Army soldiers, and 1 - an officer. In 1863, only 8 personalities were found, despite the fact that for all of them, the year of birth in 1863 was in question (1864 was indicated as an alternative). None of them were Red Army soldiers. But in 1862, out of 35 personalities, 1 junior officer died in captivity and 1 serviceman with an unknown rank went missing. In 1861 out of 41 persons 1 - this is the elder who died on December 11, 1941

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Sergeant Sergei Fedorovich Sarychev, buried in the village of Sokol, Vologda Oblast. Since in 1860 not a single Red Army soldier could be found out of 63 personalities, S.F. Sarychev is probably the oldest Red Army soldier who died in the Great Patriotic War.

Of course, the losses at these ages were incomparable with the losses at the main draft ages. For example, for the surname "Ivanov" born in 1920 and 1924, the OBD "Memorial" issues the maximum number of requests - 1000 each, and for the same surname with the year of birth 1928 - only 83, and for 1929 - only 24 surnames. However, it is interesting that in the latter case, out of 24 names, 12 belong to the dead or missing Red Army soldiers, and one belongs to an officer - junior lieutenant Vladimir Illarionovich Ivanov, who died on January 29, 1944, commander of a machine-gun platoon of the 985th rifle regiment of the 226th guards rifle regiment. divisions. At the time of his death, he was most likely still 14 years old, and, perhaps, he is the youngest officer of the Red Army to die in battle. Thus, the number of victims among the natives of 1929 turns out to be an order of magnitude greater than among the natives of 1930, which justifies the inclusion of the cohort of natives of 1925-1929 into the

recruiting contingents. By the way, there are 275 surnames for the Ivanovs born in 1927 in the Memorial OBD, 115 for the Petrovs, and 105 for the Kuznetsovs.

What is even more interesting is that there were more than 1000 persons born in 1889 in the OBD, i.e. their total number cannot be determined using the electronic version of the program. The same picture for 1886-1888. For 1885 alone, the number of personalities falls below a thousand, amounting to 980. For 1883-1884, this figure again exceeds 1,000. For 1882, it is 997, and only for 1881 drops sharply to 685.

For 1930, the number of personalities in the OBD also reaches 1000. But for 1931, it drops to 726, and the vast majority of them are either those who died among the "Ostarbeiters" or military personnel who died

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already after the war. Although among the natives of 1931 there are also a certain number of pupils (sons) of regiments - orphans, who were taken care of by the Red Army, or sons of senior officers and generals who fought together with their parents.

Such a significant, by the standards of other armies, presence in the Red Army of elderly people or, conversely, of very young ages, is probably due to the fact that many were ready to voluntarily join the army in order to receive rations. In addition, during the mobilization, directly in the unit, including among the "Ostarbeiters", they took everyone who was able to hold a weapon, including those of non-conscription ages. The data presented suggest that the irretrievable losses of conscripts of ages outside the cohort of 1890-1929 years of birth could collectively reach the first tens of thousands of people, taking into account the fact that losses at the ages of 1930, as well as 1882-1889 years of birth, are statistically significant. Naturally, conscripts from these contingents relatively rarely got to the front lines. They tried to use in rear services. Therefore, the proportion of irretrievable losses among them was significantly lower than in the main draft ages. The total number of those mobilized at unconscribed ages could reach hundreds of thousands of people, including during the mobilization directly in the unit, during the mobilization of the released "Ostarbeiters", as well as in the divisions of the people's militia, where there were many elderly people. . This factor significantly increased the mobilization capacity of the USSR.

The number of dead military personnel in the Transcarpathian region can be estimated based on the fact that by the time the "voluntary" mobilization of the inhabitants of Transcarpathia into the Red Army began, the population here could have been 850-900 thousand people! 2. A number of local residents were drafted into the Hungarian army, but it is unlikely that the death toll among them exceeded several thousand people. The population of Transcarpathia was less than one fifteenth of that of the population of Hungary. At the same time, the prevailing in Zakar

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At the same time, the Ukrainian population was almost never drafted into the Hungarian army due to political disloyalty. The Hungarians, on the other hand, made up no more than a quarter of the population of Transcarpathia, they could account for no more than one sixtieth of the irretrievable losses of Hungary, which amounted to about 160 thousand people. Of this number, the inhabitants of Transcarpathia could account for up to 3 thousand dead. The population of Transcarpathia was about one two hundredth of the population of the USSR. If it had been drafted into the Red Army from the very beginning of the war, its losses could have been estimated at 100-120 thousand dead. However, given that the Transcarpathians fought in the Red Army for only the last eight months of the war and that the losses among untrained conscripts were especially high, the real losses were unlikely to exceed 40 thousand people. The population of Transcarpathia was about 10 times higher than the population of Tuva, and the intensity of the participation of the two territories in the war was approximately the same, so the estimate of 40 thousand dead Transcarpathians seems close to

In total, the loss of the population of Transcarpathia, Tuva, as well as those born in 1868-1889 and 1930 can be estimated at about 100 thousand people. Then the total irretrievable losses

those Soviet military personnel who in 1939 were 10-49 years old, within the borders of mid-1941, can be estimated at 26.7 million people. This is about 0.6 million more than the losses of the Red Army, calculated by the balance method. The difference, most likely, arises due to the underestimation of men by the 1939 census and the calculation in the territories annexed in 1939-1940, in cohorts of 10-49 years, the compensated underestimation of women. Then the total compensated record can be estimated at no less than 1.2 million people, of which about 140,000 people account for the official 1941 count. In this case, the compensated undercount of the 1939 census in the cohorts of 10-49 years is 1.06 million people, and the total undercount in these contingents is 4.8 million people. In other age cohorts, the underreporting was certainly much less significant. It can be estimated at 10% of the underestimation in cohorts aged 10–49 years, i.e. about 0.5 million people. Then about

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The total underestimation of the 1939 census can be estimated at 5.3 million people, or 3.1%. This result is quite consistent with the data on the previous census, in 1937, the results of which were rejected. The commission for checking the results of the 1937 census under the leadership of Ya.A. Yakovleva estimated the size of the underestimation from 4.8 to 8.1 million people, i.e. from 3 to 5%¹⁰³. It can be assumed that in reality the undercount of the 1937 census was closer to 5%, while for the 1939 census the undercount rate lies rather between 3.5%. Since this indicator cannot be more than 3.5%, the additional undercount is most likely due to the compensated undercount of those men in the cohorts aged 10–49 who, being civilians, died of malnutrition and disease during the war years and during the famine of 1946–1947. Such an underestimation could reach up to 0.7 million people, including 0.35 million men. Therefore, we will accept an undercount for the 1939 census of 3.1 to 3.5% and a corresponding undercount in the territories annexed in 1939-1940.

Thus, our assessment of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, in principle, does not contradict the results of the 1939 and 1959 population censuses.

The amount of underestimation of the population by the census is determined not so much by the good or evil will of the organizers of the census, but by the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the country at the time of the census. Therefore, the degree of undercounting of the population could not differ too much in the 1937 and 1939 censuses, given that the gap between them was only two years. In addition, these two years saw the peak of the Great Terror, and this event could in no way contribute to improving the accuracy of population records. And the fact that Stalin repressed the organizers of the 1937 census, accusing them of a significant underestimation of the population, is subject to unconditional condemnation. Even if there really was an underestimation, there was no

their guilt.

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VERIFICATION OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IRRETURNABLE LOSSES OF THE RED ARMY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR ON THE OBD "MEMORIAL"

We can try to verify the figure of 26.9 million people who died in the Red Army by the OBD "Memorial". To do this, we must try to make a sample and estimate what percentage of the sample are those who died from wounds. This category of losses was taken into account most fully and accurately. There are 1104 thousand people who died from wounds! \. To verify, we need to determine what proportion of those who died from wounds among all the dead and missing, including those who were lucky enough to survive captivity, as well as those who were surrounded, but were not captured. According to our estimates, approximately 2.3 million Soviet servicemen survived the captivity. In addition, about 940 thousand people were encircled. In our opinion, up to 450,000 encircled people were actually captured, but they managed to hide this fact. Then the total number of survivors among the missing can be estimated at 2.8 million people. Note that not all of the surviving missing people had a chance to live until the end of the war. Many of them were drafted into the army and were killed or died for other reasons.

reasons why we have enough examples in OBD. If we proceed from the fact that the total number of dead and missing Soviet servicemen can be estimated at 29.7 million people, then the proportion of those who died from wounds among them should be estimated at 3.7%. There is no doubt that in the Memorial OBD this proportion will be significantly higher, since the Red Army counted those who died from wounds much more accurately than those killed and missing. However, the identified indicator can determine for us which estimate is closer to the true one - ours or the official one.

But the OBD electronic archive can provide no more than 1,000 personalities per request. For this thousand, it is impossible to make a representative sample, since it includes those persons who are in the documents entered into the data bank in the first place. For example, if

take

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1000 personalities according to the year of birth, then the percentage of those who died from wounds will be very low, since the lion's share of the personalities shown will fall on the reports of the first months of the war with a sharp predominance of those killed and missing. So we took a different path. We found such surnames that are not very common, but not unique, and are represented in the HBS by a number of personalities, although less than a thousand, but reaching about 700–900 personalities. In this case, in response to a request, the electronic archive will give us all the personalities belonging to the totality of persons with a given surname, and this will not depend on the order of entering data into the ODB, or on the electronic archive program. For analysis, we chose four surnames: one Russian, one Ukrainian, one Belarusian and one Muslim. These names are: Petrishchev, Ivanchuk (Ivanchukov, Ivanchuk), Yushkevich and Nuraliev (Nuraleev). In the process of research, we exclude duplicates as far as possible, i.e. cases where the same person appears in the database repeatedly. However, in those cases where a person was first captured and then released, again drafted into the army and subsequently died or went missing, we consider him as an independent person in the event of his repeated disappearance. There will always be some subjective moment in determining the number of takes, since there are no absolutely objective criteria for their selection. Persons with the same first and middle names and years of birth may turn out to be different people. On the contrary, persons may differ in year of birth and patronymic, but in fact they may turn out to be one and the same person.

We also cleared the sample from the wounded, deserters and persons sentenced to imprisonment.

Petrishchevs turned out to be 906 personalities, and among them died from wounds - 83 personalities. After the removal of duplicates, the number of deaths from wounds dropped to 28, and the total number of those killed, dead and missing is 593. The proportion of deaths from wounds for this surname is 4.7%.

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Ivanchukov (as well as Ivanchukov and Ivanchukov, who in some cases form doubles with this surname) turned out to be 898 personalities (including 16 Ivanchukov). The number of deaths from wounds among them reached 93. After cleaning from duplicates, the number of deaths from wounds was 36, and the total number was 625. The proportion of deaths from wounds for this surname was 5.8%.

There are 749 personalities of the Yushkevichs in the OBD, including 75 who died from wounds. After clearing duplicates of those who died from wounds, 31 remained, and the total number of dead and missing decreased to 520. The proportion of those who died from wounds for this family is 6.0%.

There were 947 Nuralievs (Nuraleevs), including 44 Nuralievs. There are 70 deaths from wounds, and after cleaning from duplicates - 37. The total number of dead and missing after the removal of duplicates is 776. The proportion of deaths from wounds for this family is 4.8%.

The total number of those who died from wounds for four families is 321 personalities, and the total number of dead and missing is 3500 personalities. The same indicators after cleaning

from duplicates will be 132 and 2514, respectively. The proportion of deaths from wounds for the entire population is 5.25%. Such a low percentage of those who died from wounds in the irretrievable losses of the Red Army proves that in its total losses the share of the wounded was several times less than in the total losses of the armies of Germany and other countries participating in the Second World War.

The proportion of those who actually died from wounds, cleared of duplicates, is 41.1% in relation to the number of personalities who died from wounds not cleared of duplicates. For the correctness of the comparison, the personalities of the rest of the victims must be cleared of those persons who entered the database by mistake. These are the wounded, deserters sentenced to prison, as well as those who died (died) before June 22, 1941 or after September 1945. Such personalities, in contrast to personalities who died from wounds, by definition do not fall into the database of personalities who died from wounds. There are a total of 62 such persons by four names. Then the proportion of the remaining dead and missing

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to lead in relation to the number of relevant personalities, excluding convicts, deserters, etc., will be 76.4%. Among those who died from wounds, the proportion of duplicates reaches 58.9%, i.e. almost two thirds, and among the rest of the dead, it is only 23.6%, or less than one quarter. This is a weighty indirect evidence that in the Memorial OBD, those who died from wounds are taken into account much more fully than the rest of the dead and missing. If the same person entered the database not in one, but in two or more documents, then the probability that he will be included in the corresponding database increases significantly.

Since the proportion of those who died from wounds among all the dead and missing in the Memorial OBD is 5.25%, then the total number of dead and missing recorded in this database, excluding duplicates, can be estimated at 21, 1 million people, of which at least 19.1 million are the dead, and about 2.0 million are the surviving prisoners and encircled. About 8.6 million dead and missing are likely to remain outside the Memorial HBS, including about 7.8 million dead and about 0.8 million remaining missing. In fact, the numbers of survivors are slightly lower than what we stated, since some of them died after the second call.

If our calculations are correct, then, having excluded 1.1 million who died from wounds, we will find that at present only 20.0 million, or 69.9%, of the 28.6 million dead and missing are now taken into account.

If the official figure of irretrievable losses of 8668 thousand dead and dead and 2776 thousand survivors of the missing were correct, which gives an irretrievable loss of 11 444 thousand people, the proportion of those who died from wounds in the Memorial OBD would be should have been significantly higher than 5.25%. Even if we assume the absolutely unbelievable, namely, that practically all the irretrievable losses of the Red Army are included in the WDS, then the proportion of those who died from wounds should be 9.6%. In reality, this figure should be several percent higher. For

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estimates of S.A. Ilyenkov in 13,850 thousand dead, taking into account approximately 2.8 million missing, survivors, the proportion of those who died from wounds should have been 6.6% only under the incredible condition that almost all the dead are included in the HBS and the missing. In reality, and in this case, this indicator should have been several percent higher. Here it should be noted that S.A. Ilyenkov dealt with the database at the end of 2000, while over the past 10 years, the Memorial OBD has been replenished with millions of new personalities.

EVALUATION OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SOVIET LOSSES AND LOSSES OF CIVIL POPULATION OF THE USSR IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The total irretrievable losses of the population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, including excess mortality from natural causes, can be calculated by estimating the number

population at the beginning and end of the war, as well as the natural movement of the population and the balance of external migrations during the war. The calculations made on the basis of Soviet population censuses also make it possible to approximately estimate the total military losses of the population of the USSR, both military and civilians. The total population at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War can be estimated based on the estimate of V.S. Kozhurin, the population of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 was 198.7 million people. According to the population assessment of the USSR, conducted in June 1941, the difference between the preliminary and re-assessment of the population of the Khabarovsk Territory at the beginning of 1940 was 72.6 thousand people (1538.0 and 1610.6), or 4.7%. This figure turns out to be even higher than the probable undercount rate in the 1939 census! 5. However, according to the 1959 census data, there was a significant drop in the birth rate in 1941, probably due to a significant increase in the size of the army in 1940 and early 1941. By the beginning of 1959, the number

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persons aged 20 years, i.e. born in 1940, amounted to 48,390.0 thousand people, and the number of persons aged 19, those born in 1941 - only 43,165.0 thousand people. If we assume that the birth rate has declined in approximately the same proportion as these cohorts relate to each other, then for 1941 it can be estimated at 2.78%. If we assume that the mortality rate in 1940 and the first half of 1941 was approximately the same, then the level of natural increase for 1941 in the absence of war can be estimated at 1%, and the actual volume of natural increase in the first half of 1941 — about 1 million people. Then the population of the USSR by June 22, 1941, without correction for the underestimation of the 1939 census, can be estimated at 199.7 million people, and adjusted for such an underestimation, at 205.9–206.7 million people. If we subtract from this the losses in the battles in Finland and Khalkhin Gol, probably not taken into account in the statistics of 1939-1941, the population at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War can be estimated at 205.7-206.5 million people. The population of the USSR by the beginning of 1946, based on the population estimate of 1950, taking into account the natural increase in this year, can be estimated at 167 million people! 6. Due to the annexation of Tuva and Transcarpathia, the population of the USSR by the beginning of 1946 should have increased by at least 0.9 million people, and due to the return of Poland to the Bialystok region and some other territories, to decrease, taking into account losses in the war, also by about 0.9 million people. In addition, due to external migrations, by the beginning of 1946, the population should have decreased by 0.9 million people. In 1940, the birth rate was 3.12%, the death rate was 1.80%, and the natural increase was 1.32%¹⁷. The average annual level of natural mortality in 1941-1945, excluding military losses at the level of 1940, can be estimated at 3.4 million people, with an average population for the war of 187 million people. Of the 6.1 million people born in 1940¹⁸, 4.8 million people survived by the beginning of 1959. The average survival index up to 1959 for people of this year of birth can be estimated at 78.7%. Then about

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The total number of those born in 1942-1945 can be estimated at 15.4 million people, given that in 1959 there were 12.155 million people of these ages, and the approximate number of those who died of natural causes over these years was 13.6 million. Human. Then the conditional natural increase over these years, offset by military losses, can be estimated in 1942-1945 at 1.8 million people. To this must be added another approximately 0.5 million conventional natural increase in the second half of 1941. Then the total population losses in the war can be estimated by subtracting 167.9 million people from 205.7-206.5 million people and adding 2.3 million people. The total losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War will amount to 40.1-40.9 million people. Losses of the civilian population, including excess mortality, can be estimated by subtracting the loss of military personnel from 13.2-13.9 million people from the total losses. These losses are certainly the largest among all the states participating in the Second World War and account for at least half of all losses in this war.

In the occupied territories and in the front line, a particularly strong decline in the birth rate was observed in large cities. So, in besieged Leningrad in 1943, the birth rate dropped to zero. In Moscow, from 1941 to 1943, the birth rate decreased by 2.6

times. In occupied Dnepropetrovsk in 1942, the birth rate reached only 34% of the pre-war level¹⁰. At the same time, in the occupied rural areas, where a significant part of the townspeople moved in search of food, the drop in the birth rate was probably not so significant. The effect of reducing mortality from natural causes here could also be observed due to a decrease in the birth rate and, for this reason, a drop in the infant mortality rate. In addition, many residents of the occupied territories and the frontline died from causes related to the war - during hostilities or as a result of repression by the occupying authorities, which reduced their likelihood of dying of natural causes.

We also note that in the losses of the civilian population of military age, a significant predominance of

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women, since in connection with the conscription of the vast majority of men of the corresponding ages into the army, the probability of death of women among civilians of these ages has increased. Such a phenomenon was observed in Germany, where, according to the results of the Allied bombing raids, "in all age groups, losses among women exceed those among men by approximately 40%"¹¹⁹. Therefore, it is not possible to use data on the female preponderance in the post-war years at military age to determine the losses of the armed forces, since the female preponderance has been significantly reduced due to the losses of the civilian population. The significant number of women who died in the armed forces also contributed to the reduction of the post-war female preponderance. In addition, many of the women who remained widowed or single could die prematurely before the 1959 census, which should also have significantly reduced the female preponderance in military age.

It is practically impossible to establish in what proportion the victims among the civilian population were distributed between the occupied and non-occupied territory of the USSR. In the occupied territory of the USSR, about 1.5 million Soviet Jews were exterminated by the Nazis as part of the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question." The Jews were exterminated both directly by executions carried out by the Einsatzgruppen of the SD (ZasNetsen, Security Services), and through starvation and epidemics in ghettos and concentration camps. There, the food supply of the Jews was limited in such a way that the daily ration did not ensure the physical survival of even a non-working person. And the Jews were also forced to do heavy physical labor. In addition, about 0.5 million more Jews from Western Europe were destroyed on the territory of the USSR, but the demographic losses of the Soviet Union

they are not included.

In the occupied Soviet territory, the population also died as a result of executions

hostages and during

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punitive operations against partisans, as well as German repressions against underground workers associated with partisans and Soviet intelligence. Civilians also died of starvation and disease. In addition, they died in the course of hostilities both between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, and between partisans and punishers. The losses of the civilian Soviet population also include those who died who did not serve in the Red Army, but ended up in the ranks of partisans or collaborationist formations. There are no reliable data on the number of victims in each of these categories.

In the unoccupied Soviet territory, civilians also became victims of hostilities - shelling and bombing. The victims of the siege of Leningrad should be included in this category, although most of them died of starvation and disease. According to the estimates of the Leningrad city commission, 16,747 Leningraders died from shelling and bombing, and another 632,253 people became victims of hunger and disease! !. This number does not include those residents

who were evacuated from Leningrad, but before the end of the war died from the consequences of the famine experienced during the blockade. Among them was the Leningrad girl Tanya Savicheva, whose diary shocked the world. She died in 1944. There are also higher estimates that increase the number of victims of the Leningrad blockade to 1 million people.

The victims of starvation were also great, especially among the evacuees. For example, in Arkhangelsk alone, during the first war winter, 20,000 people died of starvation and disease—every tenth inhabitant! And at the very end of the war, mass starvation raged in the unoccupied territory, provoking even cannibalism, and not only in besieged Leningrad. Here are the facts, for example, cited by D.A. Volkogonov: "The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Tajik SSR Kharchenko reported:

"In the Leninabad region ... 20 people were found to have died of exhaustion and 500 people swollen from malnutrition. In the Stalinabad region - Ramit, Pakhtaabad, Obi-Garm and other districts - died of exhaustion

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over 70 people. There are also emaciated and swollen. Such facts also take place in Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab, Garm regions. The assistance provided to these areas on the spot is insignificant ... "

In the Chita region there are facts of "the use of dead animals, trees, bark." A terrible fact was reported when one peasant woman with her sons killed their little daughter and used her for food ... Here is another similar case ... "13.

It should be noted that in the occupied territory, facts of cannibalism and corpse-eating were found only in prisoner-of-war camps, as well as in blockaded partisan detachments, in particular in the Crimea and in the Odessa catacombs. This suggests that in terms of food, the situation of the population of the occupied territories was more favorable than the situation of the inhabitants of the non-occupied territories. This was affected, in particular, by the fact that the population of the territories occupied by the Germans and their allies decreased both due to evacuation to Soviet territory and due to the deportation of the population for forced labor in the Reich. The German administration only minimally used the industrial potential of the occupied cities and discouraged the departure of the townspeople to the countryside, where they had a chance to feed themselves through subsistence farming. In addition, the Germans did not control the swampy part of the countryside, and the peasants and the townspeople who fled there usually had enough food left to feed themselves. Sometimes the greatest threat to the peasants was not the German occupiers, but various partisans.

On the contrary, in the territory that remained under Soviet control, the population of the cities was actively used for the needs of the front, was under the strict control of the NKVD and did not have the opportunity to leave for the countryside. In addition, the entire countryside remained under the effective control of the NKVD, and everywhere surplus food was confiscated from the collective farms and state farms, as well as the few remaining individual farmers, which often brought the peasants to the brink of starvation.

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ASSESSMENT OF THE IRREVOCABLE LOSSES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF GERMANY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht until November 1944 were taken into account quite fully according to the data of personal (personal) registration by the military registration institutions of Germany. In the period from September 1, 1939 to December 31, 1944, the ground forces lost 1 million 750.3 thousand people killed on the battlefield, as well as those who died from wounds, diseases, accidents and other reasons, and missing - | million 609.7 thousand people. The fleet during the same period lost 60 thousand people dead and 100.3 thousand people missing, and the air force -

155 thousand dead and 148.5 thousand missing. Losses for the period from | January to April 30, 1945, the central accounting authorities estimated 250 thousand dead and 1 million missing for the ground forces and 5 thousand dead and 5 thousand missing for the Navy and 10 thousand dead and 7 for the Air Force thousand missing! 4, According to the nature of the calculations, all the missing in the ground forces in the period from | January to April 30, 1945 can be attributed to the number of prisoners. Likewise, most of those who went missing during this period in the Navy and Air Force can be considered prisoners of war. The situation is more complicated with those who went missing before the end of 1944. The number of dead among them can be estimated by subtracting from the total number of missing in the ground forces during this period the approximate number of prisoners captured by Germany's enemies. It is known that in North Africa in 1942-1943 the German ground forces alone lost about 90,000 prisoners. On the Western Front from June to December 1944, more than 210 thousand people were taken prisoner, in Italy in 1943-1944 - about 20 thousand people! The number of missing people in the East before January 1945 amounted to 1 million people, while the number of prisoners can be estimated at 544 thousand people. This figure was obtained by subtracting from the total number of prisoners captured by the Red Army until the end of 1944 (997 thousand people), 202 thousand Romanians, 49 thousand Italians

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Yantsy and 2,000 Finns (all of them could have been captured only before the end of 1944), as well as 200,000 of the 514,000 Hungarian soldiers taken prisoner! 6. In this case, about 456 thousand missing in the East before the end of 1944 should be attributed to the dead. In other theaters of the war, out of 610,000 servicemen of the ground forces who went missing by the end of 1944, about 290,000 could be classified as killed. This gives the number of dead in the ground forces from the beginning of the war to the end of 1944 at 2,496,000. We conditionally attribute nine-tenths of the VMF from among the missing to the dead sailors who sank along with their ships. In this case, the total number of deaths in the fleet up to the end of 1944 can be estimated at 150 thousand people. In the Air Force, we conditionally accept that half of the missing can be attributed to the dead, and the other half to prisoners, then the total number of deaths in German aviation by the end of 1944 can be estimated at 229 thousand people. In the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945, we conditionally classify all those missing in the Air Force and Navy as prisoners. We estimate the losses killed in May 1945 at 10 thousand people, mainly from the composition of the land forces. Then the total number of deaths in the ground forces should be estimated at 2756 thousand, in the Navy - at 155 thousand and in the Air Force - at 239 thousand people, and for the Wehrmacht as a whole (together with the SS troops) - at 3.15 million people. Losses by prisoners until the end of April 1945 are estimated at 1854 thousand for the ground forces, 15 thousand for the Navy and 81 thousand for the Air Force.

In the period from January 1 to April 30, 1945, out of 1 million prisoners from the ground forces, 615 thousand were taken on the Western Front (290 thousand in January-March and 325 thousand in April in the Ruhr pocket)!! the number of prisoners in Italy can be estimated at 10 thousand, the remaining 375 thousand prisoners were taken on the Eastern Front. In this period, we also attribute half of the prisoners from the fleet and one third of the prisoners from the Air Force to the share of the Eastern Front in this period - about 5 thousand people in total. Human.

In Soviet camps for captured German soldiers and their allies, the mortality rate during the war years was also extremely high, primarily due to a lack of food.

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freedom, which was sorely lacking both for the Red Army and for the civilian population. And this despite the fact that up to 1945 there were an order of magnitude fewer prisoners of war in the USSR than in Germany. The rations for prisoners of war that existed in the Soviet Union in 1942-1943 did not provide an energy minimum even for non-working prisoners. From the beginning of the war until May 1, 1943, out of 292,630 registered prisoners in the USSR, 196,944 people died, or 67.3%, which was even higher than the death rate of Soviet prisoners in German camps. And it is correct to compare precisely these indicators, since the repatriation of prisoners for Germany was impossible. In addition, there were already millions of French and Polish prisoners in Germany. Only towards the end of 1944

the nutritional standards of prisoners of war in the USSR reached a physiological minimum, but even this was often not achieved due to theft and lack of food. Norms fell sharply again in 1946 due to the famine that befell the country! 8. It is known, for example, that out of approximately 110 thousand Germans taken prisoner near Stalingrad, only 5 thousand people returned home from captivity, or 2.6% of all prisoners! ?.

After the end of the war, the death rate of prisoners in the USSR fell due to the fact that weak and sick prisoners were repatriated in the first place. In total, 2,733,739 former servicemen of the German army were in Soviet captivity. Among them - 2388.4 thousand Germans, 156.7 thousand Austrians, 70.0 thousand Czechs and Slovaks, 23.1 thousand French, 21.8 thousand immigrants from Yugoslavia, 60.3 thousand Poles, 4 .7 thousand Dutch, 2.0 thousand Belgians, 1.7 thousand Luxembourgers, as well as 452 Spaniards, 456 Danes, 101 Norwegians and about 4.0 thousand representatives of other nationalities . Of these, 381,067 people died, or 13.9% of the prisoners. Among the Germans, the number of deaths was 356.7 thousand, and among the Austrians - 10.9 thousand people!20. In addition, more than 220 thousand soldiers of the German army from among the former Soviet citizens were captured. We are talking about the "Hee-Vee" ("voluntary assistants") who served as auxiliary personnel in the German units!?! This number, obviously, also includes up to 40 thousand ROA fighters and up to 50 thousand members Cossack formations. In addition, several hundred thousand

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German prisoners were released from captivity in Germany shortly after being captured without being registered as prisoners. Their number can be approximately estimated by subtracting G.F. Krivosheev figures in 3576.3 thousand captured German soldiers!?? 220 thousand Chi-Vi and other Soviet citizens, as well as 2733.7 thousand prisoners of war who ended up in camps. It turns out 622.6 thousand people. In total, about 11.6 million soldiers of the German army were captured, including about 8 million in the West!23. Taking into account the data on the number of those killed in Soviet captivity, the number of prisoners of war who died in captivity in the West can be approximately estimated at 350 thousand people. In total, according to our estimates, about 3950 thousand Wehrmacht servicemen died in the war, including Austrians, Czechs, Poles, Latvians, Estonians and other citizens of the USSR and other countries who served in the German armed forces. This estimate practically coincides with B. Müller-Gillebrand's estimate - 4 million dead!24.

The total number of deaths in the German armed forces, including the Luftwaffe and the Navy, can be estimated at 4 million people, of which about 0.8 million, according to the German tracing service, are those who died in captivity. Of this number, according to our estimates, about 2.6 million German servicemen died in the East, of which about 100,000 were killed by the Luftwaffe and the Navy!2 If the data on the death of 381.1 thousand Wehrmacht servicemen in Soviet captivity is correct, the total number of German servicemen who died in captivity with the Western Allies can be estimated at 0.42 million people. According to the estimate of R. Overmans, based on the card file of the German Tracing Service, 22 thousand people died in American captivity, 34 thousand people in French, 21 thousand people in British, 11 thousand people in Yugoslav and 363 in Soviet captivity 343 people. In addition, another 8.1 thousand prisoners died in captivity, but it is not known in which one! 26. The total number of those who died in captivity would then be 459.5 thousand, which is significantly less than the estimate of the Tracing Service, referring to the beginning of the 50s. However, these data refer only to those military personnel whose death is reliably established, and therefore may significantly

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underestimate the number of those who died in captivity, especially in the West. Overmans estimates the total number of German prisoners in the USA at 3.1 million people, in England - at 3.64 million people, in France - at 940 thousand people, in the USSR - at 3060 thousand people, in Yugoslavia - 190 thousand people and in other countries - 170 thousand people!27.

The German military historian R. Overmans estimates the losses of the German armed forces in World War II at 5.318 million dead, including those who died in captivity. This figure seems exaggerated to us. It was obtained in the following way. Available from the German service

search (Beschswep Poen & Eze) of the card file of those members of the German armed forces who were considered to be survivors after the war, Overmans took a representative sample of 7619 cards. According to him, there were about 15.2 million cards in the card file of the living. Overmans found that of the 7,619 people he studied, 1,100 people (14.4%) may have died during the war or in captivity, since there was no evidence that they were alive. These people were declared dead by the court or by decision of the authorities. Extending this proportion to the total population, Overmans concluded that approximately 2.2 million of those military personnel who were considered to have survived the war, in fact, should be included in the category of dying during the war, including in this concept and post-war captivity. To these 1100 cards, Overmans added 3051 cards from the card index, so to speak, "reliably dead", i.e. those servicemen whose death was confirmed either by combat reports or eyewitness accounts. Characteristically, Overmans does not indicate that among the 10,670 cards he studied, he came across women.

According to Overmans, there are about 3.1 million cards in this card index and, with rare exceptions, there is no double counting. Based on this sample, he determined the structure of the dead by years of conscription, years of death, theaters of operations, years of birth and regions of conscription, as well as by types of armed forces. Probable repeated count among the living (perhaps approximately equal to the repeated

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to the conscription at the end of the war of those previously demobilized) Overmans did not exclude from the card index and operated with a total estimate of 18.2 million people mobilized. At the same time, he made a breakdown by year of birth, as well as by regions of conscription, only for military personnel of the ground forces, the Luftwaffe and the navy, excluding the SS troops, among which there were many foreigners. Overmans estimated the number of SS troops at 900,000. Note that a double count could also be among the 3.1 million people who "certainly died," but Overmans considers it to be negligibly small in this last category. In fact, Overmans did not trace the fate of each of the 1100 "conditionally killed" he studied, i.e. could not find out the time, place and circumstances of their death. The study of this issue obviously requires time beyond the lifetime of one researcher, and in a number of cases the task turns out to be impossible in principle. Therefore, Overmans, obviously, established only the absence in the card indexes available to him of facts indicating that this person was alive after the war, but this circumstance, in our opinion, is not enough to unconditionally classify such people as dead.

In fact, 5.318 million people is not actually the number of dead German soldiers and officers, but only the maximum possible value of this number. Overmans' calculations are based on the data of the centralized card file for registering the deaths of German servicemen of the FRG. There are 3.1 million people here (to be more precise, by the end of 1994, 3,078,735 people)!²⁸ These are people who undoubtedly died at the front or died in captivity. There are reports or eyewitness reports about them. 2.2 million is the number of military personnel whose fate at the time of the request in the 1950s could not be reliably established that they were alive!² They were recognized, mainly in the mid-1950s, as dead at the request of their relatives, who claimed that they had no information about them since the war years. However, some of these servicemen, especially from among the wounded and disabled, could well have died after the war from natural causes, and the other could not be found due to a change of place.

inhabitant

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property, especially if they lived in the GDR or Austria, and also because of emigration to other countries. It should also be taken into account that, first of all, the disabled and suffering were released from Soviet captivity. dystrophy, who had a high chance of dying in the first months or years after returning to their homeland, even before they established a connection with their relatives. Indeed, in conditions when, as a result of the war, more than half of the population of Germany and Austria were forced to change their place of residence, and these countries themselves were divided into zones of occupation,

moreover, until the end of 1949 Germany did not even have its own government, the search for relatives and friends was a difficult and lengthy process.

It should be noted that in 1963 the number of reliably killed military personnel was 2,960,923 people. By the end of 1994, that number had increased to 3,078,735. Taking into account the fact that in 1963-1994 904 people were excluded from the number of dead, as those who died after the war, remained alive or were entered erroneously due to incorrect spelling of surnames, the total increase in the number of dead was equal to 118,716 people, or in an average of 3,710 people a year³⁶.

Of the approximately 2.2 million people whom Overmans considers conditionally dead, the death of 1,095,787 people was recognized by the court at the request of relatives who had no contact with them after the end of the war. Another 1,154,744 people are listed as unaccounted for and registered as deceased by the authorities, since there is no information about them for a long time that they are alive! 1. Thus, the decisions to declare them dead were taken on the initiative of interested persons - relatives who sought to receive an inheritance, divorce, etc., or officials who sought to exclude them from the unified system of social insurance. All these decisions could only be made after 1956, when the process of returning German prisoners was completed. It can be assumed that for those who were declared dead by the court, the probability of actually being killed during the war is more likely than for those who were declared as such by decision of the authorities.

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Of the 5,318,000 dead and missing, 4,737,000 fall within the territory of the Reich, including Austria, the Sudetenland, and the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 601,000 dead and missing belong to foreigners who served in the Wehrmacht, as well as conscripts and volunteers from the territories of Poland, France (Alsace and Lorraine), Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium annexed during the war. In addition, the number of 5318 thousand includes a significant number of Volkssturm fighters (78 thousand), as well as persons not differentiated by type of armed forces (154 thousand, including 63.5 thousand policemen, some of whom did not participate in hostilities)! 32. The number of dead and missing among persons aged 1873-1889 is 36,332 people, while 142,482 people of these years of birth were called up! 33. It turns out that a quarter of all those called at these ages died, which is not much more than the figure for all the dead - 29.1%, if we relate the number of 5318 thousand to the entire call of 18.3 million people, excluding recalled to the national economy, according to Overmans. Such a high percentage of dead and dead for the elderly seems incredible, given that they only rarely participated in combat, even taking into account the increased mortality of this contingent from disease. If we take the total number of mobilized people born in 1900 and older - 1472 thousand people, then the number of dead and missing is 288,310 people, which is 19.6%. This figure also appears to be extremely high.

If the figure of 5.3 million dead is correct, then according to Overmans' calculations, it turns out that almost as many German servicemen died in the last 10 months of the war as in the previous four and a half years, primarily due to the mass beating of prisoners in the last during the months of the war and shortly after the surrender, mainly on the Eastern Front. In total, in 1944 and 1945, according to Overmans, 1.8 and 1.54 million people died, including those who died in captivity!³⁴. At the same time, he attributed 135 thousand dead to 1946 and later. Only in the last three months

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The end of the war, according to Overmans, killed, including those who died in captivity, about a million German soldiers. However, it is known that in the last year of the war, the main losses of the Wehrmacht were captured, not killed or wounded, and the size of the German army was steadily declining, so that there is simply no room for millions of dead. Yes and

the number of those who died in captivity, especially in the West, where the vast majority of prisoners were released during the first two post-war years, could not be so high.

Overmans determines the losses of the SS troops at 314 thousand people, and the total number of those mobilized into these troops at 900 thousand. This gives the highest percentage of deaths among all branches of the armed forces - 34.9% compared to 31% ground forces³⁵. However, this assessment seems to us to be exaggerated. The fact is that at the beginning of 1945 there were 830 thousand people in the SS troops! 5. In order for the total number of those who served in them not to exceed 900 thousand people, it is necessary to admit, even in the absence of replenishment of the SS troops in 1945, that the losses of the SS troops before 1945 amounted to no more than 70 thousand killed and died, as well as survivors, but declared unfit for further service, and that in 1945, together with those who died in captivity, the SS troops should have lost 244 thousand people dead, which seems completely unbelievable. But we must also take into account that some of the volunteers from European countries, in particular from Scandinavia, left the SS troops before the end of the war. As an example, we point out that out of 592 Norwegian SS men who were in the SS division "Nordland" in the autumn of 1944 (before the battle for Berlin, at least 259 of them remained in the ranks), about 500 returned to Norway from the Soviet and American captivity (most of the surviving Norwegian volunteers were able to break through from Berlin to the American positions on the Elbe) and only about 100 people died in battles or in Soviet captivity! 7". In total, out of 101 Norwegian prisoners in the USSR, only 18 people died³⁸. In total, out of 5-6 thousand Norwegians who served in the SS troops, who died anyway

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and 934 people were not found missing³⁹.

It can be assumed that Overmans underestimated the number of those drafted into the SS troops and overestimated the number of deaths at the expense of foreigners, many of whom actually survived. Meanwhile, it is known that a significant part of the foreigners who were listed as irretrievable losses did not actually die and did not even end up in prisoner-of-war camps. Thus, most of the 14th SS division "Galicia" (up to 10 thousand people), having found themselves in the Brodsky boiler in July 1944, went over to the side of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In the same way, the main part of the 19th Latvian SS division, which ended up in Courland at the end of the war, did not capitulate, but went home, to a large extent later forming the backbone of the "forest brothers". Of the approximately 14 thousand military personnel, only 147,710 surrendered. Therefore, it can be assumed that a significant part of the foreigners shown among the 2.2 million people about whom there was no reliable data that they were alive did not actually die during the war or in the aftermath of the military nlenu,

It is quite possible that in reality the losses among the SS troops are no higher than in the ground forces of the Wehrmacht. More intense combat use and, accordingly, a higher level of losses of the German divisions of the SS troops could be fully compensated by the relatively low combat activity of the SS divisions formed from non-German peoples. It also plays a role that the methodology used by Overmans overestimates the number of deaths in the SS troops at the expense of foreigners. They or their relatives hardly ever applied to the German tracing service, and accordingly no one could mark on their cards that they were still alive after the war.

True, the proportion of "certainly dead" among the Waffen-SS troops turns out to be the highest - 66.1%, while the average for all German armed forces is 57.7%. However, it is possible that among the remaining "provisionally dead" in the SS troops, the proportion of survivors was the highest at the expense of foreigners. It should be noted that the smallest

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THE SHARE of the "reliably dead" is found among the Volkssturm fighters is 42.5%. It is quite probable that most of the elderly Volkssturmmen who were considered "probably dead" actually died a natural death shortly after the end of the war. Also from approximately 100,000 dead police officers and members of other organizations? a large proportion may be civilians. It is also striking that the "conditionally dead" fall mainly on the Eastern Front (their share there is 41.4%, while in the West - only 15.0%), as well as in the battles of the last five months of the war, when the proportion of "conditionally dead" reaches 56.7%¹³, it is due to this category that the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht become especially large in 1944-1945, despite the fact that its numbers are falling sharply, and the main losses of the German troops are prisoners. Taking into account the fact that, according to Overmans, the losses on the Eastern Front amount to 2,743 thousand people and 1,230 thousand people, respectively, excluding those who died in captivity! ⁴, the number of "conditionally dead" among them is 1136 thousand and 697 thousand people. In total, this gives 1833 thousand people, or 83% of all conditionally killed during the war. But just in these two categories of losses, on the Eastern Front and in the last five months of the war, the accounting is the least accurate, so that Overmans' estimates reflect not so much the actual losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front and in the last months of the war, but the real state of their accounting. . No less important is the fact that precisely on the Eastern Front among the military there was an increased proportion of conscripts from East Germany, whose relatives later turned out to be among the "expelled and refugees in the western occupation zones of Germany and Austria and for a long time could not establish contact with those who were in captivity. Also, in the last 5 months of the war, the Red Army captured the bulk of German prisoners, whose fate in Germany was unknown for a long time. Taking into account the fact that as a result of the war more than half of the population of Germany changed their place of residence, the oldest soldiers who returned from captivity, as well as those released from captivity in Germany and Austria, as well as the youngest conscripts

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There were very few chances of finding their relatives in the first post-war years. According to Overmans, a total of 43,833 conscripts born in 1928 and later were called up, of which 33.2 thousand people died or went missing, i.e. more than three-quarters, with more than 18 thousand dead accounted for by the Volkssturm"⁵. It can be assumed that a significant part of the representatives of the youngest ages, after being released from captivity, emigrated or started a new family, without establishing ties with their relatives. Some representatives of older ages, demobilized during the war, could die before the end of the war or in the first post-war years.

It must be borne in mind that, despite the ban, there was illegal emigration from Germany in the first post-war years. Thus, 14,400 people of "German origin" entered Canada in 1941-1950⁶. Obviously, almost all of them moved in after 1945, and a significant part of them were former military personnel. There must have been emigration also to the United States and Latin American countries, as well as to the Scandinavian countries and the Iberian Peninsula. In total, the number of emigrants among former military personnel could exceed 100 thousand people.

Human.

Some of the 2.2 million unidentified servicemen, especially among the wounded and disabled, could well have died after the war from natural causes, while others, especially among those living in the GDR or Austria, could not be found due to a change of place residence or emigration to other countries. It should be taken into account that the first to be released from Soviet captivity were the emaciated and the disabled, who could die in the first year or two after liberation without having established contact with relatives. It is no coincidence that the current German law on military graves states that they are understood as "the graves of those who died from 08/26/1939 to 03/31/1952, died from an accident or from wounds and diseases in military and paramilitary for- mirovaniya, as well as the graves of those who died in captivity or because of the consequences of captivity before 03/31/1952 or a year after returning from captivity! ⁷. It is likely that the 2.2 million "probationary deaths" also include those who died from the consequences of

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captivity until March 31, 1952 or within a year after returning from captivity. Also, both reliably and conditionally dead may include some members of paramilitary organizations, such as the Todt organization, that are not related to the Wehrmacht. In addition, some of the alleged victims could have arisen due to the incorrect spelling of their names in the documents.

It can be assumed that the survivors could be up to half of the 2.2 million unidentified German soldiers. In this case, one can consider the estimate of General B. Müller-Hillebrand of the number of victims of the German armed forces at 4 million people to be the closest to reality.

GERMAN POPULATION LOSSES AND TOTAL POPULATION LOSSES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A great difficulty is the determination of the losses of the civilian German population. For example, the number of deaths as a result of the bombing of Dresden by Allied aircraft in February 1945 ranges from 25,000 to 250,000 people! 8, since there were a significant but unspecified number of refugees from West Germany in the city, the number of which was impossible to count. According to official figures, 410 thousand civilians and another 23 thousand police and civilian employees of the armed forces became victims of air raids within the borders of the Reich in 1937. In addition, 160,000 foreigners, prisoners of war and displaced persons from the occupied territories died from the bombings. Within the borders of 1942 (but without the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia), the number of victims of air raids increases to 635 thousand people, and taking into account the victims of civilian employees of the Wehrmacht and policemen - up to 658 thousand people! The losses of the German civilian population from ground combat operations are estimated at 400 thousand people, the losses of the civilian population of Austria - at 17 thousand people (the last

grade

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seems to be underestimated by 2-3 times). 450,000 people, including up to 160,000 Jews, became victims of the Nazi terror in Germany, and 100,000 people, including 60,000 Jews, in Austria! 5. It is more difficult to determine how many Germans became victims of hostilities on German territory, as well as how many Germans who were deported from the Sudetenland, Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and also from the Balkan countries in 1945-1946 died. In total, more than 9 million Germans were evicted, including 250 thousand from Romania and Hungary and 300 thousand from Yugoslavia. In addition, up to 20,000 war criminals and Nazi functionaries were executed in the zones of occupation of Germany and Austria, mainly in the Soviet zone, after the war, and another 70,000 internees died in the camps! 1. There are other estimates of the victims of the civilian population of Germany (without Austria and other annexed territories): about 2 million people, including 600-700 thousand women aged 20 to 55 years, 300 thousand victims of Nazi terror, including 170,000 Jews! 5?. The most reliable estimate of the dead among the expelled Germans seems to be 473 thousand people - this is the number of people whose death is confirmed by eyewitnesses! 53. It is not possible to determine the exact number of victims of land hostilities on the territory of Germany, as well as the possible number of deaths from starvation and disease (excess mortality during the war).

It is also impossible to estimate today the total irretrievable losses of Germany, as well as the losses of the civilian population. Estimates that sometimes appear of 2-2.5 million civilians who died during the Second World War are conditional, not supported by any reliable statistics or demographic balances. changes in borders and migrations of the population after the war.

If we assume that the number of victims of hostilities on the territory of Germany among the civilian population was approximately equal to the number of victims of aerial bombardments, i.e. about 0.66 million people, then the total losses of the civilian population of Germany within the borders of 1940 can be estimated at about 2.4 million people, without taking into account the victims of excessive natural

noah mortality. Together with the armed forces, this will give a total loss of 6.3 million people, if we take the estimate of the losses of the armed forces made by B. Müller-Gillebrand. Overmans puts the number of dead German servicemen called up from the territory of Austria at 261,000 people!⁵. Since we consider his assessment of the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht to be overestimated by about 1.325 times, then his assessment of the losses of the Austrians in the Wehrmacht should be reduced in the same proportion - to 197 thousand people. The number of victims of aerial bombardment of Austria was small, since this country had never been the main object of Allied air operations. The population of Austria was no more than one-twelfth the population of the Reich in the 1942 borders, and given the lower intensity of the bombing of Austrian territory, the losses of the Austrians from the bombings can be estimated at about one-twentieth of the total number of victims, i.e. 33 thousand people. We estimate the number of victims of hostilities on the territory of Austria at no less than 50 thousand people. Thus, the total losses of Austria can be estimated, together with the victims of the Nazi terror, at 380 thousand people.

It should be emphasized that the figure of total German losses of 6.3 million people cannot be compared with the total losses of the USSR of 40.1-40.9 million people, since the figure of German losses was obtained without taking into account the excess non-violent death of the civilian population. Only the losses of the armed forces can be compared. Their ratio is 6.73:1 in favor of Germany.

CORRELATION OF THE IRREVOCABLE LOSSES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND GERMANY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The true size of Soviet Armed Forces casualties, including those who died in captivity, according to our estimate, may be 26.9 million people. This is approximately 10.3 times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army that fought on

side of Hitler, lost about 160 thousand killed and dead, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity! 6. The losses of another ally of Germany, Finland, amounted to about 61 thousand killed and dead, including 403 people who died in Soviet captivity and about 1 thousand people died in battles against the Wehrmacht! 7. The Romanian army lost in the battles against the Red Army about 165 thousand killed and dead, including 71,585 killed, 309,533 missing, 243,622 wounded and 54,612 dead in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldavians returned from captivity. Thus, from among the missing, 37,536 people must be attributed to the dead. If we assume that approximately 10% of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in the battles with the Red Army will be about 188.1 thousand dead. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the mortality among the wounded was 10%, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Thus, the total number of killed and died in captivity from among the missing Romanian military personnel can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the fight against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead! The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in the battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners!. Finally, the army of Slovakia lost 1.9 thousand dead in the battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity! On the side of the USSR, the army of Bulgaria fought against Germany, losing about 19 thousand dead!'. Two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27,500 dead and missing!⁶², and the Czechoslovak corps, which also fought on the side of the Red Army, lost 4,000 dead!. The total losses on the Soviet side can be estimated at 27.1 million troops, and on the German side - at 2.9 million people, which gives a ratio of 9.1-9.3: 1. To the council

In the 1939-1940 Scot-Finnish war, the ratio of losses killed and dead was 7.0: 1, not in favor of the Red Army (we estimate the Soviet losses of the dead at 164.3 thousand people, and the Finnish - at 23.5 thousand people)! 64. It can be assumed that this ratio was about the same in 1941-1944. Then, in the battles with the Finnish troops, the Red Army could lose up to 417 thousand killed and died from wounds. It must also be taken into account that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the war with Japan amounted to 12,000 men! If we accept that in battles with the rest of the German allies, the losses of the Red Army were approximately equal to the losses of the enemy, then in these battles it could lose up to 284 thousand people. And in the battles against the Wehrmacht, the losses of the Red Army in the dead should have been about 22.2 million killed and died of wounds against about 2.1 million killed and died on the German side. This gives a loss ratio of 10.6:1.

According to Russian search engines, for one found corpse of a Wehrmacht soldier, on average, there are ten corpses of Red Army soldiers! 6. This ratio is almost equal to our estimate of the ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

It is interesting to trace at least an approximate ratio of the losses of the parties over the years of the war. Using the ratio established above between the number of dead and injured in the battles of Soviet military personnel and based on the data given in the book by E.I. Smirnov, the number of dead Soviet servicemen by years can be distributed as follows: 1941 - 2.2 million, 1942 - 8 million, 1943 - 6.4 million, 1944 - 6.4 million, 1945 - 2, 5 million. It should also be taken into account that approximately 0.9 million Red Army soldiers who were listed as irretrievable losses, but later found out in the liberated territory and called up again, mainly accounted for 1941-1942. Due to this, we decrease the losses by those who died in 1941 by 0.6 million, and in 1942 by 0.3 million people (in proportion to the number of prisoners) and, with the addition of prisoners, we get the total irretrievable losses of the Red Army by goals: 1941 - 5.5 million, 1942 - 7.153 million, 1943 -

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6.965 million, 1944 - 6.547 million, 1945 - 2.534 million. For comparison, let's take the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces over the years, based on the data of B. Müller-Gillebrand. At the same time, we subtracted from the final figures the losses suffered outside the Eastern Front, tentatively spreading them over the years. The following picture emerged for the Eastern Front (the number of total irretrievable losses of ground forces for the year is given in brackets): 1941 (since June) - 301 thousand (307 thousand), 1942 - 519 thousand (538 thousand), 1943 - 668 thousand (793 thousand), 1944 (for this year, losses in December are taken equal to January) - 1129 thousand (1629 thousand), 1945 (before May 1) - 550 thousand (1250 thousand).)!57. The ratio in all cases is obtained in favor of the Wehrmacht: 1941 - 18.1: 1, 1942 - 13.7: 1, 1943 - 19.4: 1, 1944 - 5.8: 1, 1945 - 4, 6:1. These ratios should be close to the true ratios of the irretrievable losses of the ground forces of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front, since the losses of the ground army amounted to the lion's share of all Soviet military losses, and the German aviation and navy the main irretrievable losses during the war were suffered outside the Eastern Front. As for the losses of the German allies in the East, the underestimation of which somewhat worsens the indicators of the Red Army, it should be taken into account that in the fight against them the Red Army suffered relatively much smaller losses than in the fight against the Wehrmacht, that the German allies actively acted far away. not in all periods of the war and suffered the greatest losses as prisoners in the framework of general capitulations (Romania and Hungary). In addition, the losses of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian units operating together with the Red Army were not taken into account on the Soviet side. So, in general, the correlations we have identified should be fairly objective. They show that the improvement in the ratio of irretrievable losses for the Red Army occurs only from 1944, when the Allies landed in the West and Lend-Lease assistance already gave the maximum effect in terms of both direct deliveries of weapons and equipment, and the deployment of Soviet military production. The Wehrmacht was forced

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throw reserves to the West and could no longer, as in 1943, unleash active operations in the East. In addition, there were heavy losses of experienced soldiers and officers. Nevertheless, until the end of the war, the ratio of losses remained unfavorable for the Red Army due to its inherent vices (temporality, contempt for human life, inept use of weapons and equipment, lack of continuity of experience due to huge losses and inept use of marching reinforcements, etc.).

A particularly unfavorable ratio of losses for the Red Army was in the period from December 1941 to April 1942, when the Red Army carried out its first large-scale counter-offensive. For example, the 323rd Rifle Division of the 10th Army of the Western Front alone lost 4,138 people in three days of fighting, from 17 to 19 December 1941, including 1,696 dead and missing⁸. This gives an average daily loss of 1,346 people, including 565 irretrievable losses. The entire German Eastern Army, numbering more than 150 divisions, for the period from December 11 to December 31, 1941 inclusive, had an average daily loss rate only slightly higher. The Germans lost 2,658 men per day, including only 686 - irretrievably! ⁸⁹.

It's just amazing! One of our divisions lost as much as 150 German ones. Even if we assume that not all German formations were in combat every day during the last three weeks of December 1941, even if we assume that the losses of the 323rd Rifle Division in the three-day battles were for some reason uniquely large, the difference is too striking. eyes and cannot be explained by statistical errors. Here it is necessary to speak about the errors of the social, fundamental vices of the Soviet method of waging war.

By the way, according to the testimony of the former commander of the 10th Army, Marshal F.I. Golikov, and in the preceding days, the 323rd division suffered heavy losses, and, despite the fact that the Soviet troops were advancing, the losses were dominated by the missing, most of whom, most likely, were killed. So, in the battles for December 11

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in the course of its turn to the south towards the city of Epifan and the settlement of Lupishki, the 323rd division lost 78 people killed, 153 wounded and up to 200 missing⁹. And on December 17-19, the 323rd Division, together with other divisions of the 10th Army, successfully, by Soviet standards, attacked the German defensive line on the Upa River. And by the next frontier, the Plava River, the 323rd Division was not yet the most battered of the divisions of the 10th Army, which were fully equipped before the start of the Moscow counteroffensive. 7,613 men remained in the 323rd division, while only 6,238 men remained in the neighboring 326th. entered the battle. Lack of experience and internal cohesion of the units led to heavy losses. Nevertheless, on the night of December 19-20, two divisions took Plavsk, breaking through the enemy line. At the same time, a few allegedly lost more than 200 people alone! In fact, taking into account the fact that at that moment most of the German divisions were operating in the Moscow direction, and Plavsk was defended by only one regiment, the losses of the latter could not exceed several dozen killed. On November 17, 1942, he became a major general, in 1943 he commanded the 53rd rifle corps, successfully ended the war, having been awarded the Kutuzov order of the commander of the 1st degree, and died peacefully in 1961.

Let us compare the above monthly data on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942 with the monthly data on the losses of the German land army, calculated from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German land army, General F. Halder. Here it should be noted that the Soviet data include not only losses in the ground forces, but also losses in aviation and navy. In addition, the irretrievable losses on the Soviet side include not only those killed and missing, but also those who died from wounds. In the data given by Halder, only the losses of those killed and missing are included.

we are missing, relating only to the ground forces, without the Luftwaffe and the fleet. This circumstance makes the loss ratio more favorable for the German side than it actually was. After all, taking into account the fact that in the Wehrmacht the ratio of the wounded and killed was closer to the classical one - 3:1, and in the Red Army - closer to the unconventional ratio - 1:1, and also taking into account that the death rate in German hospitals was significantly higher than in the Soviet ones, since the latter received much fewer seriously wounded, the category of those who died from wounds accounted for a much larger share in the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht than the Red Army. Also, the share of aviation and navy losses was relatively higher for the Wehrmacht than for the Red Army, due to the extremely large losses of the Soviet ground forces. In addition, we do not take into account the losses of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian armies allied with the Wehrmacht, which also makes the loss ratio more favorable for Germany. However, all these factors can overestimate this indicator by no more than 20–25% and are not capable of distorting the overall

trend.

According to F. Halder's diary entries, from December 31, 1941 to January 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 87,082, including 18,074 killed and 7,175 missing. The irretrievable losses of the Red Army (killed and missing) in January 1942 amounted to 628 thousand people, which gives a loss ratio of 24.9:1. Between January 31 and February 28, 1942, German losses in the East amounted to 87,651 people, including 18,776 killed and 4,355 missing. Soviet losses in February reached 523 thousand people and turned out to be 22.6 times more than German irretrievable losses.

In the period from March 1 to March 31, 1942, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 102,194 people, including 12,808 killed and 5,217 missing. Soviet losses in March 1942 amounted to 625 thousand dead and missing. This gives us a record ratio of 34.7:1. In April, when the offensive began to fade, but the Soviet troops still suffered quite a few losses as prisoners.

little, German losses amounted to 60,005 people, including 12,690 killed and 2,573 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 435,000 dead and missing. The ratio is 28.5:1.

In May 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy losses of prisoners as a result of its unsuccessful offensive near Kharkov and the successful German offensive on the Kerch Peninsula, its losses amounted to 433 thousand people. This figure is likely to be significantly underestimated. After all, the Nempas alone captured almost 400 thousand prisoners in May, and compared to April, when there were almost no prisoners, the losses even decreased by 13 thousand people - with a fall in the index of those struck in battles by only three points. The losses of the German ground forces can only be calculated for the period from May to June 10, 1942. They amounted to 100,599 people, including 21,157 killed and 4,212 missing. To establish the ratio of irretrievable losses, a third of the losses in June must be added to the Soviet losses in May. Soviet losses for this month amounted to 519 thousand people. Most likely, they are overestimated due to the inclusion of underestimated May losses in the June parts. Therefore, the total loss figure for May and the first ten days of June of 606,000 dead and missing seems close to reality. The deadweight loss ratio is 23.9:1, not fundamentally different from the indicators of several previous months.

During the period from 19 to 30 June, the losses of the German ground forces in the East amounted to 64,013 people, including 11,079 killed and 2,270 missing. The ratio of deadweight losses for the second and third decades of June turns out to be 25.9:1.

In July 1942, the German land army in the East lost 96,341 men, including 17,782 killed and 3,290 missing. Soviet losses in July 1942 amounted to only

330 thousand people, and, most likely, they are somewhat underestimated. But this underestimation is largely compensated by the more significant losses of the German allies who participated in the general offensive in the south that began at the end of June. Ratio without

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return loss is 15.7:1. This already means a significant improvement in this indicator for the Red Army. The German offensive turned out to be less catastrophic for the Red Army in terms of casualties than its own offensive in the winter and spring of 1942.

But the real turning point in the ratio of irretrievable losses occurred in August 1942, when German troops were advancing on Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Soviet troops were advancing in the Rzhev region. Soviet losses in prisoners were significant, and there certainly was an underestimation of Soviet irretrievable losses, but most likely it was no more than in July. In August 1942, the German army in the East lost 160,294 men, including 31,713 killed and 7,443 missing. Soviet losses this month amounted to 385 thousand dead and missing. The ratio is 9.8:1, i.e. an order of magnitude better for the Red Army than in the winter or spring of 1942. Even taking into account the likely underestimation of Soviet losses in August, the change in the ratio of losses looks significant. Moreover, the likely underestimation of Soviet losses was offset by a significant increase in the losses of the German allies - the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian troops, who actively participated in the summer-autumn offensive. The loss ratio is improving not so much due to the reduction in Soviet losses (although this, in all likelihood, took place), but due to a significant increase in German losses. It is no coincidence that it was in August 1942 that Hitler, according to W. Schellenberg, for the first time admitted the possibility that Germany would lose the war, and in September the loud resignations of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army F. Halder and the Commander-in-Chief operating in the Caucasus followed. Army Group A Field Marshal V. List. Hitler was beginning to realize that there was no way out of the impasse into which the German offensive in the Caucasus and Stalingrad was increasingly entering, and that the growing losses would soon enough lead the Wehrmacht to exhaustion, but he could not do anything.

Halder's diary makes it possible to calculate the losses of the ground forces only for the first ten days of September. They made up

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48,198 people, including 9558 killed and 3637 missing!"4. Soviet losses in September amounted to 473,000 dead and missing. Not only do these losses not seem to underestimate, but, on the contrary, rather underestimate the true size of Soviet losses in September by including earlier unrecorded losses, since in this month, compared with August, the index of those killed in battles fell from 130 to 109. One third of 473 thousand is 157.7 thousand. The ratio of Soviet and German irretrievable losses in the first decade of September 1942 turns out to be 11.95:1, which proves that the August trend of improving the ratio of losses continued into September, especially considering into account the overestimation of Soviet losses this month.

In the further course of the war, the irretrievable losses of the German land army, with rare exceptions, only grew. The number of Soviet prisoners of war sharply decreased in 1943, while the German troops this year for the first time suffered significant losses of prisoners on the Eastern Front as a result of the Stalingrad catastrophe. Soviet losses in killed after 1942 also experienced an upward trend, however, the absolute value of the increase in killed was significantly less than the amount by which the average monthly number of Soviet prisoners decreased. According to the dynamics of the index of those killed in battles, the maximum losses in killed and dead from wounds were noted in July, August and September 1943, during the Battle of Kursk and forcing the Dnieper (the index of those killed in battles in these months is 143, 172 and 139, respectively) . The next peak of the losses of the Red Army in killed and dead from wounds falls on July,

August and September 1944 (132, 140 and 130). The only peak of casualties in 1941-1942 falls on August 1942 (130)¹⁷. There were some months when the ratio of deadweight losses was almost as unfavorable for the Soviet side as in the first half of 1942, for example, during the Battle of Kursk, but in most of the months of 1943-1945 this ratio was already significantly better for the Red Army. than in 1941-1942

years.

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A significant, by Soviet standards, improvement in the ratio of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and its allies, which began in August 1942 and continued until the end of the war, was due to the action of several factors. Firstly, Soviet middle and senior commanders, starting with regimental commanders, gained certain combat experience and began to fight somewhat more competently, adopting a number of tactics from the Germans. At a lower command level, as well as among ordinary fighters, there was no significant improvement in the quality of combat operations, because due to huge losses, a large turnover of personnel remained. An improvement in the relative quality of Soviet tanks and aircraft, as well as an increase in the level of training of pilots and tankers, also played a role, although

the level of training they were still inferior to the Germans even at the end of the WAR.

But an even greater role than the growth of the combat capability of the Red Army in the defeat of Germany on the Eastern Front was played by the decline in the combat capability of the Wehrmacht. Due to the ever-increasing irretrievable losses, the proportion of experienced soldiers and officers decreased. Due to the need to replace increasing losses, by the end of the war, the level of training of pilots and tankers had decreased, although it remained higher than that of their Soviet opponents. This drop in the level of training could not even compensate for the growth in the quality of military equipment. But more importantly, starting in November 1942, after the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany had to send more and more aircraft, and then ground forces, to fight against the Western Allies. Germany had to make greater use of its weaker allies. The defeat by the Red Army of significant Italian, Romanian and Hungarian troops in late 1942 - early 1943 and in the second half of 1944 - early 1945 significantly improved the ratio of irretrievable losses in favor of the Soviet side and significantly increased the numerical advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht . Another turning point here occurred after the Allied landings in Normandy in June

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1944. It was from July 1944 that there was a sharp increase in the irretrievable losses of the German army, primarily prisoners. In June, the irretrievable losses of the ground forces amounted to 58 thousand people, and in July - 369 thousand and remained at such a high level until the end of the war! front, thanks to which the Soviet numerical superiority in people increased to seven or even up to eight times, which made it impossible for any effective defense. Explaining the enormous Soviet casualties, German generals usually point to the neglect of the lives of soldiers on the part of the high command, weakly the tactical training of the middle and lower command personnel, the stereotyped methods used during the offensive, the inability of both commanders and soldiers to make independent decisions!" Such statements could be considered a simple attempt to belittle the dignity of the enemy, who nevertheless won the war, If not for numerous similar testimonies from the Soviet side, Zhores Medvedev recalls the battles near Novorossiysk in 1943: "The Germans near Novorossiysk had two lines of defense, perfectly fortified to a depth of about 3 km. It was believed that artillery preparation was very effective, but it seems to me that the Germans quickly adapted to it. Noticing that the equipment was concentrating and powerful shooting began, they went to the second line, leaving only a few machine gunners on the front line. They left and, with the same interest as we, observed all this noise and smoke. Then we were ordered to go forward. We walked, got blown up by mines and occupied the trenches - already almost empty, only two or three corpses were lying there. Then the order was given - to attack the second

line. It was then that up to 80% of the advancing Vigils perished - the Germans, after all, were sitting in perfectly fortified structures and shot all of us almost point-blank! 78. The American diplomat A. Harriman conveys Stalin's words that "in the Soviet Army one must have more courage to retreat than to advance" and comments on it this way: "This phrase of Stalin clearly shows that he

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aware of the state of affairs in the army. We were shocked, but we understood that this forced the Red Army to fight... Our military, who consulted with the Germans after the war, told me that the most destructive thing about the Russian offensive was its mass character. The Russians came wave after wave. The Germans literally mowed them down, but as a result of such pressure, one wave broke through!

And here is the testimony of the battles in December 1943 in Belarus of the former platoon commander V. Dyatlov: "A chain of people in civilian clothes with huge "sadors" behind their backs passed by, along the way of the message." "Slavs, who are you, where are you from?" I asked. - "We are from the Oryol region, replenishment." - "What kind of replenishment, when in civilian clothes and without RIFLES?" - "Yes, they said that you would get it in battle ...

The artillery strike on the enemy lasted five minutes. 36 guns of the artillery regiment "hollowed out" the front line of the Germans. From the discharges of shells, visibility became even worse ...

And here is the attack. The chain rose, writhing like a black, curved snake. Behind her is the second. And those black snakes writhing and moving were so absurd, so unnatural on the gray-white earth! Black on snow is a perfect target. And the German "watered" these chains with dense lead. Many firing points came to life. Large-caliber machine guns fired from the second line of the trench. The chains are stuck. The battalion commander yelled: "Forward, motherfucker! Forward!.. In battle! Forward! I'll shoot!" But it was impossible to get up. Try to tear yourself off the ground under the artillery, bullet

metgny and automatic fire ...

The commanders still managed to raise the "black" village infantry several times. But all in vain. The enemy fire was so dense that, after running a couple of steps, people fell as if they had been cut down. We, the gunners, also could not reliably help - there was no visibility, the Germans camouflaged the firing points well, and, most likely, the main machine-gun fire was fired from bunkers, and therefore the firing of our guns did not give the desired results.

The same memoirist very colorfully describes the reconnaissance in force carried out by the battalion

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nikov: "Two divisions of our regiment participated in a ten-minute fire raid - that's all. There was silence for a few seconds after the fire. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: "Guys, ah! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Behind me! Hooray! The penitentiaries slowly crawled out of the trench and, as if waiting for the last, throwing their rifles at the ready, ran. A groan or a cry with a drawn-out "ah-ah-ah" shimmered from left to right and again to the left, now fading, now intensifying. We also jumped out of the trench and ran forward. The Germans threw a series of red rockets towards the attackers and immediately opened a powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, and we also lay down - a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. I couldn't raise my head. How to detect and to whom to detect enemy targets in this hell? His artillery hit from covered positions and far from the flanks. They also beat heavy guns. Several tanks fired at direct fire, their blank shells whining overhead...

Penal boxes lay in front of the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German "threshed" this field, plowing the earth, and bushes, and the bodies of people ... Only seven people left us with a battalion of penal ones, and it was all together - 306"180.

By the way, there was no attack in this area.

We have a story about such senseless and bloody attacks in the memoirs and letters of German soldiers and junior officers. One unnamed witness describes the attack of units of the 37th Soviet army of A.A. Vlasov to the height occupied by the Germans near Kiev in August 194] of the year, and his description in detail coincides with the story of the Soviet officer given above. Here and useless artillery preparation past the German positions, and the attack in thick waves, perishing under German machine guns, and an unknown commander, unsuccessfully trying to raise his people and dying from a German bullet. Such attacks on a not very important height continued for three days in a row. The German soldiers were most struck by the fact that when the whole wave perished, single soldiers still continued to run forward (the Germans were on such senseless actions

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were unable). These failed attacks nevertheless exhausted the Germans physically. And, as a German soldier recalls, what most shocked and depressed him and his comrades was the methodicalness and scale of these attacks: "If the Soviets can afford to spend so many people trying to eliminate such insignificant results of our advance, then how often how many people will they attack if the object is really very important?!! (The German author could not imagine that otherwise the Red Army simply did not know how to attack and could not.)

And in the letter of a German soldier home during the retreat from Kursk in the second half of 1943, it is described, as in the quoted letter of V. Dyatlov, an attack by almost unarmed and non-equipped reinforcements from the newly liberated territories (the same Oryol region), in which killed the vast majority of participants (according to an eyewitness, even women were among those called). The prisoners said that the authorities suspected the inhabitants of collaborating with the occupying authorities, and mobilization served as a form of punishment for them. And in the same letter, an attack by Soviet penalty boxers through a German minefield to blow up mines at the cost of their own lives is described (the story of Marshal G.K. Zhukov about this practice of the Soviet troops is cited in his memoirs by D. Eisenhower). And again, the German soldier was most struck by the obedience of the mobilized and the penalized. Prisoners of the penalty, "with rare exceptions, never complained about such treatment." they said that life is hard and that "you have to pay for mistakes"! 2. Such obedience of the Soviet soldiers clearly shows that the Soviet regime brought up not only commanders capable of issuing such inhuman orders, but also soldiers capable of carrying out such orders unquestioningly.

The inability of the Red Army to fight otherwise than at the cost of very large bloodshed is also evidenced by high-ranking Soviet military leaders. So, Marshal A.I. Eremenko characterizes the features of the "art of war" of the famous (deservedly?) "Marshal

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victory" G.K. Zhukova: "It should be said that Zhukov's operational art is 5-6 times superior in strength, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight not in numbers and builds his career on blood"! By the way, in another case, the same A.I. Eremenko conveyed his impression of reading the memoirs of the German generals in the following way: "The question naturally arises, why did the Hitlerite "heroes", who "defeated" our squad together, and five together a whole platoon, could not complete the tasks in the first period of the war, when an undeniable numerical and technical superiority was on their side? Yeremenko actually knew very well that the German military leaders did not exaggerate the balance of power in favor of the Red Army. After all, G.K. Zhukov led the main operations in the main directions and had an overwhelming superiority of forces and means. Another thing is that other Soviet generals and marshals were hardly able to fight otherwise than G.K. Zhukov, and A.I. Eremenko was no exception here.

We also note that the huge irretrievable losses of the Red Army did not allow, to the same extent as in the Wehrmacht, and even more so in the armies of the Western allies, to retain experienced soldiers and junior commanders, which reduced the cohesion and stamina of the units and did not allow the replenishment fighters to adopt combat experience from veterans, which further increased losses. Such an unfavorable ratio of irretrievable losses for the USSR was the result of a fundamental flaw in the communist totalitarian system, which deprived people of the ability to independently make decisions and act, taught everyone, including the military, to act according to a template, to avoid even a reasonable risk and more than the enemy. to be afraid of responsibility
their higher authorities.

As the former intelligence officer E.I. Malashenko, who after the war rose to the rank of lieutenant general, even at the very end of the war, Soviet troops often acted very inefficiently: "A few hours before the offensive of our division on March 10, a reconnaissance group ... captured a prisoner. He showed that the main forces of his regiment

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withdrawn to 8-10 km in depth ... By telephone, I reported this information to the division commander, who - to the commander. The division commander gave us his car to deliver the prisoner to the army headquarters. Approaching the command post, we heard the rumble of artillery preparations that had begun. Unfortunately, it was carried out on unoccupied positions. Thousands of shells delivered with great difficulty through the Carpathians (it happened on the 4th Ukrainian Front. - B.S.) turned out to be spent in vain. The surviving enemy with stubborn resistance stopped the advance of our troops. The same author gives a comparative assessment of the fighting qualities of German and Soviet soldiers and officers - not in favor of the Red Army: "German soldiers and officers fought well. The rank and file was well trained, skillfully acted on the offensive and in defense. Well-trained non-commissioned officers played a more prominent role in combat than our sergeants, many of whom were almost indistinguishable from privates. Enemy infantry constantly fired intensely, acted persistently and swiftly in the offensive, stubbornly defended and carried out quick counterattacks, usually supported by artillery fire, and sometimes by air strikes. The tankers also aggressively attacked, fired on the move and from short stops, skillfully maneuvered and conducted reconnaissance. In case of failure, they quickly concentrated their efforts in another direction, often striking at the junctions and flanks of our units. Artillery promptly opened fire and conducted it sometimes very accurately. She had a large amount of ammunition. German officers skillfully organized the battle and controlled the actions of their subunits and units, skillfully used the terrain, and timely maneuvered in a favorable direction. With the threat of encirclement or defeat, German units and subunits made an organized retreat in depth, usually to occupy a new line. Soldiers and officers of the enemy were intimidated by rumors of reprisals against prisoners, they rarely surrendered without a fight ...

Our infantry was trained weaker than the German. However, she fought bravely. Of course, there were instances of panic and

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temporary withdrawal, especially at the beginning of the war. The infantry was greatly assisted by artillery, the most effective was the fire of "Katyushas" in repelling enemy counterattacks and delivering strikes on areas of concentration and concentration of troops. However, artillery in the initial period of the war had few shells. It must be admitted that the tank units in the attacks did not always act skillfully. At the same time, in the operational depth during the development of the offensive, they showed themselves brilliantly!

Even at that time, some Soviet generals recognized the excessively large losses of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War, although this was by no means safe. For example, Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin, who previously commanded the army, and then was engaged in the preparation of reserves, had the imprudence to write in his diary that the Supreme

The High Command "does not care about maintaining manpower reserves and allows heavy losses in individual operations." This, along with others, "anti-Soviet" statement cost the general a sentence of 25 years in the camps! 6. And another military commander, Major General of Aviation A.A. Turzhansky - in 1942 he received only 12 years in the camps for a completely fair opinion about the reports of the Sovinformburo, which "are intended only to calm the masses and do not correspond to reality, since they downplay our losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy"! 7.

It is interesting that the ratio of irretrievable losses between Russian and German troops in the First World War was approximately the same as in the Great Patriotic War. This follows from a study conducted by S.G. Nelipovich. In the second half of 1916, the troops of the Russian Northern and Western fronts lost 54 thousand killed and 42.35 thousand missing. The German troops operating on these fronts and the few Austro-Hungarian divisions fighting on the Western Front lost 7,700 killed and 6,100 missing! 88 This gives a ratio of 7.0:1 as in killed and missing. On the Southwestern Front, Russian losses amounted to 202.8 thousand killed. Acting pro

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against him, the Austrian troops lost 55.1 thousand killed, and the German troops - 21.2 thousand killed. The ratio of losses turns out to be very indicative, especially considering that in the second half of 1916, Germany had far from the best divisions on the Eastern Front, mostly secondary divisions. If we assume that the ratio of Russian and German losses here was the same as on the other two fronts, then from the composition of the Russian Southwestern Front, approximately 148.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed in battles against the Germans, and approximately 54 4 thousand - in battles against the Austro-Hungarian troops. Thus, with the Austrians, the ratio of losses killed was even slightly in our favor - 1.01: 1, and the Austrians lost significantly more prisoners than the Russians - 377.8 thousand missing against 152.7 thousand for the Russians in all Southwestern Front, including in the battles against the German troops. If we extend these coefficients to the entire war as a whole, the ratio between the total losses of Russia and its opponents killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and in captivity can be estimated as 1.9:1. This calculation was made as follows. German losses on the Eastern Front of World War I, including losses on the Romanian Front, amounted to 173.8 thousand killed and 143.3 thousand missing. In total, according to official data, there were 177.1 thousand prisoners of war in Russia, of which more than 101 thousand people were repatriated by the end of 1918! Until the spring of 1918, 15.5 thousand people died in captivity! ⑥. It is possible that some of the German prisoners repatriated later or died. The official Russian figure of German prisoners is probably overestimated due to subjects of the German Empire interned in Russia. In any case, practically all the missing German servicemen on the Eastern Front can be attributed to prisoners. If we assume that during the entire war there were on average seven Russian soldiers per dead German soldier, the total losses of Russia in the fight against Germany can be estimated at 1217 thousand killed. The losses of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front in 1914-1918 amounted to 311.7 thousand killed. Austrian losses

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1194.1 thousand people were lost in action, which is less than Russian data on the number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners - 1750 thousand. The excess was probably formed due to civilian prisoners in Galicia and Bukovina, as well as double counting in reports! '. As in the case of Germany, in the case of Austria-Hungary, one can be sure that almost all those missing on the Russian front are prisoners of war. Then, extending the proportion between Russian and Austrian killed, which we established for the second half of 1916, for the entire period of the First World War, Russian losses in the fight against the Austro-Hungarian troops can be estimated at 308.6 thousand people. Losses of Turkey in the First World War by those killed by B.Ts. Uralanis estimated at 250 thousand people, of which, in his opinion, probably up to 150 thousand people fall on the Caucasian front! 2. However, this figure accounts for

doubt. The fact is that the same B.Ts. Uralnis cites data that there were 65,000 Turks in Russian captivity, and 110,000 in British captivity!³. It can be assumed that the real combat activity on the Middle East (including the Thessaloniki front) and the Caucasian theaters of military operations differed in the same proportion, given that since the beginning of 1917 there were no active hostilities on the Caucasian front. Then the number of Turkish soldiers killed in the fighting against the Caucasian front, as well as against the Russian troops in Galicia and Romania, can be estimated at 93 thousand people. The losses of the Russian army in the fight against Turkey are unknown. Considering that the Turkish troops were significantly inferior to the Russians in terms of combat capability, the losses of the Russian Caucasian Front can be estimated at half that of the Turkish losses, at 46,500 killed. The losses of the Turks in the fight against the Anglo-French troops can be estimated at 157 thousand killed. Of these, about half died at the Dardanelles, where Turkish troops lost 74,600 people, British troops, including New Zealanders, Australians, Indians and Canadians, 33,000 killed, and French troops about 10,000 killed. ! ". This gives a ratio of 1.7:1, close to that which we assumed for the losses of the Turkish and Russian armies.

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The total losses of the Russian army killed in the First World War can be estimated at 1601 thousand people, and the losses of its opponents - at 607 thousand people, or 2.6 times less. For comparison, let's determine the ratio of casualties on the Western Front of the First World War, where the German troops fought with the British, French and Belgian. Here Germany lost killed before | August 1918 590.9 thousand people. For the last 3 months and 1 [days of the war, German casualties can be estimated at about one quarter of the previous 12 months of the war, considering that in November there was almost no fighting. Germany's losses in the period | August 1917 to July 31, 1918 according to the official sanitary report amounted to 181.8 thousand killed. Taking this into account, the losses in the last months of the war can be estimated at 45.5 thousand people, and all the losses of Germany in those killed on the Western Front - at 636.4 thousand people. The losses of the French ground forces killed and died of wounds in the First World War amounted to 1104.9 thousand people. If we subtract from this number 232,000 dead from wounds, the loss of those killed can be estimated at 873,000 people. Probably about 850,000 were killed on the Western Front. English troops in France and Flanders lost 381,000 men killed. The total loss of killed British dominions amounted to 119 thousand people. Of these, at least 90 thousand died on the Western Front. Belgium lost 13.7 thousand people killed! 5. American troops lost 37 thousand people killed! 5. The total losses of the Allies killed in the West are approximately 1,372 thousand people, and in Germany - 636 thousand people. The loss ratio turns out to be 2.2:1, which turns out to be three times more favorable for the Entente than the ratio between Russia and Germany.

The extremely unfavorable ratio of Russia's losses to Germany's is offset by the losses of the German allies. To get the total irretrievable losses of Russia in the First World War, it is necessary to add to the losses killed the losses of those who died from wounds, died from diseases and died in captivity - respectively 240 thousand, 160 thousand (together with victims of suicide and accidents)

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and 190 thousand people. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Russian army can be estimated at 2.2 million people. The total number of Russian prisoners is estimated at 2.6 million people! 7". About 15.5 thousand German and at least 50 thousand Austro-Hungarian soldiers, as well as about 10 thousand Turks, died in Russian captivity. The total number of deaths from wounds in the German army is estimated at 320 thousand people. Considering that the Eastern Front accounts for about 21.5% of all killed German soldiers, Germany's losses in the fight against Russia who died from wounds can be estimated at 69 thousand people. The number of deaths from diseases and accidents in the German army is estimated at 166 thousand people. Of these, up to 36 thousand people may fall on the Russian front. The Austrians lost 170 thousand people who died from wounds and 120 thousand people who died from diseases. Since the Russian front accounts for 51.2% of all the losses of Austria-Hungary (4273.9 thousand people out of 8349.2 thousand)⁹⁸, the number of those who died from wounds and died from diseases related to the Russian front,

can be estimated at 87 thousand and 61 thousand people, respectively. The Turks lost 68,000 dead from wounds and 467,000 from disease. Of these, the Russian front accounts for 25,000 and 173,000, respectively! ?. The total irretrievable losses of Russia's opponents in the First World War amounted to about 1133.5 thousand people. The ratio of total deadweight losses turns out to be 1.9:1. It becomes even more favorable for the Russian side than the ratio of dead only, due to the significant mortality from disease in the Turkish army.

The ratio of losses in the First World War was much more favorable for the Russian army than in the Second World War, only due to the fact that in 1914-1918, not German, but much less combat-ready Austro-Hungarian troops fought on the Russian front.

Such an unfavorable for Russia (USSR) ratio of losses in the two world wars in relation to the losses of the German troops is explained primarily by the general economic and cultural backwardness of Russia in comparison with Germany and with the Western allies. In the case of WTO

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A swarm of world war worsened the situation due to the peculiarities of Stalinist totalitarianism, which destroyed the army as an effective instrument of warfare. Stalin failed, as he urged, to overcome the ten-year lag behind the leading capitalist countries, which he defined as 50-100 years²⁰. On the other hand, he completely remained in line with the late imperial tradition, preferring to win not with skill, but with sick blood, since he saw a potential threat to the regime in creating a highly professional army.

The totalitarian system ensured the stability of the state during the period of the most severe defeats. Defeats did not lead to revolution, and the Soviet Union was able to win the final victory. But the fact that Germany attacked the USSR during the period of the virtual absence of the Second Front in Europe led to the fact that the main ground forces of the German army, in contrast to the First World War, during 1941-1945 fought against Red Army (despite the fact that the main forces of the Luftwaffe and the German fleet fought throughout the war against the Western allies). This led to the fact that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War were an order of magnitude higher than the losses of the Russian army in the First World War. The losses of the Anglo-American troops killed were equal or even less than the German losses on those fronts of the Second World War, where the Wehrmacht had to fight against the Western allies⁰¹.

Interestingly, in contrast to the First World War, in the Great Patriotic War the Red Army used up more ammunition than the German army and its allies on the Eastern Front — 8.0 million tons against 5.6 million tons²⁰². Here, the fact that the German artillery was mainly aimed fire, while the Soviet fired more at the squares, had an effect. As V.I. Thank you, "from June 22, 1941 to July 31, 1942, the German ground forces used up 745 thousand tons of artillery ammunition (about 57 thousand monthly), and taking into account other types of ammunition, the consumption averaged 85 thousand tons - almost two times less than that of the Red Army"⁸³. Contrary to

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According to popular belief, the much better supply of ammunition for the Soviet troops in comparison with the Russian army in the First World War did not lead to a decrease in the casualties of the Red Army.

The relative military weakness of the USSR compared to Germany, paradoxically, helped Stalin win the war. In the choice between two totalitarian regimes, Western democracies inevitably had to take the side of the weakest, as representing the least threat to them, and thereby ensure his victory. The Western allies not only diverted to themselves a significant part of the German ground forces (in the last year of the war - up to 40%), almost the entire fleet and more than 2/3 of German aviation, "but also supplies under Lend-Lease

ensured the ability of the Soviet Union to wage war. Western deliveries provided the bulk of high-octane gasoline for Soviet aviation, their half of all aluminum and copper consumed in the USSR during the war, almost completely covered the needs of Soviet rail transport? ®. The most sophisticated machine tools and equipment came from the United States, as well as a significant proportion of the explosives consumed by the Soviet industry.

In the purely military sphere, the backwardness of the Russian tsarist army from the German Kaiser's army was determined primarily by mistakes in the training of the Russian officer corps. In Russian military educational institutions, in contrast to German ones, the emphasis was on theory, and not on the practical application of command skills and the ability to conduct a real battle. The lag was aggravated by the low functional literacy of the mass of soldiers, the inability of most soldiers and non-commissioned officers to make the right independent decisions. Advanced, thinking officers understood the danger of the situation. In 1910, Professor of the Academy of the General Staff N.N. Golovin, the future general and active participant in the Russian Liberation Movement of General Vlasov, who wrote the Charter of the internal service of the ROA, began to introduce an applied method of teaching tactics based on the experience of the French, German

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and other Western armies. He also introduced the course of service of the General Staff, ie. a course of training in staff work techniques, which had not previously been taught to officers. However, by the beginning of World War I, Golovin, his patron General D.G. Shcherbachev, head of the Academy, and other progressively minded teachers were removed from the Academy, and they were suspected almost ... of revolutionary moods?®.

The reform of the army did not begin, and soon the First World War began, in which the shortcomings of the Russian army were catastrophically aggravated by the lack of shells (the main losses in the two world wars were incurred by the troops from artillery fire). Excessively large human losses became one of the prerequisites for the revolution and the subsequent catastrophe of historical Russia. At the same time, significantly losing to the German army, the Russian imperial army, on an equal footing and even with some superiority in the number of prisoners, fought with the Austro-Hungarian imperial-royal army, which was considered one of the strongest in Europe. As N.N. Golovin, "depending on the ability, degree of training and even the tastes of this or that person, we paid attention to one or another issue; this issue was resolved one way or another, but we did not have that scientifically based synthesis that was available in France or Germany" 207. At the same time, "before the war of 1914, we did not develop a doctrine. There were attempts to copy the Germans or the French. But in view of the fact that the doctrine is entirely conditioned by the properties of its armed force and local conditions, this provision even more gave the strategy of our senior command staff and the General Staff the character of groundlessness and scholasticism. According to Golovin, "our tactics were up to the mark; the strategy was lame." And for the lack of a proper strategy, as well as for the lack of military equipment, "we had to pay with rivers of blood"?08.

The Soviet Union had to pay tens of millions of human lives not only for Stalin's totalitarianism in itself, but also for Stalin's desire to expand the empire. Rivers of excess blood now had to

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shed not only for the lack of a competent strategy aimed at saving soldiers' lives, but also for vicious tactics. Unlike the tsarist generals of the First World War, Stalin and his generals and marshals, without hesitation, threw absolutely untrained reinforcements to the slaughter. In addition, if in the First World War the Russian army paid with blood for the lack of equipment, and above all artillery, then in the Second World War the Soviet army paid with blood for its overabundance. The desire for gigantomania, for having as much as possible

tanks and planes, led to the fact that there were more tanks and planes than pilots and tankers who knew how to fly them.

On the whole, Soviet totalitarianism significantly worsened the quality of the armies, since the ratio of casualties to the German army became one and a half times worse compared to the First World War.

You can try to undertake a study to more accurately determine the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. For this, it is necessary, following the example of S.G. Nelipovich and his comrades, who did a similar study in relation to the losses of the Russian army in the second half of 1916, take regimental reports on losses, the number of personnel and replenishments. In total, in this case, researchers, according to the most conservative estimates, will have to deal with more than 5 million documents. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the Russian irretrievable losses in the First World War were almost 10 times, i.e. an order of magnitude less than the losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. In order to carry out this work at least in 20-30 years, it is necessary to attract hundreds of researchers. Moreover, they will not only have to mechanically rewrite data from documents, but also search and analyze these documents, each time building a balance between data on losses, replenishments and the number of personnel on different dates. Unfortunately, the experience of working in the archives convinces us that they have very large gaps in the reports regarding the accounting of losses and the number of personnel in the regimental and divisional divisions.

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visual level. In them, in particular, those called up directly to the unit were not recorded. For example, as L.N. Lopukhovsky, in the file of the 93rd Guards Rifle Division for July 1943 in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO) "there is no data on the losses of the division for 10, 11, 12 and 14 July. The corresponding sheets have been removed from the file, and the numbering has been corrected"®. Therefore, each researcher will quickly encounter the problem of imbalance, and it will be practically impossible to determine whether it occurred due to the return to their units of some of those who were previously reported missing or due to the arrival of undocumented replenishment in the regiment. Due to all these reasons, it seems to us that it is impossible to conduct a study of this kind to determine the magnitude of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War today. But such an account of irretrievable losses according to regimental reports can be carried out to create the most complete database of names of the dead and missing during the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, it is not possible to make a reservation that it is not possible to use this base, as well as the already existing base of irretrievable losses of the Ministry of Defense to calculate the total value of irretrievable losses, since it is impossible to determine what percentage of the true number of deaths turned out to be in this base.

Part 2

LOSSES OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES - PARTICIPANTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

LOSSES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA (ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER)

Chinese losses

Let's start with a country whose losses cannot be estimated even approximately. This is China. He waged war with Japan from July 7, 1937 until the Japanese surrender. In fact, the Japanese-Chinese war can be considered an integral part of the Second World War. How many Chinese soldiers and civilians died from war-induced famine and epidemics is basically impossible to calculate exactly. The first population census in China took place only in 1950, and mass mortality from famine and epidemics was typical for China even in the pre-war years, especially since in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in the second half of the 1940s. The country was engulfed in civil war. There are no demographic statistics, nor any

reliable statistics of the losses of the Chinese government troops and the communist guerrillas of Mao Zedong in the fight against the Japanese.

Chinese troops, according to the official data of the government of Chiang Kai-shek on June 7, 1945, in the war with Japan lost 1,310,000 killed, 1,753,000 wounded and 115,000 missing. According to the statement of the army command of national (Kuomintang) China dated September 28, 1945, 1.8 million Chinese soldiers were killed in the war with Japan, and about 1.7 million were wounded or missing. Considering the losses of the communist partisans

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and those who died among the missing, the total irretrievable losses of the Chinese armed forces certainly exceeded 2 million people¹⁰. Ulanis, in particular, estimates the death toll of Chinese soldiers at 2.5 million people¹¹. Is there a higher figure for the loss of the Chinese army of 4 million dead and dead¹²? It is possible that this estimate does not contradict the previous one, since it also includes soldiers who died of starvation and disease. Mortality from the action of these factors, of course, was very high and could well be comparable to mortality from combat causes.

As for the data on the losses of the Chinese civilian population, they are purely conditional. Thus, V. Erlikhman estimates them at 7.2 million people, and 2.5 million dead military personnel add another 300 thousand dead in captivity, it is obvious that the total loss figure would reach 10 million, although there is no reliable data on either the total number Chinese prisoners, or how many of them died¹³. There are also lower ratings. V.G. Petrovich determines China's total losses at 5 million people¹⁴. Obviously, here the losses of the civilian population are simply taken in the amount of army losses. There are also much higher ratings. So, Yu.V. Tavrovsky estimates the losses of the civilian population of China at [6 million dead, but in this case the estimate is clearly made in such a way that together the losses of the army and the civilian population amounted to 20 million people¹⁵. There is also a higher figure of Chinese losses - 35 million dead, of which 20 million allegedly died even before 1939 - during the great Sino-Japanese war that began in 1937 and during the armed incidents that preceded it in 1931-1937, after the Japanese occupation Manchuria¹⁶. The fantasticness of these figures is visible, as they say, to the naked eye. Indeed, the Chinese could not have lost less in a year and a half of the war with the Japanese than in the six and a half years of the subsequent war with the same Japanese. In fact, the figure of 35 million includes both the dead and the wounded. This is the official casualty figure adopted in communist China, and it consists of 20 million dead and 15 million injured¹⁷.

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At the end of the war, Chinese troops accepted the surrender of 1,280,000 Japanese troops¹⁸. The Chinese armies opposing this grouping probably outnumbered it by 2-3 times. The maximum size of the army of the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek was 4.3 million people, of which no more than 800 thousand people participated in active hostilities. The communist troops of Mao Zedong, who acted in alliance with the Kuomintang (which did not exclude periodically occurring armed clashes between the communists and the Kuomintang), totaled about 1.3 million people in two armies (4th and 8th), formally subordinate to Kuomintang command, and a number of irregular detachments. Of these forces, no more than 250 thousand people participated in the battles with the Japanese. Chinese troops were many times inferior to the Japanese in firepower and training.

Here are the official data of the government of national (Kuomintang) China on the distribution of losses by killed and wounded by years, published at the end of 1944 :

CHINA'S LOSS IN THE WAR WITH JAPAN

According to later data published after the end of the civil war by the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan, the total losses of the army

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Mindan in the war with Japan amounted to 3238 thousand people, including 1797 thousand wounded, 1320 thousand killed and 120 thousand missing?²⁰. This ratio between the number of wounded and killed, 1.36:1, proves that due to the high level of casualties, the medical service in the Kuomintang army was rather weak and the seriously wounded were not able to be evacuated from the battlefield in time. It can be assumed that as a result of this, the proportion of those who died from wounds was small and could be, as in the Red Army, about 7%. Then the total number of those who died from wounds in the Kuomintang army can be estimated at 126 thousand people. The total losses of the Kuomintang in the last year of the war, from July 1944 to September 1945, can be estimated by subtracting from 3238 thousand losses in killed and wounded in the previous period (2802.8 thousand) and the loss of missing persons (120 thousand). It turns out 315 thousand killed and wounded.

The losses of the communist troops in the fight against the Japanese are estimated by official statistics at 580,000 men?²¹ which is 5.4 times lower than our estimate of the losses of the Kuomintang. This proportion seems to us quite plausible and reflects the real contribution of the Communists and the Kuomintang to the victory over Japan. Since the sanitary service of Mao Zedong's army was hardly better than that of Chiang Kai-shek's army, the proportion of those killed in the losses of the communist troops could not be less than one third. Then the total number of those killed here can be estimated at 193 thousand people, and the number of those who died from wounds, also taking the share as 7%, at 27 thousand people.

The majority of the 120,000 missing Kuomintang soldiers must obviously be counted as prisoners. The number of prisoners from the communist army can be estimated at 22 thousand people. Taking this into account, the total number of Chinese prisoners can be estimated at 142 thousand people. How many of them died in captivity is unknown, but the sometimes found figure of 400,000 Chinese servicemen who died in Japanese captivity?²² is clearly absurd, since it far exceeds the total number of Chinese prisoners of war. Taking into account the fact that many Chinese prisoners entered the

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laborationist formations, the number of those who died in captivity could not be large. Also, the official figures of the PRC on the losses of Chinese collaborationist formations in 1.18 million dead and wounded look significantly exaggerated. After all, their role in the fighting was purely secondary. First of all, we are talking about the army of Manchzhou-G led by Emperor Pu Yi, the army of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic in Peking led by Wang Kemin and the government of the Republic of China in Nanjing led by Wang Jingwei. Until the end of the war, and mainly during the surrender in September 1945, the troops of the government of Chiang Kai-shek and the communist troops of Mao Zedong captured 950,000 collaborators?²³. Considering that by the end of the war the collaborationist formations had reached their maximum strength of 900 thousand people, it is quite unbelievable that their losses amounted to 1.18 million people, including 432 thousand dead, given that they carried out - They took on mainly security functions and almost did not participate in battles. I think that the total number of those killed among the collaborators, together with the Chinese soldiers who died in Japanese captivity, hardly exceeds 100,000 people. The Tomindan government claimed that in total 5,787,352 civilians were killed and wounded as a result of hostilities?²⁴. Of this number, 335,934 were killed and 426,249 were injured as a result of Japanese bombing?²⁵. The remaining civilians, 5,025,169, were victims of ground fighting and war crimes by the Japanese. All civilian casualty figures seem to be greatly exaggerated. Japanese aviation, unlike the Anglo-American, did not have strategic bombers, and its activity was limited by an acute shortage of pilots. Meanwhile, if we believe the existing estimates and official data, the results of Japanese strategic bombing in terms of the number of victims

were comparable to the Anglo-American bombing of Germany. But rather, one has to conclude that the number of victims is significantly overestimated.

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Equally doubtful is the number of Chinese civilian casualties in ground fighting. They were much less intense than on the European fronts, and it turns out that there were much more victims than in Europe. The same picture with the war crimes of the Japanese, the largest of which is considered the massacre of the population of Nanjing by Japanese soldiers in December 1937. The traditional figure is 300,000 killed. Other estimates range from 155 thousand to 500 thousand. However, as the Russian historian V.E. Molodyakov, all testimonies about the massacre of the civilian population by the Japanese in Nanjing are post-war and do not inspire much confidence. Thus, one of the witnesses who appeared before the Tokyo Tribunal during the trial of the main Japanese war criminals described "the mass execution of prisoners and civilians on the banks of the Yangtze on December 18, 1937, reported that 57,418 people were killed there. The witness was among them, but escaped with a slight wound and was able to hide in a cave, from where he observed what was happening. His testimony was accepted by the tribunal, which did not doubt the figure quoted. It is not so much the order that raises doubts, but the accuracy of the five-digit number, down to the last person. It is interesting to know how the witness, wounded and hiding in the cave, could so accurately determine the number of his comrades in misfortune?

In addition to testimonies, the Tribunal was presented with data on mass graves carried out in Nanjing and its environs by the Red Swastika Society (Chinese Red Cross) and the small charitable organization Chongshantang shortly after the capture of the city. These figures amounted to 43,071 and 112,261 respectively, those. a little more than 155 thousand people in total. Both organizations drew up explanatory notes, indicating in them the place and time of the main burials, the number and gender of the buried, and the main places where the corpses were found. However, all these documents were prepared retroactively, almost ten

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years after the events, on the basis of sources unknown to us, no contemporary documents were presented to the tribunal. It follows from the Chongshantang documents that this organization, with a funeral team of 12 people, without vehicles and bulldozers, buried an average of 2,600 people a day. From the point of view of common sense, this looks like pure fantasy, so many authors consider this information to be a post-war fabrication. As for the data of the Red Swastika Society, which is much more credible, they appear to be correct, but include mainly Chinese soldiers who died in the defense of Nanjing. It should be noted that the data of the Society of the Red Swastika contain very few references to buried women and children, on the mass destruction of which (albeit without specific statistics) all official versions insist. The calculation of the number of victims of mass tragedies during the war is associated with many specific difficulties: for example, the identification of the dead takes a long time, while sanitary conditions (prevention of epidemics, etc.) require the speedy burial of corpses?²⁵.

One can agree with these conclusions, but with one caveat. The total number of victims of the Nanking massacre, as well as the storming of Nanking, can be estimated approximately equal to the number of persons buried by the Red Swastika Society, i.e. 43.1 thousand people. As for the Chongshantang society, there are doubts that it buried anyone at all.

However, contrary to the opinion of V.E. Molodyakov and a number of Japanese revisionist historians, among the dead in Nanjing, civilians prevailed, not Kuomintang army personnel. After all, the assault on Nanking, in contrast to the three-month siege of Shanghai, lasted only 4 days (from December 10 to 13). At the same time, the main part of the Chinese garrison successfully retreated behind the Yangtze even before

start of the assault. Only 2,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. Even taking into account the fact that the Japanese did not become one of the unarmed soldiers in their hands

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taken prisoner, but killed, the number of victims among Chinese soldiers could hardly reach 40 thousand people. Human.

In total, as we remember, in 1937 the Kuomintang troops lost 366,382 people killed and wounded. In total, during the Sino-Japanese war, the total losses in killed and wounded amounted to 3117 thousand people, including 1797 thousand wounded and 1320 thousand killed. If we assume that approximately the same proportion between killed and wounded was maintained in each year of the war, then in 1937 the Chinese losses in killed should have been 156 thousand people. Taking into account that the main battles took place in 1937 in the area of Shanghai, and the losses of the Chinese killed in the defense of Nanjing could be 20 times less than in the defense of Shanghai, and that, in addition, some losses of the Kuomintang troops suffered in 1937 also in Northern and Central China (at least 10%), the losses in Nanjing could have been 6-7 thousand people. Accordingly, in the city, 36-37 thousand civilians were killed by Japanese soldiers who broke into it, and 36-37 thousand civilians fell victim to artillery shelling, which is about 8 times less than the traditional estimate of 300 thousand dead. Probably, the total number of Chinese civilians killed in the course of hostilities is unlikely to significantly exceed 1 million people during the entire war.

Japanese losses in China in 1937 amounted to 70 thousand killed and wounded???. The ratio of losses in killed and wounded between the Kuomintang and Japanese troops in 1937 was 5.2:1. It can be assumed that due to the much lower absolute value of combat losses than China's, the proportion of those killed in Japanese losses was lower than in Chinese losses, and could approach the classical ratio between the number of wounded and the number of killed - 3: 1. Then the number of killed Japanese soldiers in 1937 can be estimated at 17.5 thousand people, and the ratio of Chinese and Japanese losses to those killed is 8.9:1, which is close to the ratio of losses to those killed between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.

That the ratio of casualties between wounded and killed

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MI in the Japanese army in the Chinese theater of operations was close to 3:1, is proved by the available Japanese data on losses in individual battles. So, in the battles near Shanghai in January - February 1932, the Japanese army lost 738 killed and 2257 wounded (3.1: 1 ratio), during the fighting in Guangdong in October 1938 - 173 killed and 493 wounded (2.8: 1). 1), in the Wuhan operation (June - November 1938), Japanese losses amounted to about 9.5 thousand killed and died from wounds and about 26 thousand wounded (2.7: 1, with the exception of those who died from wounds from among the dead - not less than 3:1)228.

The total losses of the Chinese armed forces, Kuomintang and Communist, killed and died of wounds, can be estimated at 1,166,000 people, and with losses among those who died in captivity and collaborationist formations, at 1,266,000 people. It is much more difficult to estimate the number of Chinese military personnel who died from disease. It was, of course, equally significant among the Kuomintang and Communist, as well as among the collaborative rationist troops, and certainly many times higher than the number of those who died from wounds. However, accurate statistics of military personnel who died of disease were hardly kept at all, since they were placed in civilian hospitals. We estimate the number of deaths from wounds in the ranks of the Chinese anti-Japanese armies at 153,000. Chinese researcher Ho Ping-ti determines the number of deaths from diseases at 1.5 million people?2. It is impossible to assess the degree of reliability of the estimate of 1.5 million people, but in the absence of another, we accept it. The total loss of the Chinese army in the dead, we take 2.8 million people. Purely conditionally, we will accept that half of the losses

the deaths from disease accounted for anti-Japanese, and half - for pro-Japanese Chinese formations.

The number of civilians killed by the Japanese army, as we have seen, is seriously exaggerated by Chinese sources. The loss of the Chinese civilian population during the hostilities, we conditionally estimate at | million people.

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It should be kept in mind that between 1937 and 1945, tens of millions of Chinese died of starvation and disease. However, these deaths were a common reality in China throughout the first half of the 20th century. The situation was aggravated by the civil war that had been raging in the country since the early 1920s. There are no objective data that in 1937-1945 the death rate from famine and epidemics increased, just as there is no data on what the absolute size of mortality from these factors was in the pre-war, and even in the post-war years, when the civil war resumed.

We estimate the total loss of China in 1937-1945 in killed and dead at 3.8 million people, of which 2.8 million people were missing.

Losses of Mongolia

During the Soviet-Japanese War, the losses of the Mongolian troops fighting on the side of the Red Army amounted, according to official Russian data, to 72 killed and 125 wounded²³⁰.

Japanese losses

According to the estimate of the American researcher John Dower, the losses of the Japanese army amounted to 2803 killed and dead wounded in French Indochina, in battles against the Americans - 485,717, in battles against the British and Dutch - 208,026, in battles against the Australians - 199,511, in battles against the Red Army in August - September 1945 - 7483 killed and died from wounds, in other overseas territories - 23,388, on the territory of Japan itself - 10,543. The losses of the fleet in 1941-1945 amounted to 414,879 killed and died from wounds. J. Dauer estimates the losses of the Japanese army in China in 1937-1941 at 185,647 killed and died from wounds, and in 1942-1945 at 202,958 dead²³¹!. It seems to us that there is some error in Dauer's data here. The fact is that Chinese losses in killed and wounded in 1937-1941 amounted to 2398.9 thousand people, and for

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1942-1945 - only 719 thousand people. Thus, Chinese losses in killed and wounded in 1942-1945 amounted to only 30.0% of their losses in 1937-1941, while Japanese losses in China in 1942-1945 amounted to 109.3% of losses in 1937-1941. Then we will have to admit that in relation to one killed or wounded Chinese, Japanese losses in killed increased by 3.6 times in 1942-1945, which seems absolutely incredible. The quality of the Chinese army after 1941 could not have improved so significantly, given that the most experienced cadres were knocked out in 1937-1941.

HUMAN LOSS OF JAPAN??? troops face

Killed 1439 101 419 710 658 595 2517406 and missing Persons with disabilities 85 620 8895 94 515 and terminally ill

| itu = | 1524721 | 428605 658 595 2611921

This estimate includes 170,000 civilian casualties who died or died after the end of the war in Manchuria, China, and Korea, 165,000 died on Okinawa, and 24,000 died after the end of the war in Japan itself. , mainly from hunger. As you can understand, in the category of killed and missing

servicemen, those who died from wounds and diseases are included, but those who died in Soviet captivity are not included.

In the future, more careful calculations made it possible to increase the number of dead Japanese servicemen, including those who died in Soviet captivity.

The distribution of Japanese casualties by service and theater of operations, according to an official estimate made in 1964, was as follows:²³³

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LOSSES OF THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES DEAD IN THE MAIN THEATERS COMBAT ACTIONS (CHINA - 1937-1945, OTHER THEATERS - 1941-1945)

[taprybihlyst | Aya | Fut [in |

China (including Hong Kong, but 435,600,455,700 without Manchuria)

Manchuria (Manchukuo) 45,900 46,700

Territories proper 58,100 45,800 103,900 of Japan

Ogasawara Islands (Bonin) 2,700 12,500 15,200 (main island Iwo Jima)

50vm 190

Sakhalin, Kuril and Aleutian Islands 8200 3200 11400

Central Pacific Islands 95,800 151,400 247,200

Goaitins | 975 | And | 9860 | Voice | [m[m | GB | 8 | 50[#45 | PE Hey you th you islands

Gumerli voovetkomilnu - | 50 | 4% | 8% |

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It should be noted that, according to clarifications made between 1964 and 1976, during the battle on Iwo Jima (Ogasawara Islands), 4,700 more people died - 12,850 in the army and 7,050 people in the navy. According to the same data, not 62,100, but 65,000 servicemen died in Okinawa. The only campaign for which official Japanese data on the number of wounded is given is the battles on Iwo Jima - 736 in the army and 297 in the navy, for a total of 1033 people³⁴. There is also a higher estimate of the number of Japanese servicemen who died on Iwo Jima - about 22 thousand people. So far, only about 8,700 bodies have been found, and about 13,000 more burials are expected to be found. The Japanese government is going to allow civilian searchers to search for the remains of the dead on Iwo Jima. So far, only military facilities are located on the island, and civilians are not allowed to enter there³⁵. Taking into account these higher estimates, assuming an estimate of 19,900 dead on the Ogasawara Islands, the total number of dead Japanese military personnel can be estimated at 2,128,600 people. Before surrender, the Americans and their allies captured 41,000 Japanese prisoners³⁶.

In addition, in 1938, during the battles near Lake Khasan against the Red Army, the Japanese lost 526 killed and died from wounds and 914 wounded. In 1939, during a much larger clash with Soviet troops in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River (according to Japanese terminology, the Nomongan Incident), Japanese losses in May-July amounted to 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing, and in August - early September - 7696 killed, 8647 wounded and 1021 missing³⁷. Thus, the total number of Japanese dead during the battles at Khalkhin Tol, taking into account the fact that 160 Japanese and 44 Manchurian servicemen returned from Soviet captivity, can be estimated at 8684 people. However, from those carved on the stele in

Hailar, a monument erected by the Japanese command in 1942 to the Japanese and Manchu soldiers of the Kwantung Army who had died in the war by that time, out of 10,301 names engraved on the monument, 9471 are those who fell during the Nomongan Incident?3. It can be assumed

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live that difference of 813 people refers to those who died from wounds, diseases and other causes.

The losses of Soviet troops in the battles near Khasan amounted to 759 killed, 100 died from wounds and diseases, 6 people died as a result of accidents and 95 missing, and in total - 960 dead, 2752 wounded and 527 sick?3. The Soviet irretrievable losses were 1.8 times greater than the Japanese ones.

The losses of the Red Army during the battles on the Khalkhin Gol amounted to 6472 killed, 1152 died from wounds, 8 died from diseases, 2028 people were missing, and 43 people died as a result of accidents. Taking into account the fact that 89 Red Army soldiers returned from Japanese captivity, the total losses of Soviet troops in killed and dead can be estimated at 9614 people. This is 1.015 times greater than the losses of the Japanese-Manchu troops in dead and dead. In addition, during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, the allied Red | The Mongolian army lost, according to official figures published in November 1939, 165 killed and 401 wounded. However, according to later studies by the Mongolian historian Tamir Ganbold, the losses of the Mongolian army amounted to 895 people, of which 234 people were killed and died. Of this number, 1 Mongol soldier died in Japanese captivity?%. Taking into account the irretrievable losses of the Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchu troops, the ratio turns out to be 1.04:1.

The losses of the Soviet troops at Khalkhin Gol were 15,251 wounded and at least 2,287 sick, of which 701 were treated on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District, and the vast majority of the rest - on the territory of Mongolia 72 “.

We do not include the losses of the Japanese in the battles of Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in the losses during the Second World War, just as we do not include the losses of the Red Army in these battles in the losses in the Second World War.

In total, the Japanese armed forces at the time of surrender numbered 6983 thousand people in 154 divisions and 136 brigades of the land army and 20 formations of the Navy. Of this number, 3,532 thousand people were on the territory of their own

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veins of the Japanese islands. In addition, outside of Japan, there were about 3 million Japanese civilians in the theaters of operations?@.

Japan officially believes that approximately 220,000 Japanese, both military and civilians, became victims of the Soviet invasion in August-September 194524. Probably, this may include not only the Japanese, but also the Chinese, Manchus, Koreans and representatives of other nationalities who served in the Japanese armed forces and either died in battles with the Red Army or died in Soviet captivity. At the beginning of 1949, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 590,830 Japanese prisoners of war. Of this number, 440,387 people had been repatriated by that time, 6,357 people were recognized as civilian prisoners, 52,165 people died, and 91,276 people remained in prisoner of war camps. 49 Japanese were convicted by military tribunals, 427 were sent to prisons and the Gulag, 56 fled, and another 113 people left for other reasons? The figure of 52,165 dead prisoners of war is close to the official Japanese figure of 52,700 servicemen who died in Soviet captivity. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners of war remained in Soviet camps until 1956, and it is hard to believe that only 535 Japanese died in 7 years. According to official Soviet data, 609,448 Japanese were captured, of which 61,855 people died?@. It is possible that the difference in 18,618 prisoners and 9,690 dead was formed at the expense of civilian prisoners. It is also possible that

the difference was nevertheless formed at the expense of the Japanese prisoners of war themselves. In a certificate prepared by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in October 1956, which first spoke about 609,448 Japanese prisoners of war and that 61,855 of them died, it was specifically noted that "for Japanese prisoners of war repatriated directly at the fronts, before they were brought to the territory of the USSR, as well as on those who died at the front-line collection points, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The USSR does not have personal lists." It can be assumed that the difference in the figures of 1949 and 1956 was formed due to those repatriated and those who died directly at the fronts, even before the prisoners entered the NKVD system. Maybe,

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these 9,690 Japanese prisoners of war who died directly at the front are included in the Japanese official losses among those who died during the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. For other nationalities who served in the Japanese army (Chinese, Koreans, etc.), there is no discrepancy in the number of prisoners between the documents of 1949 and 1956, and in the number of those who died in captivity there is a slight discrepancy only for the Chinese (respectively 135 and 138 Human). Therefore, we will give data on the death rate of prisoners based on materials from 1956:

Of the 16,150 Chinese, 138 died.

Out of 10,312 Koreans, 71 died.

Out of 3633 Mongols, 4 people died.

Out of 5 Buryats, 1 person died.

486 Manchus, 58 Russians and 2 Tungus were liberated directly on the fronts. None of them died in captivity.

According to Japanese official figures, 393,367 civilian casualties were reported during the American air raids, including approximately 210,000 victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 97,031 deaths during the bombing of Tokyo with conventional bombs. About 150,000 more civilians died or committed suicide during the fighting in Okinawa, and 10,000 on the island of Saipan from the Northern Mariana Islands? 7. There is another estimate of casualties among the Japanese civilian population during the fighting on Saipan and Okinawa - respectively 22 thousand and 77 thousand dead?4. It should be noted that many Japanese civilians, following the example of the military, committed collective suicides in order not to be captured by the enemy. It is likely that the number of civilian casualties in Okinawa and Saipan is still closer to 100 thousand and not to 160 thousand people, or even 180 thousand, according to Japanese official data. Based on the adjustments made, we estimate the total number of Japanese civilian casualties, including 393,400 bombing victims, 100,000 casualties in Okinawa and Saipan, and 24,000 deaths in the mainland.

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torii of Japan and 170 thousand dead and missing in Manchuria, China and Korea, in 687.4 thousand people.

About 100,000 Americans were held in Japan, captured mainly in the Philippines. Java also held about 300,000 military and civilian prisoners. All of them were supposed to be destroyed in the event of an American invasion. This invasion was supposed to take place at the end of October 1945. At the same time, American generals assumed that during the first month of fighting on the Japanese islands, American losses would amount to 500-800 thousand people killed and wounded, and the level of losses remained the same in each subsequent month until the cessation of Japanese resistance. At the same time, Japanese losses were estimated at 1.5-4 times more than American ones.

In the event of a landing, atomic bombs would be used in tactical support for the landing, against large concentrations of Japanese troops. In September-October 1945, the production of atomic bombs was to be 3-4 bombs per month, and by December it would have reached 7 bombs per month. By the end of October, when it was supposed to start landing on the Japanese islands, at least 7 atomic bombs were supposed to be at the disposal of the American armed forces?⁵⁰.

We estimate Japan's total losses in World War II at 2,816,000 dead, of which 2,128,600 were killed or died by the armed forces.

Losses of Korea

Korea was a Japanese colony. Koreans were not drafted into combat units of the Japanese army due to unreliability, but tens of thousands of them served in auxiliary rear units. On the other hand, Koreans were widely involved in forced labor in the interests of the Japanese army and the military industry. In total, they were involved in forced labor according to A.S. Breckman 5.4 million Koreans. How many of them died is not known. The American researcher RJ Rummel estimates the number of victims at 378 thousand people, although he stipulates that his estimate is rough and not

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gives reasons on which it is based. Rummel refers to a study by Brackman, who believes that 60,000 out of 670,000 Koreans who were brought there died in Japan, although Koreans were treated better than people from other countries? Assuming that in Manchuria and Korea the death rate of Koreans was higher but lower than the death rate among workers of other nationalities, Rummel makes the maximum estimate of 810,000 Koreans dead, the minimum of 270,000, and considers the closest to reality an average estimate of 378 thousand people?⁵¹. However, Brackman's figures are also, in fact, estimates, and he does not give the total number of dead Koreans. Werner Gruhl estimates the number of Koreans killed in forced labor at 483,000. Another 50 thousand Koreans, in his opinion, died in the auxiliary service in the Japanese army?³. John W. Dower believes that up to 10,000 Koreans may have died in the atomic bombing of Nagasaki."

Meanwhile, all these statements are opposed by the study of South Korean demographers — the impact of the war on both the birth rate and the death rate among Koreans was extremely insignificant, and not only those who lived in Korea, but also those who ended up in Japan or Manchuria. . At the same time, a Korean source testifies that 6369 Koreans were killed and died in the Japanese armed forces. In addition, 8158 civilians from among the civilians attached to the Japanese army perished and died?⁵⁵. These figures seem to us to be the most realistic figures for Korean casualties.

Korean troops also fought on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition. The Korean Liberation Army was under the command of Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese National Army. It was established in September 1941 in the temporary military capital of national China, Chongqing, and was subordinate to the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, President Kim Gu. The KLA was commanded by General Ji Cheng Chen and the chief of staff was General Lee Bum-suk. The KLA was replenished both by deserters from the Japanese army and by Korean emigrants in China. As a result, the number

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KLA officers grew from 30 in 1941 to 1,000 in 1945, and the number of personnel increased from 1,000 to 30,000. The KLA fought both in China and on the Burma front. After the Japanese surrender, the KLA became the backbone of the Army of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). There are no data on her losses, but given that she played only an auxiliary role in the hostilities, it is unlikely that the death toll exceeded 1 thousand people.

In addition to the KLA, the Korean Volunteer Army, formed in Chinese communist-controlled Yanan in 1939, led by one of the leaders of the Korean communists, fought the Japanese. It numbered no more than a hundred people and had a purely symbolic

meaning. It was only in 1945 that the number of the KDA increased to 1,000 people due to deserters from the Japanese army. The KDA did not take part in the hostilities and had practically no losses. After the Japanese surrender, the KDA became part of the Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).

Thus, the total losses of Korea in World War II can be estimated at 15.5 thousand people, of which 7.4 thousand fell to the share of the military, of which 6.4 thousand died on the Japanese side, and 1 thousand — on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Losses of Thailand (Siam)

Japan's only ally in World War II was Thailand (Siam). On November 28, 1940, he presented the French government with a demand for the cession of a large territory of French Indochina to him. After France's refusal, hostilities began, reaching their maximum intensity in January 1941. From France, 12 thousand soldiers of the French army and 38 thousand soldiers of the colonial troops participated in the battles. The Thai army numbered 60 thousand people. Neither side has achieved decisive success. On January 29, 1941, an armistice was signed. On March 11, 1941, with Japanese mediation,

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peace treaty. Under Japanese pressure, France was forced to cede 69 thousand square meters to Thailand. km of the territory of modern Laos and Cambodia. French losses amounted to 321 killed or wounded, 178 missing, 222 captured. Thai troops lost 108 killed and died of wounds, 307 wounded and 21 captured⁵⁶.

On December 8, 1941, Japanese troops suddenly invaded Thailand under the pretext of protecting it from the British. In reality, Tokyo wanted to secure a springboard for strikes against British Malaya and Burma. The Thai troops put up only minor resistance, which ended on the same day on the orders of the Thai dictator, Marshal Pibun Songgram, who signed an alliance treaty with Japan on December 25. In the fighting on December 8, 180 Thai soldiers were killed. On January 25, 1942, after the Anglo-American bombing of Bangkok, Thailand declared war on England and the United States. Thai troops, together with the Japanese, fought against British and Chinese troops in Burma, which ended by the end of May 1942. In 1943, some border areas of Malaysia and Burma were transferred to Thailand. During the fighting in Burma, 150 Thai soldiers were killed. After this, the Thai army no longer took an active part in the hostilities. Up until the end of the war, 5,229 Thai soldiers died of diseases, mostly malaria⁷. The total losses of the Thai army in World War II amounted to 5667 people. Losses of the civilian population from the Anglo American bombings, mainly in 1944-1945, are estimated at about 2 thousand people - 5%.

Burmese losses

Burma's losses in World War II consist of the losses of the Burmese National Army, which fought on the side of the Japanese, and the losses of the civilian population. The BNA was formed in Siam (Thailand) by one of the leaders of the Burmese national movement, General Secretary

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General Aung San, the founder of the People's Revolutionary Party of Burma and the Communist Party of Burma, was a retarder of the Our Burma Union. The army was formed on 28 December 1941 as the Burmese Independence Army. It consisted of 227 Burmese and 74 Japanese. Some Burmese were descendants of emigrants to Siam and no longer spoke Burmese. The ABN was used as a reconnaissance and sabotage group during the Japanese invasion of Burma. By the time the Japanese occupied Rangoon on March 8, 1942, the ABN numbered 12 thousand people, and it reached its maximum strength of 18 thousand by May

1942?. Its fighters were mostly armed with British captured weapons. Basically, they waged a guerrilla war against the British troops. The only major battle fought by Burmese units was at Shwedaung in South Burma. There, the ABN, with a force of 1,300 men, attempted to block the retreat of the British 7th Armored Brigade. However, the British were able to break through, losing 19 tanks, 2 guns, 300 vehicles and over 350 killed and wounded. The Burmese also suffered heavy losses - 60 killed, 300 wounded, 60 captured and 350 deserters. Both Japanese liaison officers at the ABN were also killed. Did the inexperience of the Burmese and their lack of heavy weapons lead to heavy losses? ABN fighters and unorganized Burmese gangs have also committed war crimes against the Karen ethnic minority and Indian refugees. After the end of the active phase of hostilities in Burma in July 1942, the ABN was disbanded and instead the Burma Defense Army was formed with only 3 thousand people. The Japanese did not like the attempts of the ABN to establish their power in a number of settlements in Burma. In August 1943, the Japanese declared the independence of Burma. One of the leaders of the national movement of Burma, Ba Mo, became the head of government, and Aung San became the minister of defense. He was promoted to major general in the Japanese army and appointed commander in chief of the Burmese National Army (as it became

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called the Burma Defense Army). The Japanese occupying forces remained in real control of Burma, and Aung San doubted that the Japanese would ever grant true independence to the Burmese. Most importantly, in August 1943 there was no longer any doubt that Japan would lose the war. Therefore, Aung San established links with the British command, using the leadership of the Communist Party of Burma. In 1944, the 1,000th BNA took only a minor part in the battles with the British. On March 27, 1945, the BNA revolted against the Japanese and linked up with British troops. Renamed the Patriotic Force of Burma, it helped the British clear the Japanese from southern Burma. UAV losses during the war, mainly in battles against British forces, amounted to, but in all likelihood, no more than 1 thousand dead, of which during the struggle against the Japanese in March-August 1945, there were hardly more than 200 people. Losses of the civilian population of Burma from Japanese war crimes, hunger and forced labor are estimated by Michael Clodfelter at 250 thousand people, including 110 thousand Burmese, 100 thousand Indians and 40 thousand Chinese? !. Werner Gruhl estimates the civilian casualties of the Philippines as a result of the Japanese occupation at 170,000?62. It should be emphasized that all of the above estimates of civilian casualties in Burma are based neither on the current statistics of the number of deaths, which simply were not available, nor on estimates of data from pre-war and post-war censuses, since since the early 1930s, censuses in Burma was not conducted until 1973, and many of the previous censuses were destroyed during the Japanese occupation. Therefore, the estimates are purely conditional. It should be noted that before the war Burma was an exporter of rice, and there was no famine there, so those who died of starvation in wartime must be attributed to war losses. We accept the lowest estimate of civilian casualties in Burma at 170,000 people, and together with the losses of the army, at 171,000 people. This estimate is also quite arbitrary, and the actual number of those killed and dead may be much higher or lower than it.

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Losses of French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos)

In September 1940, Japanese troops received permission from the French colonial administration to access Ronkin Bay through French Indochina. The purpose of the operation was to cut off the Sino-Vietnamese road, along which the troops of Chiang Kai-shek were supplied. On September 22, 1940, Japanese troops invaded Indochina and tried to occupy points not covered by the agreement, but met with resistance.

French colonial troops and the Foreign Legion. The fighting continued until September 26 and ended with the landing of Japanese troops near Haiphong. Under the new agreement, Japanese troops remained in Indochina until the end of the war, posting small garrisons in Haiphong, Hanoi and

some other cities in Vietnam. The losses of the French colonial troops, as well as the civilian population of Haiphong, subjected to Japanese bombardment, amounted to about 900 people. On August 1, 1941, the Japanese also occupied Saigon. At the same time, 8 thousand Japanese soldiers entered Cambodia.

The second Japanese invasion of Indochina took place in March 1945. This time, his goal was to control the entire territory of Indochina by declaring the formal independence of the Vietnamese Empire and the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia. The Japanese feared that Allied troops might land in Indochina, because after the liberation of France and the fall of the pro-German Vichy government, the French governor of Indochina, Admiral Jean Decaux, recognized the authority of the provisional French government of General De Gaulle. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese issued an ultimatum to disarm the French troops. In Saigon, two French generals and many officers were killed by the Japanese after refusing to sign a surrender. However, the French garrisons in the interior of Indochina were able to organize resistance. 5,700 men, mostly from the Foreign Legion, were able to

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break through Japanese positions into Chinese territory. French and British commandos were deployed to Indochina, who started a guerrilla war with the support of the local population. But by the time of the Japanese surrender, the clashes between the Japanese and the partisans had not yet acquired a large-scale character. After the Japanese surrender, Emperor Bao Dai of Vietnam abdicated on August 25, and power in Hanoi was transferred by the Japanese to the communist Viet Minh movement on August 19, 1945. In the province of Thai Nguyen, they refused to capitulate and entered into battles with the partisans, which lasted from 20 to 25 August. The Japanese surrendered only on 26 August. In the fighting in March and during the Japanese massacre, 2,129 French and other Europeans, mostly soldiers, were killed. Local partisans, numbering up to 10 thousand people, suffered some losses in battles with Japanese troops, but these losses are unlikely to exceed several hundred people.

The number of victims of the civilian population of Indochina is estimated by modern researchers from 1 million? to 1.5 million people?5. These figures are not based on anything and are based only on declarations, in particular on the statement of the leader of the Viet Minh Ho Chi Minh, who declared in the declaration of independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, that as a result of cruel exploitation by the Japanese and famine the peoples of Indochina lost 2 million people. In fact, the famine that lasted in North Vietnam from October 1944 to May 1945 was due to crop failure caused by drought and floods and the subsequent cold winter, and not to war, and its casualties can hardly be attributed to military losses. . Moreover, famine happened in Vietnam before the war. It must be said that there is also a lower estimate of the number of victims - 400 thousand people, which, however, like the upper estimate of 2 million people, is not based on any current statistics or census data. The figure of 400,000 came about as a result of a request from the government in Hanoi in May 1945 to the governors of twenty northern provinces of Vietnam to report how many

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people died of starvation. The governors reported that 380,000 people died directly from starvation, and another 20,000 from related diseases. Undoubtedly, the governors were interested in exaggerating rather than downplaying the number of victims, since the amount of assistance they expected to receive directly depended on this. The French military, probably believing that after Ho Chi Minh's statement about 2 million victims, it would be undignified to talk about 400,000, in October 1945 they reported about half a million victims of famine. Former governor Jean Decaux, in his memoirs written in 1949, reported on a million victims in order to emphasize the severity of his mission. The current authors of estimates in 1.5 million who died of starvation simply take the average estimates between all those available in the literature. It is curious that all the authors of the existing figures, from the minimum to the maximum, were only interested in exaggerating the number of victims. Undoubtedly, closer to the truth is the lowest

an estimate of 400,000 dead, but it is also likely to be significantly overestimated. This is indicated by the fact that among the victims of the famine, according to the reports of the governors, those who died from exhaustion accounted for 95%, while those who died from diseases - only 5%. Meanwhile, in cases where famine is relatively well documented, in particular due to the presence of representatives of the International Red Cross in the disaster area, the vast majority of deaths are most often caused not by exhaustion itself (dystrophy), but by infectious diseases, immunity to which is weakened by prolonged malnutrition. So it was, for example, during the famine in Greece in the winter of 1941/42⁶⁶. Given that there are no reports of mass epidemics in Vietnam in 1940, the number of deaths as a result of the famine could not have been particularly high. If the figure of 20,000 who died from diseases in the governor's reports is close to reality, then the total number of deaths due to starvation, including victims of exhaustion, hardly exceeded 100,000 people.

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Philippine casualties

According to the US State Department, about 1 million people, mainly from famine and disease caused by the Japanese occupation⁷⁷. This figure also includes the casualties of military operations, in particular the American bombing of Manila in the last months of the war, the victims of the guerrilla war in the Philippines against the Japanese, and the victims of Japanese war crimes. According to American estimates, in February 1945, Japanese troops, before leaving Manila, massacred Filipinos in the city and killed 90-100 thousand people⁷⁸. Considering that the number of Japanese troops involved in the massacre was only 10 thousand people, the above figures seem to be significantly exaggerated, and the true number of victims of the massacre is unlikely to exceed the same 10 thousand people. Since almost all of the 10,000 Japanese marines led by Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi either died in battle or committed suicide, there were almost no witnesses to the massacre. Another Japanese war crime in the Philippines was the so-called Baatan death march. After the surrender of the American and Filipino troops on the Baatan Peninsula on April 9, 1942, 67,000 Filipinos, 1,000 Chinese soldiers and 11,796 Americans were forced to make a 100-kilometer march through the mud to the camp. prisoners of war. During the march, thousands of prisoners died from exhaustion, wounds, dehydration, or were shot by guards because they could not go any further. The exact number of victims of this "death march" is unknown. There are estimates of the number of dead Filipinos from 5 to 10 thousand and the number of dead Americans from 600 to 850 Americans. Only 54,000 prisoners reached their destination, but did thousands of Filipinos manage to escape into the jungle during the march? ⁹.

It should be emphasized that for the Philippines, unlike many other countries in Asia, the loss of hunger during the war years, of course, should be attributed to the number of military losses.

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Indeed, during the period of American domination in the first half of the twentieth century, there was no famine in the Philippines. It could only have arisen because the Japanese forcibly reduced the cultivation of rice and expanded the production of industrial crops necessary for the war industry. However, there are no statistics on deaths from starvation in the Philippines. There are also lower estimates of the number of deaths during the war years in the Philippines - 500 thousand people, divided with comic accuracy by 141 thousand victims of the "massacre", i.e. Japanese war crimes (probably including dead guerrillas), 22.5 thousand victims of forced labor and 336.5 thousand victims of starvation⁷⁹.

According to the American estimate in 1946, 27,260 soldiers of the Philippine army died during the war⁸⁰. However, later estimates significantly increased the number of dead - up to 7 thousand dead in the Battle of the Philippines in 1941-1942, 8 thousand dead in during the guerrilla war and up to 42 thousand died in captivity (out of a total of 98 thousand prisoners)⁷² Werner Gruhl believes that

The loss of the Philippine army in the dead amounted to 27 thousand people, including 7 thousand who died in the battle for the Philippines and 20 thousand who died in captivity?⁷³ In fact, he repeated the assessment of 1946, but with a breakdown by category of losses. It is likely that the difference between the two estimates of the number of Filipino soldiers who died in captivity (42,000 and 20,000) was due to approximately 22,000 prisoners who either fled from the camps or were released by the Japanese. The fact is that in the Philippines, as in other occupied territories, the Japanese tried to win over to their side the local nationalists who fought for independence against the colonial powers. In the Philippines, the Japanese were supported by part of the leadership of the ruling Nationalist Party. In October 1943, Japan even allowed the independence of the Philippines to be declared, while the real power remained with the Japanese occupation authorities. At the same time, there were quite influential pro-American forces in the Philippines that benefited from trade and economic ties with the United States. In addition, America was not a classic colo

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nial power. Back in early 1935, she undertook to grant independence to the Philippines in ten years, and to provide the country with internal autonomy for a transitional period. After the Japanese occupation, supporters of the pro-American government in exile, which left the Philippines in March 1942, launched a guerrilla war with the support of the Americans. The struggle against the Japanese was also started by detachments formed by the Communist Party of the Philippines. With this in mind, an estimate of 8,000 partisan casualties seems quite plausible, although it is not clear on what data it is based. The guerrilla movement involved both soldiers of the Philippine army, who escaped captivity or fled from it, and people who had not previously served in the army. It can be assumed that the losses between the partisans from former soldiers and civilians were distributed approximately equally. Then the total losses of the Philippine army can be estimated at 31 thousand dead, and the loss of civilian guerrillas - at 4 thousand dead. It is claimed that 260,000 people participated in the guerrilla movement and underground anti-Japanese cells?⁷⁴ which seems to be a significant exaggeration, if only because there were neither weapons nor ammunition for such a number of guerrillas in the Philippines. And the losses of the partisans indicate that those who really fought against the Japanese were an order of magnitude smaller. Meanwhile, the mountains and jungles of the Philippines were ideal for guerrilla warfare, which the Filipinos had had good experience with since the time of the Spanish

colonial domination.

As for the losses among the civilian population, we purely conditionally define them as half a million people, including here both victims of starvation and victims of Japanese war crimes, victims of punitive operations of Japanese troops against partisans, and victims among collaborators who died at the hands of partisans, victims of Japanese and American bombardments. The true number of civilian deaths may be much higher or much lower than 0.5 million people. However, there is no way to define it in any way.

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precisely, as well as to determine in what proportion the specified categories of victims correlate with each other. The total losses of the population of the Philippines can be equally conditionally estimated at 535,000 dead.

Indian losses

The losses of the armed forces of British India (which included present-day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) are estimated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission at 87,032 dead, of which only 18,218 are buried in identified graves?⁷⁵

According to preliminary data, the losses of the Indian armed forces amounted to 24,338 killed, 11,754 missing, 64,354 wounded and 79,489 captured? Out of more than 60 thousand

Indian prisoners taken by the Japanese in Malaya and during the fall of Singapore in February 1942, at least 11 thousand died in captivity?

The British Indian Army bore the brunt of the fight against Japan on the Burmese front and also participated in campaigns in North and East Africa and in Italy. During the fighting in the Asia-Pacific theater, Indian troops lost 67,340 prisoners??.

Fighting on the Japanese side was the Indian National Army, formed from Indian prisoners of war by Indian immigrants fighting against British rule in India. It was headed by a prominent figure in the Indian National Congress, Subhas Chandra Bose, a Bengali by nationality, who headed the Provisional Government of Free India. Beginning in 1943, the INA took part in hostilities, although it tried to avoid clashes. Its leaders hoped, following the Japanese, to break through to India and raise an uprising there. The INA numbered up to 40 thousand people, of which about half were Indian construction and agricultural workers from Southeast Asia. The losses of the INA until the end of the war amounted to 2615 dead and missing??9.

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Losses of the civilian population of India are estimated from 1.5 to 3 million dead from starvation?80. This refers to the Bengal famine of 1943, the number of victims of which is estimated at between 1.5 and 3 million people. However, the basis on which the estimate is based is not clear, as there are no statistics to estimate the number of victims. More importantly, massive famines were common in India and in the years between the two world wars, and there is no evidence that the famine of 1943 was due to the war, and not to the uneven distribution that is common in India during crop failures. food. In particular, back in August 1939, there was a mass famine in the state of Rajasthan, which could in no way be connected with the Second World War. There is no evidence that the famine of 1943 had anything to do with the fighting. In particular, the conscription on a voluntary basis of more than 2 million people in the Indian army, which had 195 thousand people at the beginning of the war, could not significantly undermine the country's agriculture, given that India's population was about 400 million people. The total strength of the Indian Army, including the Military Labor Corps, reached 2.5 million by the end of the war?!. Also, food supplies for the needs of the army could not play a decisive role in causing famine. A more serious factor was the Japanese occupation of Burma, India's main exporter of rice. But the main factor was a purely natural phenomenon - a cyclone that destroyed the main part of the rice crop in Bengal in October 1942.

Therefore, we believe that there were no victims of the war among the civilian population at all, with the exception of those who died in the Indian territories occupied by Japan - the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and a small territory near the Burmese border. For a short time, the Japanese managed to capture the capital of Nagaland, Kohima, and one of the INA divisions reached Moudok in the province of Chitagon. In the Andaman Islands, according to Indian estimates, as a result of Japanese occupation, up to 2 thousand people died. In the Nicobar Islands, very sparsely populated, the victims

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there was practically none, since there was no permanent Japanese garrison? *?.

We estimate the total losses of India in the Second World War at 91.6 thousand people, of which 89.6 thousand people are military personnel.

Losses of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)

The Ceylon Garrison Artillery Regiment, dominated by natives of Ceylon, located in the Cocos Islands, revolted on May 8, 1942, in anticipation of a Japanese landing. However, other units quickly crushed the uprising, and three Ceylon soldiers who were executed

On August 4, 1942, they became the only soldiers of the British Empire who were shot during the Second World War on charges of rebellion. The leader of the mutiny, the bombadier Gratien Fernando, belonged to the Sinhalese majority population. He was born into a Buddhist family, but later converted to Catholicism. They advocated the independence of Sri Lanka. After that, the Ceylon units were withdrawn from the front line, and had no more losses. The civilian population also had no losses - and the Japanese landing in Ceylon did not follow. The only bombardment of Colombo on April 5, 1942 was aimed at British ships (two cruisers and an aircraft carrier were sunk) and did not inflict losses on the civilian population. There was no famine on the island, as the population was supplied at higher rates than in India in order to prevent unrest among the population. Ceylon was considered the most important strategic object as the only major rubber producer remaining under Allied control in Asia after the Japanese invasion.

Losses of Malaya (Malaysia)

John W. Dower estimates the number of victims of the Japanese occupation of Malaya (including British Borneo) at 100,000⁷⁸. This figure is absolutely arbitrary and includes victims of war crimes, hunger and forced labor.

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Losses of Singapore

During the Japanese occupation, which lasted from February 15, 1942 until the end of the war, Japanese troops were accused of numerous war crimes against the local Chinese population. It is alleged that during the purge of the Chinese population of Malaya and Singapur from anti-Japanese persons carried out by the Japanese occupying forces, between 25,000 and 50,000 Chinese were killed. What part of them falls on the population of Singapore is unknown. Since the population of Singapore practically did not serve in the British army, there were no actual military losses among them.

During the period of Japanese occupation, the food situation of the city became much more complicated, primarily due to the reduction in the supply of rice to the market, which the Japanese issued strictly on cards. However, the population of Singapore was able to find a substitute for rice in the form of sweet potatoes, tapioca and yams, which could be grown in vegetable gardens, and there was no famine in the city.

Indonesian losses

During the war, the population of the Dutch Indies (Indonesia) suffered significant losses, but it is very difficult to establish their true value. There are estimates that during the Japanese occupation, about 4 million Indonesians died of starvation and forced labor⁷⁹. But, firstly, this kind of mortality, from starvation and forced labor, was common for Indonesians even before the Japanese occupation. Secondly, it is absolutely unclear how the figures of 3 or 4 million dead were obtained, who registered them, or how the estimates were made. Strictly speaking, not all those who died from starvation and forced labor should be classified as victims of the war, but only those who are among the excess mortality compared to peacetime. However, there are no objective data that would allow us to establish the amount of excess

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mortality, as well as the magnitude of mortality in the pre-war and war years.

Tens of thousands of Indonesians were brought in to build the Burma-Siam Railway to supply the Japanese forces in Burma. How many of them died from starvation and hard work, there is no data, but, in any case, the number of victims can be in the thousands, but not millions. In total, 270,000 Indonesians were taken out of Indonesia for forced labor. It is also alleged that many Indonesians have been victims of military

crimes by the Japanese occupying forces, but there are no statistics on this. After the declaration of independence, Indonesian historiography claimed that tens and even hundreds of thousands of Indonesians died in the struggle against the Japanese. In fact, there was no mass anti-Japanese movement in Indonesia. On the contrary, the Japanese supported the local nationalist movement, which had an anti-Dutch orientation, and its leader Ahmed Sukarno was even awarded a Japanese order. The Nationalists, with the support of the Japanese, formed police units. This helped Sukarno proclaim the independence of Indonesia immediately after the Japanese surrender. Armed struggle began in October 1945, when the Japanese attempted to remove the nationalist-appointed local authorities in order to effect capitulation to British troops and the former Dutch authorities. Incidentally, Sukarno opposed the release of the Dutch internees. They were released only four months after the Japanese surrender and with the obligation to leave Indonesia. After the war, Dutch authorities handed down 234 death sentences to Japanese accused of war crimes. A total of 936 Japanese were convicted."

More credible is the data on the losses of the European population. UN experts believed that about 30,000 Europeans died in Indonesia, mostly Dutch and British, as well as about 300,000 Indonesians imprisoned in internment camps. However, the last

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is a myth, since all Indonesians who served in the Dutch colonial troops and were taken prisoner were sent home. Is there a higher estimate of mortality among Europeans - 35,000 out of 240,000 internees and prisoners? 7. Do we think the most accurate are the data of the Dutch Red Cross, according to which 14.8 thousand Europeans died out of 80 thousand internees, 12.5 thousand out of 34 thousand prisoners of war? . Thus, the number of dead Europeans in Indonesia can be estimated at 27.3 thousand people, of which 12.5 thousand are prisoners of war - the Dutch, British and Australians.

We estimate the loss of the Indonesian population at no more than 50 thousand indigenous people who became victims of forced labor and war crimes, and the loss of the local European, mainly Dutch population, at about 15 thousand people.

Losses of Portuguese (East) Timor

Although Portugal remained neutral in World War II, its colony of East Timor was occupied by Japanese troops in 1942. With the help of the Australian command, a partisan movement was organized on the island. Australian and Dutch troops were the first to land on East Timor on December 17, 1941, violating its neutrality. The Japanese arrived here only in February 1942. The evacuation of Australian troops from the island was completed only in February 1943. A powerful guerrilla war unfolded on Timor. The local population hoped that after the war the Australians would help them free themselves from Portuguese domination. The Japanese, in turn, sought to use in the struggle against them the population of West Timor, where the Dutch dominated and where the Japanese were initially looked upon as liberators from the Dutch yoke. According to Australian estimates, between 40,000 and 70,000 East Timorese, both guerrillas and civilians, died fighting the Japanese. The lower estimate of 40,000 dead seems to us closer to reality.

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Australian losses

Australian troops fought both in the European and North African, and in the Asia-Pacific theaters. In total, 993 thousand people were called up to the Australian army, of which 557.8 thousand served outside Australia? Australian troops fought in North Africa against Rommel's Afrika Korps, and also in 1941 in Greece and Crete.

Only a few Australian air formations and ships participated against Germany during the Italian campaign, as well as during the Normandy landings. Australian pilots also took part in the air battles over the British Isles and in the strategic bombing of Germany in 1940-1945. In this war, about 3.5 thousand Australians died in the air.

The main efforts of Australia were aimed at fighting Japan. Australian ground formations fought against the Japanese in Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore, and then successfully defended themselves against the Japanese invasion in New Guinea.

In total, Australia lost in the Second World War, according to official estimates, 39,685 military personnel and 735 civilians?! The latter were victims of the Japanese aerial bombardment of Australia in 1942-1943, and were also merchant marine sailors who died during attacks by enemy aircraft and ships. More than 30,000 Australian troops were taken prisoner, including more than two-thirds in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations. If the mortality in German and Italian captivity was low, then 36% of Australians, or 8031 people, did not return from Japanese captivity???. Of the 22,376 Australian prisoners of war, 14,972 were captured in Singapore, 2,736 in Java, 1,137 in Timor, 1,075 in the Indonesian island of Ambon from the Moluccas, and 1,049 in New Britain, the largest island of the Bismarck archipelago off the coast of New Guinea?33.

The losses of the Australian armed forces are distributed as follows??%. In the fight against Germany

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and Italy, the Australian Land Army lost 2,610 killed and those reported missing in action, 700 dead of wounds, 242 dead in captivity. In addition, 6,874 people returned from captivity, and 8,925 people were wounded but survived. Losses of the fleet in the war against Germany and Italy 900 people killed and missing, recognized as killed, 3 people died from wounds. In addition, 25 people returned from captivity, and 26 people were injured but survived. The Australian Air Force in the fight against Germany and Italy lost 5,036 killed and missing, declared dead, 58 dead from wounds and 23 people who died in captivity. In addition, 1020 pilots returned from captivity, and 529 people were wounded but survived.

In the struggle against Japan, the Australian land army lost 6,294 killed and missing, admitted dead, 1,090 dead from wounds, 7,777 people died in captivity. In addition, 13,872 people returned from captivity, and 13 19] were wounded but survived. The losses of the fleet in the struggle against Japan amounted to 840 killed and missing, recognized as killed, 41 people died of wounds and 116 people died in captivity. In addition, 238 people returned from captivity and 553 people were injured but survived. The loss of the Australian Air Force in the fight against Japan amounted to 1140 killed and missing, recognized as killed, 65 died of wounds and 138 died in captivity. In addition, 235 airmen returned from Japanese captivity, and 253 were wounded but survived.

In the Pacific theater of operations, 85 soldiers of the allied Australia of Papua New Guinea, which was an Australian colony at that time, also died. 201 Papuans were wounded.

Non-combat casualty casualties, suicides, executions by firing squad in the war zone amounted to 1,165 dead and dead and 33,396 wounded in the Australian Army. Non-combat casualties incurred outside combat zones

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In rear areas, mainly in Australia, there were 2,051 deaths and deaths and 121,800 injured.

Non-combat losses of the fleet amounted to 181 dead. From non-combat causes, 1 employee of the auxiliary female service of the fleet also died. Air Force non-combat losses reached 6271 people, including 3861 dead and 2410 wounded. In the Australian Army, 6,038 people died from disease, of which 2,658 died in Australia, and 433,587 people who fell ill outside the Australian mainland. In the fleet, 147 people died from diseases and another 5 people from the Women's Auxiliary Service of the Fleet. In the Australian Air Force, 342 people died of disease, of which only 40 were in the European and North African theaters.

In total, the Australian armed forces lost 40,764 killed and dead. This figure is close to the latest Commonwealth War Graves Commission estimate of 40,464 Australian service deaths, of which 28,374 are buried in identified graves²⁵. The irretrievable losses of the armed forces of Australia can be estimated at 40.5 thousand people, and the losses of the civilian population - at 0.7 thousand people.

If we take only the losses of the Australian armed forces killed and died of wounds, then the fight against Germany and Japan accounts for 9307 dead, and the fight against Japan - 9470 people. Thus, these figures are almost equal. At the same time, losses in the Asia-Pacific theater are dominated by losses of the ground army, and in the Western theater - losses of the air force. The preponderance of losses in favor of the Asia-Pacific theater arises at the expense of prisoners and those who died in captivity. 9837 Australians fell into the Italo-German captivity, of which only 265, or 2.7%, died, and 22,376 into the Japanese, of which 8031, or 35.9% died. Such a high mortality rate among prisoners of war in Japan was due to the fact that the Japanese did not comply with the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, used them for hard work,

Badly

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fed them and often killed them for no reason. In Japanese military ethics, captivity was considered the greatest shame. The Japanese themselves hardly surrendered, they deeply despised those of their opponents who surrendered, and therefore they treated the prisoners very badly, not even considering their murder a crime, because all the same, these people, from the point of view of the Japanese, lost face, which was the most terrible punishment in terms of Shintoism.

The Australian Land Army in the Western Theater had 9,625 wounded and 2,610 killed, giving a ratio of 3.7:1. In the Asia-Pacific theater, there were 14,281 wounded and 6,294 killed, giving a ratio of 2.3:1. Such a significant decrease in the number of wounded per one killed is obviously due to the fact that the Australian troops in the first stage of the war with Japan suffered more severe defeats than in the fight against Italy and Germany, and many Australians found themselves in a hopeless situation. , without ammunition, and were often killed by the Japanese, who did not always seek to take prisoners. The share of deaths from wounds among soldiers of the ground forces in the Western theater was 7.3%, and in the Asia-Pacific theater - 7.6%. This suggests that the level of Australian medical service in both theaters was approximately the same, and the more unfavorable nature of the hostilities against Japan, as well as the difference in climatic conditions, had a significant impact on the survival rate of the wounded.

did not provide.

New Zealand losses

About 240 thousand people were called up to the armed forces of New Zealand, from September 3, 1939 until the end of the war, fighting on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, of which 140 thousand people served outside New Zealand.

Losses of the New Zealand armed forces amounted to 10,033 killed, 2,129 missing and 8,453 captured²⁶. Subsequently, the total number of dead increased to 11,929, while 233 missing were recognized

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us alive. Of the total number of dead, 9041 were buried in the identified graves??7.

The losses of the New Zealand ground forces in Europe (the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force fought there), participating in the hostilities in North Africa in 1941-1943, in Greece and Crete in 1941 and in Italy in 1943-1945, amounted to 5,624 killed and also died from wounds and in captivity, 7,876 prisoners who were lucky enough to survive captivity, 312 missing, who were never found and probably should be attributed to the dead, as well as 15,644 wounded who were lucky enough to be alive? After Japan started the war in the Pacific, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force was formed to operate in the Pacific. Its units took part in the battles in the Solomon Islands and carried out garrison duty on the islands in the South Pacific. Later, the Americans relieved a significant part of the New Zealand troops in the Pacific Islands in order to free them for the Italian campaign. The New Zealand land units were also planned to be used for the proposed landing in Japan, and after the surrender of Tokyo, they participated in the occupation of the Japanese islands.

Losses of the New Zealand Air Force, operating as part of the Dominion Air Force, amounted to 2960 killed, wounded and missing. The losses of the New Zealanders who fought in the ranks of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain amounted to 3285 dead and 548 prisoners. The total combat losses of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, fighting both in the Dominions Air Force and in the Royal Air Force of Great Britain, amounted to 3687 dead and dead? ®. If we add up the losses of the Expeditionary Force in Europe and the New Zealand Air Force, we get 9723. The remaining 2206 people, obviously, fall on the irretrievable losses of the ground forces of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, which were insignificant, the losses of the New Zealand Navy, as well as irretrievable losses from disease and other non-combat causes of all three branches of the New Zealand armed forces. According to some information

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about 600 New Zealanders died during the fighting in the Solomon Islands, of which 345 belonged to the Air Force? !. Probably 255 killed and died of wounds - this is the loss of the New Zealand land army in the battles in the Pacific.

Losses of Nauru

The former German colony of the island of Nauru before the outbreak of World War II was under the joint administration of England, Australia and New Zealand. In August 1942, Japan occupied Nauru without a fight and deported 1,200 natives for forced labor to the Caroline Islands. 463 of them died due to a change in their usual way of life and environment and hard work^{3°}. The surviving Naurans returned to their homeland in 1945. In total, 38.6% of the deportees died, which amounted to 13.6% of the total population of Nauru at the beginning of the war.

Losses of Papua New Guinea

The losses of the population of Papua New Guinea from shelling and bombing during the hostilities are estimated at 15 thousand people³³. The basis for this assessment is unclear. The loss of the armed forces of Papua New Guinea during the fighting on the island amounted to 85 killed and 201 wounded.

Pacific Island population losses

The term "Pacific Islands" includes the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Palau Archipelago, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the island of Guam. R.J. Rummel puts the number of victims of Japanese war crimes on these islands at 57,000." During the battle for the island of Saipan from the Mariana Islands, 10,000 local Japanese civilians committed suicide⁵. During the fighting on the island of Guam in July 1944, up to 600 civilians could have died from American and Japanese shells and bombs? 6.

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RATIO OF IRREVOCABLE LOSSES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PARTIES ON ASIA PACIFIC THEATER

In the Japanese army, surrender was considered an act of shame. The samurai code of honor forbade surrender. But not only samurai, i.e. The Japanese nobility, but also the vast majority of the rest of the Japanese military, preferred suicide or death in a hopeless attack, after running out of ammunition, with only melee weapons against an enemy armed with guns and machine guns. Therefore, the number of Japanese prisoners was very small. Stalin unsuccessfully sought to instill in Soviet soldiers the psychology of the Japanese and to get them to never surrender. It was believed that a Red Army soldier could be captured only if he was unconscious or seriously wounded and could no longer resist. However, the Soviet mentality was still closer to the European, and not to the Japanese, and the majority of Red Army soldiers had a stronger sense of self-preservation than the fear of reprisals for surrendering. In the Japanese army, without any reprisals, the vast majority of soldiers, without any threats of reprisals, preferred death to surrender, even in a completely hopeless situation. Therefore, comparing the losses of the Japanese killed with the losses of their opponents would be incorrect. In Japanese military losses, there is no way to divide among themselves those killed in battle, those who died from wounds, those who died from diseases, and other categories of irretrievable losses. It should be noted that the number of wounded in the Japanese army due to these reasons was relatively small, since even the seriously wounded often fought to the end.

It seems to us that for a correct comparison, it is necessary to compare the total losses of Japan and its opponents by those killed, who died from wounds, diseases, and other causes, as well as captured. If we take the war between Japan and China in 1937-1945 as a separate theater of operations, then the total losses of anti-Japanese China

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We estimate the number of killed and dead from wounds and diseases (but without prisoners and those who died in captivity) at 1.92 million people. Japanese casualties in this theater of operations - 455.7 thousand people. The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armed forces of Japan and China by the dead and the dead is 4.2:1. It can be assumed that the ratio of killed will be even less favorable for China, since in Japanese losses, in all likelihood, at least half is due to deaths from diseases, while in Chinese losses the proportion of deaths from diseases is only slightly more than a third. The ratio of losses was affected both by the superiority of Japan in the level of economic development, and in particular by the superiority of the Japanese army over the Chinese. Japan began to create modern armed forces on the European model as early as in the late 1920s, while in China, torn apart by civil war, attempts to create such an army with Soviet and German assistance began to be made only from the mid-20s of the 20th century, and no great success was achieved in bringing the combat effectiveness of Chinese troops closer to the level of European armies.

The loss of Japanese troops in the remaining theaters of operations, with the exception of China, Manchuria and all the prisoners who died after the surrender, amounted to 1633.4 thousand dead, dead and captured. We estimate the losses of the troops opposed to them by the dead, the dead and the prisoners as follows? 7:

USA - 127.5 thousand people.

Canada - 2.0 thousand people.

Great Britain - 94 thousand people.

Union of South Africa - 1.1 thousand people.

Australia - 35.5 thousand people.

New Zealand - 0.6 thousand people.

Holland - 40.5 thousand people.

India - 131 thousand people.

Philippines - 113 thousand people.

Frannusian Indochina - 2.1 thousand people.

Total: 547.2 thousand people.

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The ratio is 3.0:1, not in favor of the Japanese side. This ratio, in all likelihood, is obtained primarily due to the high mortality from diseases in the Japanese army due to the poor organization of the sanitary service. The superiority of the American troops in the number of personnel, weapons and military equipment played its role. After the American fleet inflicted a decisive defeat on the Japanese fleet at Midway Atoll in June 1942, the outcome of the war in the Pacific theater was effectively decided. After that, Japan could only hope for a German victory in Europe. However, after the Wehrmacht was defeated at Stalingrad in January 1943, Japan could only hope to prolong the war and try to achieve a compromise peace if America was exhausted by the war. But already from 1943, the dominance of the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean was such that the American command almost always had the opportunity to concentrate superior forces and means against the Japanese, which could not but affect the ratio of losses. The huge superiority of the USA over Japan in the level of industrial development predetermined the unfavorable loss ratio for Japan.

The losses of the Japanese troops in Manchuria and the Kuril Islands during the fighting against the Red Army in August and early September 1945 obviously consist of the losses of the army and navy in Manchuria and on Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The losses of the Japanese army in Manchuria in 1941-1945 are estimated at 46,700 people. Of this number, probably at least half are those who died from diseases, since until August 9, 1945, there were no hostilities here. In the same way, practically all the losses of the Japanese military forces in South and North Korea (26,500 people), where there was virtually no fighting, can be attributed to those who died of disease. On Sakhalin, Japanese losses amounted to about 2 thousand killed and missing, and on the Kuril Islands - 1018 killed and wounded? 8. If we assume that in this case there were approximately that many

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the same as the number of wounded, the total losses of the Japanese in the battles for Sakhalin and the Kuriles can be estimated at 2.5 thousand people, and the total losses of the Japanese armed forces in the war with the Soviet Union in August-September 1945 - at 25,850 killed and died from wounds. Soviet losses in the war with Japan, according to Russian official data, amounted to 12,031 killed and died of wounds. Another 72 people were lost by the allied Red Army Mongolian troops³⁰. Keeping in mind that the official Russian data on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War are underestimated by about three times, and taking into account the relatively small amount of losses in the Soviet-Japanese war, we assume that the figure of 12,031 dead may be about doubled. Then the losses of the Red Army in the war against Japan, together with the losses of the Mongolian allies, can be estimated at 24.1 thousand dead. The ratio of casualties to those killed in the Soviet-Japanese War would then be 1.07:1 in favor of the Red Army. The ratio of casualties turns out to be slightly more favorable for the Red Army than in the battles at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. Here, the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet troops in people and military equipment, as well as the fact that a week after the start of hostilities, the Japanese troops stopped resistance, following the statement of the emperor on surrender, had an effect here.

LOSSES IN EUROPE, NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN THEATERS)

US losses

In the period from December 1, 1941 to August 31, 1945, 14,903,213 people served in the American armed forces, including 10,420,000 people in the Army, 3,883,520 people in the Navy and in the Marine Corps. —

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599,693 people. The losses of the US military in World War II amounted to 405,399 deaths and deaths. Of this number, 291,557 are combat casualties and 113,842 are non-combat casualties. The surviving wounded in the American armed forces numbered 670,846. This included all the wounded and sick who died before the end of 1946, but the number of victims after August 31, 1945 was extremely small. Army losses amounted to 31,274 dead. Of this number, 234,874 were combat casualties, and 83,400 were non-combat casualties, which included mainly victims of disease, but also accidents, suicides, and those executed by tribunals. In addition, 9098 prisoners of war who died from non-combat causes stand out as part of the combat losses of the army. The number of war-wounded survivors in the ground forces was 565,861.

The losses of army aviation, included in the losses of the ground army, amounted to 52,173 combat deaths and 35,946 non-combat deaths. It should be emphasized that the US strategic aviation, which bombed Germany and Japan, was part of the army aviation. The latter was also bombed by the aviation of the fleet and the naval corps.

infantry.

Fleet losses amounted to 62,614 people, including 36,950 combat and 25,664 non-combat. There were 37,778 wounded who survived the war in the Navy. In the Marine Corps, a total of 24,511 people died. Of this number, 19,733 are combat losses and 4,778 are non-combat losses. 67,207 wounded US Marines survived the war?!

In the army, 189,666 people died in battle, 26,309 people died of wounds, 575,861 people were wounded, and 2,752 people went missing. In the fleet, 34,702 men died in action, 1,783 men died of wounds, and 26,793 men died of other causes. The number of wounded survivors among American sailors was estimated at 33,870, and the number of missing was only 28 people. The US Marine Corps lost 15,460 killed in action,

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3,163 died of wounds and another 5,863 died of non-combat causes, mostly from disease. Marines lost 67,134 wounded. 172,952 people served in the US Coast Guard, of which 1,917 people died, including 572 in combat?

In total, about 140 thousand women served in the US Army, including about 1 thousand - in army aviation. There were 100,000 women in the Navy, 23,000 in the Marines. Another 13,000 American women served in the Coast Guard, and 74,000 in the medical service of the Army and Navy. A total of 446 women died in the US Army, including 244 officers. Of this number, only 16 people can be attributed to combat losses, and all of them are officers?

The distribution of combat losses of the US armed forces perished by the main theaters of operations and types of armed forces is as follows:

Euro-Atlantic Theater

Total: 183,588, including 1,124 who died in captivity, Army Ground Forces - 141,088.

Army Air Force - 36,461.

Navy and Coast Guard - 6039.

Asia Pacific theater

Total: 108,504, including 12,935 who died in captivity. Army ground forces - 41,592.

Army Air Force - 15,694.

Navy and Coast Guard - 31,485.

Marine Corps - 19,733.

Army not allocated to theaters - 39.

A more detailed distribution of the combat losses of the US Army in various theaters of operations is presented in the following table:

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Losses of American civilians are reduced to the losses of sailors of the American merchant fleet during the Battle of the Atlantic and from Japanese submarines in the Pacific. The bulk of American merchant ships were sunk in the Atlantic. In total, the sailors of the American merchant fleet lost their lives and died 9497 people. Of this number, at least 66 died in Japanese captivity, and about 1,100 died of wounds. In addition, 1,704 American civilians interned in Japan (1,536) and Germany (168) died. Another 68 American civilians died during the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 from the "friendly fire" of American troops, and another 6 American civilians in the state of Oregon died from a bomb explosion delivered by an unguided Japanese air balloon! 5.

The total US casualties in the war are 416,674, of which only 11,275 are civilians.

Losses of Canada

The losses of the Canadian armed forces are estimated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission at 45,383 dead, including 102 dead natives of Newfoundland (21 in the army, 41 in the navy and 40 in the air force), which until 1949 was not formally part of Canada, but was an independent dominion. It should be noted that another 600 Newfoundlanders died in the British armed forces, including 115 people in the War, 351 in the Navy and 134 in the Air Force. In addition, 356 Newfoundlanders died on British merchant ships. 37,348 Canadian servicemen buried in identified graves³⁶. According to preliminary data, after the end of the war, the losses of the Canadian armed forces amounted to 37,476 dead, 1,843 missing, 53,174 wounded and 9,045 prisoners?! In addition, about 1,600 sailors of the Canadian merchant fleet died on ships sunk by German submarines in the Atlantic. In the ranks of the Canadian army, combat losses amounted to about 23

thousand

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dead, in the ranks of the Air Force - 17 thousand, in the ranks of the military fleet - about 2 thousand dead?! °. Canadian forces fought almost exclusively against Germany and Italy. They participated in the raid on Dieppe in March 1942, in the offensive in Western Europe after the landings in Normandy in 1944-1945, in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the strategic bombing of Germany, as well as in the Italian campaign. Canada's contribution to the fighting in the Asia-Pacific theater was more modest and limited to the participation of 1975 Canadian soldiers in the defense of Hong Kong. 290 of them were killed, and the rest, including several hundred wounded, were taken prisoner. Until the end of the war, about 300 Canadians died in Japanese captivity??. In addition, at the end of the war, Canadian ships were used in operations in the Pacific. Canadian troops helped the Americans clear the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands, and two transport squadrons supplied Allied forces in Burma and India.

Taking into account the losses of Newfoundland, the loss of Canadian military personnel can be estimated at 46,000 dead, and the loss of the civilian population - at 2,000 dead.

Brazilian losses

Brazil was the only one of the Latin American countries - members of the Anti-Hitler coalition, which sent its ground troops to Europe to participate in the Italian campaign. Brazil declared war on the Axis on August 22, 1942. The Brazilian Navy took part in the Battle of the Atlantic, during which 492 sailors were killed. In addition, 470 merchant mariners and 502 passengers perished on merchant ships sunk by German submarines? 20. The expeditionary force in Italy from June 1944 to April 1945 consisted of 25,334 people and consisted of one division and an aviation group. His losses amounted to 510 dead?! Brazil's total losses in World War II can be

estimated at 2,000 people, who are almost equally distributed between the military and civilians.

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Losses of Mexico

Mexico lost 9 pilots of the squadron, which, together with the Americans, operated in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations against Japan in the Philippines and Taiwan in 1945. 1 pilot killed in action, 3 at sea after running out of fuel, 1 - in an accident when returning from a sortie, 4 - during training flights? 2?. In addition, one ground support soldier died in a hospital in the Philippines from illness. In addition, 63 merchant seamen died during the Battle of the Atlantic?323.

Cuban losses

The losses of Cuba, which was a member of the Anti-Hitler coalition, were reduced to the death of 79 sailors on 5 merchant ships sunk by German submarines??".

Losses of England (United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland)

About 5.5 million people served in the British armed forces. The most recent estimate by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission puts the military casualties of the United Kingdom as well as the British colonies in World War II at 383,786 military dead, of which 244,661 are buried in identified graves? 25. Of this number, 31,271 military personnel died of natural causes, mainly from disease and accidents?26. The British colonies that participated in the war (Ghana, West Africa, East Africa, the Caribbean, Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Jordan, Sudan, Malga, and Palestine, represented by the Jewish Brigade) lost in the war according to preliminary data from June 1945 6877 killed,

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14,208 missing (mostly in Japanese captivity), 6,972 wounded and 8,115 captured??7.

The distribution of British casualties by service, amounting to 357,116 dead, including the British colonies listed, as well as Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia, according to the preliminary official loss report made in June 1946, was as follows: Navy 50,758, Army 144,079, Air Force 69,606, Women's Auxiliary Territorial Service 624, Merchant Marine 30,248, British Self-Defense Units 1,206 and civilians 60,595. Missing by 28 February 1946 6244 people continued to be registered, including 340 in the Navy, 2267 in the Warmla, 3089 in the Air Force, 18 in the Women's Auxiliary Territorial Service, and 530 in the Merchant Navy. the news must be considered dead. In addition to 60,595 civilians killed by air and missile attacks, 1,206 British self-defense units were killed. The report did not include the deaths of those civilians who died in the Axis internment camps. Probably, at their expense, the total number of dead and dead civilians rises to 67,328.

The losses of the civilian population of Great Britain amounted to 67,080 people - victims of bombing and shelling with rockets "V"2. Also, this number may include several dozen Australian citizens who became victims of the Japanese bombing of Australia. In England, the sailors of the merchant fleet who died during the Battle of the Atlantic, as well as in other theaters of war, including during the escort of northern convoys to the USSR, are traditionally included in the losses of the armed forces.

The loss of British ground forces in killed and captured is as follows distributed by theater of operations:

Norway, 1940: killed - 0.8 thousand, captured - 0.2 thousand

Western Front, 1940: 11.01 thousand killed, 41.34 thousand captured

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Balkans, 1941: killed - 2.0 thousand, captured - 0.8 thousand

East Africa, 1940-1941: 2,500 killed

North Africa, 1940-1943: killed - 13.4 thousand, captured - 10.6 thousand

Italy, 1943-1945: killed - 24.6 thousand, captured - 3.5 thousand.

Western Front, 1944-1945: killed - 30.28 thousand, captured - 14.7 thousand.

Far East, 1941-1945: 5.67 thousand killed, 53.23 thousand taken prisoner.³³⁰

The total losses of the United Kingdom in the war, together with the losses of the colonies, can be estimated at 450.9 thousand dead, of which only 97.8 thousand falls on the civilian population. We, in contrast to British statistics, attribute the loss of merchant marine sailors to the loss of civilians. Losses of the colonies cannot exceed 21,085 dead military personnel. If we assume that of the 14,208 missing soldiers of the colonial troops, about half died, the total losses of the colonies by the dead can be estimated at 14.0 thousand dead. Then the loss of the British Isles proper can be estimated at 436.9 thousand people.

Losses of the Union of South Africa

South African troops fought in East and North Africa against German and Italian troops, in the capture of the island of Madagascar in May 1942, occupied by the troops of the French government of Vichy, in the Italian campaign. The South African Air Force also operated in the Balkans, bombing Romanian oil fields and dropping supplies on the Warsaw rebels in 1944.

334,000 volunteers served in the South African armed forces, including 211,000 whites, 77,000 blacks, and 46,000 people of color and Asians.

The losses of the Union of South African armed forces, according to the latest estimate of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, amounted to 11,903 dead, of which 10,021 people were buried in identified graves.

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lahz³¹!. After the end of the war, the losses of the South African armed forces were estimated at 6,840 killed, 1,841 missing, 14,363 wounded and 14,589 captured?³².

Irish losses

Ireland was the only British dominion to remain neutral during World War II. However, according to the Irish authorities, about 70 thousand citizens of Ireland voluntarily served in the British army. In 1995, the then head of the Irish government, John Bratton, claimed that only about 150 thousand Irish from the North and South of the island served in the British army (Ireland did not recognize the separation of Northern Ireland, which became part of the United Kingdom), and of these, at least 10 thousand died³³. Taking into account the fact that the number of Irish citizens who served in the British army is estimated at 70 thousand.

people, their losses in the dead can be estimated at 4.7 thousand people. These losses are also included in the losses of the English army.

Iraqi losses

On March 31, 1941, the regent of Iraq, which was a British protectorate, Prince Amir Abdul Ilah, having learned about a plot against himself, fled to a British warship in the Persian Gulf. On April 1, the former Prime Minister Rashid Ali, who was pro-German, came to power as a result of a coup. On April 17, he asked for military assistance from Germany in case Iraq had to go to war with England. On May 2, 1941, British troops began fighting against the Iraqis who surrounded their military base in Habbaniya. On May 30, British troops occupied Baghdad, and Rashid Ali fled to Iran. On May 31, an armistice was signed. Germany and Italy, due to their geographical remoteness, were able to send only 41 planes to Iraq - 29 German and 12 Italian. Also, the French authorities in Syria, subordinate to the Vichy government, organized

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supply of weapons to the Iraqi army. Before the end of the fighting, the German and Italian military personnel left Iraq on the surviving aircraft. Losses of Iraqi troops, according to the Iraqi command, amounted to 500 killed and 1,250 wounded³³⁴, as well as tens of thousands of prisoners. 19 German and 3 Italian aircraft were shot down or lost for technical reasons, as well as all 60 combat-ready Iraqi aircraft. The British lost 60 killed and died from wounds and several hundred wounded, as well as 28 aircraft. In total, 162 servicemen of the British Empire were buried in Iraq, as well as 10 Poles and 1 Norwegian. 115 of them either died of disease or crashed during training flights³³⁵.

We estimate the loss of Iraq in World War II at 0.5 thousand people.

Iranian losses

During the occupation of Iran by Soviet and British troops from August 25 to September 17, 1941, undertaken to protect Iranian oil fields from the Axis countries, Iranian troops lost about 200 people in clashes with the interventionists. On August 29, the Iranians stopped their resistance against the British, and on August 30, against the Soviet troops. The allies deposed Shah Reza Pahlavi, who on September 16 was forced to transfer the throne to his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. British troops lost 22 killed and 50 wounded, and | tank³³⁶. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted to about 50 killed, about 100 wounded and up to 4 thousand sick and 3 aircraft³³⁷, Iranian losses are estimated at about 800 military personnel, including Admiral Bayandor, and about 200 civilians who died during the bombing of Gilan by Soviet aircraft, as well as more than 7 thousand prisoners in battles only against the Red Army. Iran also lost 6 aircraft and 2 patrol ships. Another 4 patrol ships were damaged.

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Belgian losses

The losses of the Belgian army in the fight against the Wehrmacht amounted to 8.8 thousand killed, 500 missing, who should be counted among the dead, 200 subjected to the death penalty, 1.8 thousand died in captivity and 800 died in resistance movement. In addition, according to R. Overmans, about 19 thousand Belgians died in the ranks of the German armed forces³³⁹. This estimate seems to us too high. The fact is that on January 31, 1944, there were only 6,845 natives of Belgium (5,033 Flemings and 1,812 Walloons) in the German army³⁴⁹. This calculation was made even without taking into account the losses in the Cherkasy pocket, where the losses of the Walloons were especially great. And before that time, only a few hundred Walloons and Flemings could have died. After January 1944, there were few volunteers from Belgium in the SS troops. And even if we assume that all the natives of Belgium who served in the German army,

died, it is unlikely that their number would have reached 19 thousand people. Meanwhile, according to official Russian data, out of 2014 natives of Belgium, 181 people died in Soviet captivity³¹. But, apart from 1833 Belgians who returned from Soviet captivity, a significant number of Belgian SS surrendered to the Western allies, and some, like the leader of the far-right Rexist party, the commander of the 28th SS division "Wallonia" Leon Degrel, managed to emigrate. On January 31, 1944, there were 2.7 times more natives of Holland in the German army (18,473 people) than natives of Belgium. Meanwhile, R. Overmans also describes the loss of the Dutch in the German army at 10 thousand people. If we assume that this last estimate is close to reality, then the number of Belgians who died in the German army can be estimated at 3.7 thousand people. The losses of the civilian population of Belgium amounted to 32.2 thousand victims of hostilities in 1940 and 1944-1945, 16.9 thousand victims of Nazi terror, including up to 500 gypsies, and 24,387 Jews killed by the Nazis as part of the Holocaust? “?.

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Thus, the losses of Belgium can be estimated at 89.3 thousand people, of which about 15.8 thousand are military personnel.

Losses of the Netherlands (Holland)

The losses of the Dutch army in battles with the Germans in 1940 amounted to 2.2 thousand people. Another 1.7 thousand resistance fighters died during the German occupation. The Dutch navy lost 2.6 thousand people dead. In addition, 250 Dutch soldiers died in German captivity. In the Battle of the Atlantic, 1,350 sailors of the Dutch merchant fleet from among the Dutch and another 1,650 representatives of other nationalities perished on ships sunk by German submarines. The latter are not included by us in the composition of the Dutch losses? *. In addition, about 900 Dutch soldiers died in the battles against Japan, and about 8,000 of the 37,000 Dutch prisoners of war died in Japanese captivity. According to R. Overmans, about 10 thousand Dutch people died in the German army. In Soviet captivity, according to official Russian data, there were 4,730 Dutchmen, of whom 200 people died⁷⁷. The losses of the civilian population of Holland amounted to 7.5 thousand dead or missing in forced labor in Germany (in total, 27 thousand Dutch were taken out for forced labor), 2.8 thousand executed by the German occupation authorities, 2.5 thousand Dutch who died in concentration camps in Holland, 18 thousand died in concentration camps in Germany, 20.4 thousand died from Anglo-American bombing and as a result of ground fighting, and 16 thousand died as a result of the famine of the winter of 1944/45. 104,000 Dutch Jews became victims of the Holocaust. As a result of the gypsy genocide, 500 Dutch citizens were killed³. In addition, in Indonesia (Dutch Indies), out of more than 100,000 interned European civilians, 14,800 people died, mostly Dutch³. These losses are included by us in the losses of Indone

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zii. According to Dutch data, only 3,700 Dutch died in the German army.³ This is almost three times lower than R Overmans' estimate, but the latter seems to me much closer to reality. Probably the difference between 10,000 and 3 7,000 were formed from the 7,500 Dutchmen who were considered missing while in Germany, It can be assumed that at least 6,300 of them actually entered the German army, mainly to the Waffen-SS and died on the Eastern Front or in Soviet captivity. German attack on the USSR, according to the data of the German Foreign Ministry, there were even slightly more Flemings in the SS troops than the Dutch - respectively 5721 and 4814³⁵². But on January 31, 1944, there were 18,473 Dutchmen in the German army, which was 2, 7 times more than the number of inhabitants of Belgium (5033 Flemings and 1812 Walloons)³³³. This was due to the relatively large influx of Dutch volunteers. With this in mind, the number of Dutch who died in the German army should be about 2.7 times greater than the number of Belgians who died. If R were correct

Overmans in 10 thousand Belgians who died in the ranks of the German army, then the number of Dutch should have been about 27 thousand people, which would be one and a half times the number of Dutch in the SS troops on January 31, 1944. And before January 31, 1944, only a few hundred Dutch could die. Therefore, we believe that approximately 10,000 Dutch died in the German army. In total, the losses of Holland are estimated by us at 193.4 thousand people, including 25,650 military personnel, of which approximately 10 thousand died fighting on the German side.

Losses of Luxembourg

The losses of Luxembourg are estimated at 5 thousand people, of which about 3 thousand died in the German army (since Luxembourg was annexed by Germany, then

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Luxembourgers served mainly in the Wehrmacht, and not in the SS troops), and 200 served in the Belgian army. Altogether 10,200 Luxembourgers were drafted into the German army. In Soviet captivity, according to 1956, there were 1653 Luxembourgers, of whom 93 people died. However, according to the data of the beginning of 1949, 1660 Luxembourgers were in Soviet captivity, of which 92 people had died by that time. It can be assumed that 1 out of 2 Luxembourgers who remained at that time in the POW camps died before 1956. The difference between 1653 and 1660 was apparently formed by 5 Luxembourgers transferred to the Gulag and 2 Luxembourgers transferred to civilian internment camps⁷. The loss of civilians - 1800 people - falls on the victims of German repression. This number includes 700 Jews⁵⁸ and 200 Gypsies³⁵, as well as 57 executed members of the resistance movement³⁶,

Swiss losses

60 Swiss citizens died in the resistance movement in France?'. R. Overmans estimates the number of Swiss citizens who died in the German armed forces at 300 people³⁶². Taking into account the fact that by January 31, 1944, there were still 584 Swiss in the SS troops⁶³, and the total number of Swiss in the German army is estimated at 700-800 people, the death toll could be 200-300 people. We prefer an average estimate of 250 people. After all, the proportion of deaths among the Swiss was higher than among the German soldiers. The last Swiss volunteers entered the German army in 1942, while a significant part of the Germans were only called up in 1945. In addition, almost all the Swiss served in combat units, and the German SS units participated in the battle more intensively than the Wehrmacht formations. These two factors probably override the effect of the factor that some of the wounded Swiss returned to their homeland and no longer participated in the battles. 205 Swiss were in Soviet captivity, of which by the beginning of 1949 there were repat

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175 people were arrested, 22 people died, 4 were recognized as civilian prisoners, and 4 more remained in prisoner of war camps^{6*},

In 1940, during the Battle of France, the Luftwaffe repeatedly violated Swiss airspace and several aircraft were shot down by Swiss fighters and anti-aircraft guns. Anglo-American aircraft repeatedly bombed Switzerland in 1943-1945. At least 67 civilians were killed during these raids. In a battle with the American "flying fortress" 1 pilot of a Swiss fighter was killed. In 1944 and 1949, the US government paid about \$18.4 million in compensation to Switzerland⁶⁵.

We estimate the total losses of Switzerland at 378 people, of which 311 are military personnel.

French losses

The losses of the French army in 1939-1940, during the battle for France, amounted to 123 thousand killed and died from wounds and up to 250 thousand wounded. About 20,000 members of the resistance movement died, and about 40,000 of the 1,405,000 French prisoners of war died in German captivity. "To these losses must be added the victims of the Franco-Thai war in Indochina. French losses in this war amounted to 321 killed or wounded, 178 missing, 222 captured. Assuming that at least half of the missing are killed and that the ratio between the number of killed and wounded, on the Thai side, was close to 1:3, then the total number of deaths the French can be estimated at 140. In addition, up to 3,000 people, mostly soldiers, were killed during clashes with the Japanese in 1940 and 1945. The total losses of the French army in Indochina can be estimated at 3,000 dead. Vichy in clashes with American troops in North Africa in November 1942, as well as in other clashes with the Anglo-American troops and with the troops of the "Free French" of General Charles de Gaulle, lost 2653 people

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ka dead, including 1368 people during the landing of American troops in North Africa in November 1942. Losses of American troops amounted to 453 people? 7. The loss of free French troops during the fighting in Africa amounted to about 1950 people, during the campaign in Italy in 1943-1945 - 8.7 thousand dead and during the fighting on the Western Front - 12.6 thousand people³⁶⁸.

French soldiers also died as part of the German army. These were both natives of Alsace and Lorraine, mobilized into the Wehrmacht, attached to the Reich, and French volunteers who served in the French Legion on the Eastern Front, deployed at the end of the war to the 33rd SS division "Charlemagne". The number of casualties among conscripts from Alsace-Lorraine in the Wehrmacht is estimated by R. Overmans at 30 thousand people?. Since we believe his estimate of German military losses to be 1.3 times overestimated, the most probable figure for us seems to be the number of dead natives of Alsace and Lorraine at 23,000 people. In addition, 6,425 French volunteers served in the Wehrmacht and then in the SS troops. About 2,640 more people joined the Charlemagne division from the German Navy, the Todt organization and the National Socialist Automobile Corps, so that the total number of French volunteers was about 9 thousand people. The number of dead among them is estimated between July 1941 and May 1943 at 169 killed and 550 wounded. By September 1, 1944, the total number of those killed had risen to 400. In September, all French volunteers were assembled in the Charlemagne division. At the end of February and in March 1945, the division took part in heavy fighting in Pomerania, where about 4.8 thousand legionnaires died or were captured. Approximately 300 more French SS men died or were captured in Berlin in April-May 37°. Taking the number of dead in Pomerania as one third of the total number of killed and captured, and the number of dead in Berlin as half, the total number of French dead in the last battles of 1945 can be estimated at 1750 people, and the total number of dead and dead from wounds French SS - 2150 people. Remains of the division

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The Charlemagne, outside of Berlin, surrendered to the Western Allies. In Soviet captivity, according to official Russian data, there were 23,136 Frenchmen, of whom 1,325 people³ died in captivity! At the same time, 22,115 people were actually French in Soviet captivity. departed for other reasons, 21 people still remained in prisoner-of-war camps, and 1329 prisoners died.

The losses of the civilian population of France include the victims of German repressions, as well as the victims of the repressions of the French authorities in 1944-1945. The total number of victims of hostilities

in France among the civilian population is estimated at 125 thousand people. This includes both the victims of ground battles and the German bombings of 1940 - 58 thousand people, and the victims of the Anglo-American bombing - 67 thousand people. In addition, up to 230 thousand French citizens became victims of Nazi repression? 73. Of this number, the number of victims of the Gypsy genocide in France is estimated at 15 thousand people? thousand) 375. There is also a higher figure of the dead Jews of France - 83 thousand people? 76. Perhaps this includes not only French Jews, but also emigrants from Germany and other countries.

The number of persons executed for collaborationism or killed without trial on suspicion of collaborationism is estimated at 10,000 people³⁷⁷. Of these, only 3,784 people were executed by court sentences³⁻⁸.

We estimate the total number of French citizens who died during the Second World War at 602.3 thousand people, of which about 237.3 thousand people perished in the military, including resistance fighters. From the general

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the number of French military about 28.1 thousand died fighting on the side of the Axis powers. According to V.V. Erlichman, about 6.5 thousand inhabitants of the French African colonies, primarily Moroccans and Senegalese, died as part of the French troops in World War II. Taking this into account, the victims of the population of France itself can be estimated at 595.8 thousand people. The losses of the French colonial troops are probably equally divided between the countries of French North Africa and the countries of French West Africa.

Losses of Tunisia

During the bombing of Tunisia by Anglo-American aircraft in 1942-1943, 752 civilians were killed⁸⁰,

Spanish losses

The Blue Division, made up of Spanish volunteers, fought on the Eastern Front as the 250th Wehrmacht division and showed high combat capability, being sent home in October 1943, after the capitulation of Italy. This division was formed as a token of gratitude to Germany for the participation of the German volunteer aviation legion "Condor" in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 on the side of the troops of General Franco. About 45 thousand Spaniards passed through it? !. Actually, the 250th division lost, according to some estimates, about 4.5 thousand dead²². In total, during the fighting, the "blue division" and other Spanish units that continued to fight in 1944-1945 lost 4957 killed and died from wounds and diseases (the latter was about 1.5 thousand) and 8766 wounded. The losses of the "blue division" proper as missing persons amounted to 326. In addition, the losses were 8.4 thousand people with the sick, and 1.5 thousand people with frostbite. 2 thousand wounded and sick became disabled? 3. Practically all the missing people ended up in Soviet captivity.

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Soviet losses in the battles against the 250th division, its former commander, General Emilio Esteban Infantes, estimated at 32 thousand killed, wounded and missing on the Leningrad front and 14 thousand on the Volkhov front?²⁴. After the division was withdrawn, the Spanish Legion of 1,800 remained, sent home at the end of March 1944, and about 700 more Spanish volunteers continued to fight in the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord and in other formations of the SS troops. In total, 452 Spaniards from the Blue Division and the Nord Division ended up in Soviet captivity, of which 70 people died in captivity. According to Spanish data, the loss of Spanish troops on the Eastern Front as prisoners of war amounted to 464 people, and the number of deaths could reach 130. However, according to the Spaniards, about 70 of the prisoners were actually defectors?. Survivors of captivity defectors after the war

could stay in the USSR or move to another country. Most likely, the figure of 130 who did not return from captivity includes not only the dead, but also about 50 deserters who did not want to return to Spain. If this is so, then it is quite possible that 82 Spaniards died in captivity, since 12 people, on whom Russian official statistics underestimate the total number of Spanish prisoners, most likely died in captivity. Note that the figure of 464 Spanish prisoners is confirmed in Soviet documents. According to the certificate of the GUPVI of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR dated January 28, 1949, by the beginning of this year, 464 Spaniard prisoners of war were registered, of which 78 were repatriated by that time, 1 was recognized as a civilian prisoner and transferred to an internment camp, 1 escaped, 13 were transferred to prisons, 67 died, and 304 remained in POW camps? 7. Probably the difference of 12 people was formed at the expense of those who were transferred to prisons. It is possible that 12 out of 13 of these people died.

The total losses of Spain in World War II can be estimated at 5,000 servicemen killed. In addition, about 100 thousand Spanish workers worked in Germany and in the territories occupied by German troops, where some of them could die from allied bombardments.

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rovok. Also, a number of Spanish sailors of the merchant fleet could have died on ships sunk during the battle for the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. However, there are no figures for these victims. A significant number of Spanish emigrants who left the country after the victory of General Franco fought in the armies of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition, and many of them died. However, they were not residents of Spain at the beginning of the Second World War, and the survivors could not return to Spain after the end of the war. Therefore, we have taken into account their losses in the losses of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition. In the same way, the losses of the Spanish legionnaires in Russia were taken into account by us as part of the losses of the German armed forces.

Italian losses

According to official Italian figures, before the armistice of September 8, 1943, the Italian armed forces, excluding the losses of local soldiers of the colonial army, lost 66,686 killed and died of wounds, 111,579 missing and died in captivity and 26,081 died from diseases, and a total of 204,346 dead. After the armistice, the losses were 42,916 killed and died of wounds, 19,840 missing and died in captivity, 24,274 died of disease, for a total of 87,030 dead. By type of armed forces, irretrievable losses are distributed as follows: land army - 201,405 dead, navy - 22,034, air force - 9,096, colonial troops - 354, military priests - 96, fascist militia (blackshirts) - 10,066, paramilitary units 3252, not defined - 45,078 people. According to the theaters of operations, the losses of the Italian armed forces are distributed as follows: Italy - 74,725 (including 37,573 after the armistice), France - 2060 (1039 people after the armistice), Germany - 25,430 (24,020 after the armistice - we are talking about mainly about those who died in prison camps), in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia 45,459 (10,090 after the armistice), in the USSR - 82,079 (3522 after the armistice), in Africa - 22,341 (1565 after the armistice),

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at sea - 28,438 (5,526 after the armistice), other and unspecified 6,844 (3,695 after the armistice). In addition, after the armistice, 5927 people died in the Italian formations fighting on the side of the Anglo-American allies, and 13 thousand people died in the army of the Italian Social Republic, who fought on the side of Germany, and the 29th Italian SS division. Also 17,488 partisans died in the Italian resistance movement⁸⁸. In Soviet captivity, out of 48,957 Italians, 27,683 people died. In total, about 4 million people served in the Italian army.

From the point of view of the ratio of losses, the Italian troops acted rather inefficiently. So, for example, during the battle for France, the Italians launched an offensive only on June 20, and in 6 days of fighting that lasted until June 25, they lost 631 killed and 816 missing, of which 390 people were killed, as well as 2631 wounded. and 2151 frostbitten³. French casualties were only 37² '.

The losses of the civilian population of Italy amounted to 153,147 people (123,119 after the armistice). Of this number, 61,432 (42,613 after the armistice) died as a result of the bombing by Anglo-American aircraft. 36 thousand civilian casualties after the truce were women. Italian statistics also include partisan casualties^{3??} in civilian casualties. The remainder of the civilian casualties are mainly due to reprisals by the German occupation authorities and those killed in ground fighting and on scuttled Italian ships. Also included are the fascists and supporters of the Italian Social Republic of Benito Mussolini, who were killed by partisans, mainly after the surrender of German troops in Italy on April 29, 1945. The victims of the Holocaust in Italy amounted to 8,562 people^{3?3}. Approximately | thousand Italian citizens³⁹⁴.

We estimate the total losses of Italy at 463.4 thousand people, of which 327.8 thousand are military losses, including the losses of Italian Resistance fighters. It should be noted that a significant part of the partisans were

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former soldiers of the Italian army who managed to avoid disarmament and internment by the German troops. At least 23.4 thousand Italians died fighting on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition.

Losses of Malta

Losses of the civilian population of Malta from German-Italian air raids are estimated at 1.5 thousand people. 14 thousand bombs were dropped on the island, about 30 thousand buildings were destroyed and damaged. The relatively low number of casualties is due to the fact that the population of the capital, La Valletta, and three other towns on the island were evacuated to the countryside.

Losses of Ethiopia (Abyssinia, Italian East Africa)

In 1935-1936, Ethiopia was occupied by Italy and transformed into the colony of Italian East Africa along with Italian Somalia and Eritrea. This annexation was not recognized by many countries. After the latter entered World War II in June 1940, a partisan movement of supporters of the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie T. became more active in Ethiopia. Italian troops did not control Ethiopian territory outside the cities. After the initial successes of the Italian troops in British Somalia, they began to retreat under the onslaught of the British colonial troops, as well as parts of the Free French and Free Belgium operating from the territory of the French and Belgian colonies. The Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy of Italian East Africa, Marshal Duke Amedeo Aosta, continued to resist until May 18, 1941, when the 7,000-strong Italian contingent under his command was forced to agree to an honorable surrender in the Ethiopian fortress of Amba Aladzha. In November 1941, the remaining Italian army in Ethiopia, deprived of supplies from

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metropolis, was forced to capitulate. More than 40,000 people surrendered, led by General Giulielmo Nasi. In total, up to 230 thousand Italian soldiers were captured, mainly from the colonial troops. Scattered detachments of Italians from among the local colonists and a few Italian soldiers who escaped captivity waged a guerrilla war until the general Italian surrender on September 9, 1943. The Italian army numbered 74

thousand Italian soldiers and 182 thousand Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians. Most of the Italian colonial formations were newly created irregular units (bands), which were distinguished by a very low combat capability. British troops and their Ethiopian allies had well over 250,000 men, mostly colonial soldiers from Nigeria, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, South Africa, British West Africa, British East Africa, Sudan, British Somalia, and also from India and British Mandatory Palestine. The losses of the Italian troops amounted to 6 thousand killed, the losses of the British troops - up to 4 thousand killed. According to British, perhaps exaggerated data, 278.5 thousand Italian soldiers were taken prisoner. It is possible that this number also includes support personnel (porters, mule drivers, etc.). The soldiers of the colonial troops were sent home. During the fighting in Somalia in 1940, Italian losses in 1941, in the most fierce battle for Keren in February-March, the Italian troops lost up to 3 thousand killed and wounded, and the British - 500 killed and 3229 wounded. During the fighting in the area of the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in March-April, about 500 were killed and wounded. The only Ethiopian "part of Gideon" numbering 1600 people, led by Emperor Haile Selassie, who returned to the country, took part in these battles. In 1941, the Allied losses also amounted to about 500 people killed and wounded?

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The losses of the Italian colonial troops can be estimated at 4.3 thousand people. Of this number, probably up to 3 thousand are Ethiopians and Eritreans. The losses of the Ethiopian and Somali irregulars fighting on the British side were negligible. It is possible that the British Somali formations suffered slightly more significant losses - up to 200 people. We estimate the losses of Ethiopia (including Eritrea, which was annexed to Ethiopia in 1952) at 3 thousand people, the losses of the Somali tribes (after the war, in 1960, British and Italian Somalia united into a single state) - at 1.5 thousand people.

According to official Ethiopian data, a total of 760,000 people perished in the war against Italy in 1935-1941³, but this figure looks exaggerated many times over. It should also be borne in mind that the bulk of the losses occurred during active hostilities in 1935-1936 years.

Albanian losses

Albanian losses, both military and civilian, were estimated after the war by the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Organization at 30,000 people⁴. In Albania, about 200 Jews were killed by the Nazis. All of them were citizens of Yugoslavia³. According to official Albanian data, 28.8 thousand Albanians died in battles with the German-Italian occupiers in 1939-1944.⁵ This figure probably includes the losses of the Albanian army during the short Albanian-Italian war in April 1939, as well as the losses of the partisans of the anti-communist National Front (Baly kombtar), who until the autumn of 1943 fought alongside the communist partisans of Enver Hoxha against the Italian troops. until the autumn of 1943, and after the Italian capitulation, they went over to the side of the German troops that landed in the country, as Germany proclaimed the formal independence of Albania. Perhaps this also includes the loss of the 12,000th

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Albanian army, which participated in 1940-1941 in the Italian war against Greece. Estimates of Albanian civilian casualties vary.

Yugoslav losses

The losses of Yugoslavia in World War II during the time of Tito were officially estimated at 1,706,000 dead and died of starvation and disease. However, the American Census Bureau in 1954

year estimated the military losses of Yugoslavia at 1067 thousand dead. At the same time, American statisticians argued that the official Yugoslav figure significantly overstates the size of the losses, since it was announced after the war and did not take into account the data of the post-war population census. Croatian researcher Vladimir Zheryavich, after analyzing the data of the 1921, 1931 and 1948 population censuses, believes that the American estimate is too high and the actual death toll is 1027 thousand people⁴⁰?

According to Russian official figures, 21,830 natives of Yugoslavia, mostly Croats, ended up in Soviet captivity. Of these, 1,476 people died. 3 Bosnian researcher of Serbian origin, Bogoljub Kožović, also using data from the pre-war and post-war censuses of Yugoslavia, estimates war losses at 1,014,000 dead. According to him, based on an official estimate in 1964, in Bosnia and Herzegovina of those whose names were known, 177,045 people died during the war years, and 49,242 were wounded. For Serbia (excluding Vojvodina and Kosovo), the corresponding figures were 97,728 and 123,818; for Vojvodina, 41,370 and 66,957; for Kosovo, 7927 and 13,960; for Montenegro, 16,903 and 14,136; and 106,220, for Macedonia 19,076 and 32,374, for Slovenia 40,791 and 101,929, and 1,744 killed and 2,214 wounded could not be distributed among the republics. The total number of victims of the war in Yugoslavia whose names were known in 1964 was 597,323 killed and 509,849 wounded. These lists have been compiled at the request of

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government of Germany to calculate the payments due to Yugoslavia. In addition, according to the Yugoslav government, there were another 150-180 thousand dead, whose names could not be established due to the destruction of entire families and even villages in mountainous areas, as well as due to the post-war emigration of those relatives and acquaintances who could report about these dead. Thus, we could talk about 750-780 thousand dead⁴⁹. This figure covers only those who died in the fight against the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupiers and their local allies. V. Zheryavich added to this number approximately 200,000 casualties among collaborators and received a figure of losses as a result of hostilities and repressions. This figure can be increased to 234,000 if we accept the total figure of 1,014,000 killed in Yugoslavia.

V. Zheryavich also cited the national composition of 597,323 dead, whose names were established:

Serbs - 346,740.

Croats - 83,257.

Slovenians - 42,027.

Macedonians - 6724.

Montenegrins - 16,726.

Muslim Bosnians - 32,300.

Jews - 45,000.

Turks - 686.

Albanians - 3241.

Hungarians - 2680.

Slovaks - 1160.

Unknown - 16,202.

In our opinion, in reality, the number of 597,323 dead quite fully reflects the victims of the peoples of Yugoslavia in the struggle against the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupiers and their local accomplices, and it does not need to be increased by 150-180 thousand supposedly underestimated victims. After all, the 1964 census itself was aimed at maximizing the number of victims, and in the hope of reparation payments, people tried to name the maximum number of victims. The possible underestimation was probably insignificant and compensated

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Xia by double counting the same persons, including because of the different spelling of the surnames of the same Lin. It seems to us that the casualties among the fighters of the collaborationist formations, the victims of the Anglo-American air raids, the casualties among the civilian population caused by the actions of Tito's partisans, as well as the excess mortality caused by epidemics and famine, which amounted to 430 thousand people, remained outside the 1964 census, subtracting from the total amount of losses determined by V. Zheryavich at 1027 thousand people, 597 thousand identified victims of the occupiers and their accomplices by name. Of the 430,000 dead, according to our estimates, about half, or 215,000 people, are fighters of collaborationist formations, including here the fighters of the 373rd Croatian Infantry Regiment who fought in the Wehrmacht and were destroyed in the Stalingrad cauldron. and the 13th and 23rd Croatian SS divisions, which operated mainly in the Balkans and briefly fought against Soviet troops in Hungary. In these divisions, apart from Croats, Muslims and Volksdeutsche served. Yugoslavian Volksdeutsche also served in the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen", which operated mainly against the NOAJ.

We assume that, in a breakdown of the 597,323 deaths by nationality, Roma make up the vast majority in the "unknown" category, and we estimate the number of victims of the Yugoslav Roma genocide at 16,000. This is close to the estimate of V. Zheryavich, who estimates the victims among the Roma at 18,000 people. We estimate the number of victims of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia at 45,000 people. Perhaps this number is slightly less, since some, although a small number of Jews could have died in the ranks of the NOAU.

There are also higher estimates of the number of victims of the Holocaust (67,122 deaths)" and the genocide of Roma in Yugoslavia (40 thousand deaths)" 6. They seem to us to be inflated.

Just as V. Zheryavic shows, the statements of the Communists of Yugoslavia are absolutely fantastic, that in the Croatian conservatory Gradina

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700,000 people were tortured by the Ustashe and that the victims were buried in almost 900 graves of 800 victims each. Archaeological excavations at the site of the camp did not confirm this version. In 1989, 7 graves were excavated. Information was published for only 6 graves, in which a total of 485 skeletons were found, or an average of 61 skeletons per grave. If we assume that the situation is the same with other graves, then the number of victims of Jasenovac can be estimated at 55-60 thousand people, but by no means at 700 thousand. V. Zheryavych estimates the number of deaths in this camp at 85 thousand people, including 50 thousand Serbs, 12 thousand Croats and Muslims, 13 thousand Jews and 10 thousand Gypsies. The number of casualties among the collaborators handed over by the British troops to Tito's partisans and killed in Bleiberg on the Austro-Yugoslav border and during the so-called "death marches" to the camps, Zheryavich estimates at 12,196 Croats, 1.5-2 thousand Serbian and Montenegrin Chetniks and about 8 thousand Slovenian collaborators from the "White Guard" of General Leon Rupnik. This gives 21.7-22.2 thousand victims, but by no means 300 thousand victims, as some Croatian emigrants claimed.

It should be emphasized that neither B. Kožović nor V. Jerevic analyzed the Yugoslav censuses in terms of their accuracy and changes in their accuracy from census to census. Therefore, it is difficult to say how accurate their estimates of the total number of victims are. But the increase in data

a nominal census of victims among the opponents of the Axis countries for 150-180 thousand people seems to us not entirely justified.

It should be noted that both estimates, both by V. Žerjavič and B. Kožovič, are based only on census data and depend on calculation methods. Kočovich determined the total demographic losses of Yugoslavia during the war years at 1985 thousand people, and Žerjavič - at 2022 thousand people. The first determined the fall in the birth rate at 333 thousand people, and the second - at 326 thousand people. Emigration during the war years was estimated by Kožovič at 638,000 people, and Žerjavič at 669,000 people.

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The losses of the Yugoslav army and partisans Josip Broz Tito, speaking on May 21, 1945 in Zagreb, estimated at 300 thousand dead, and the total losses of Yugoslavia at 1.7 million people⁷.

By the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, the figures of losses were specified by the Yugoslav government - 1706 thousand dead Yugoslavs, including 305 thousand fighters of the People's Liberation Army⁸.

A breakdown of the total number of losses by representatives of various nationalities was also made:

Serbs - 1,280 thousand Croats - 110 thousand Bosnians - 100 thousand Slovenes - 60 thousand Jews - 60 thousand Montenegrins - 50 thousand Macedonians - 35 thousand Albanians - 4 thousand Hungarians - 3 thousand Slovaks - 1 thousand Turks - 686.

In total, this gives 1703.7 thousand people, which is 2.3 thousand men of the total figure. Obviously, 2.3 thousand people are representatives of other nationalities, as well as those whose nationality has not been determined. Undoubtedly, the overall overestimation of losses occurred almost exclusively due to the losses of the Serbian population. For this purpose, statements were required that 700 thousand people, mostly Serbs, died in the Croatian concentration camp Jasenovac. This number exaggerates the number of victims by more than 600,000. The casualties of other nationalities, especially Croats, are most likely underestimated here.

The absence of casualties among the Roma is striking. Probably, in this calculation, the Roma are included in the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks.

The overall loss figures had no demographic justification and were aimed at finishing off

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As large as possible reparation payments in favor of Yugoslavia.

B. Kočovich gives a different breakdown of losses by nationality:

Serbs - 487 thousand Croats - 207 thousand Slovenes - 32 thousand Montenegrins - 50 thousand Muslims - 86 thousand Macedonians - 7 thousand Other Slavs - 12 thousand Albanians - 6 thousand Jews - 60 thousand Gypsies - 27 thousand Germans - 26 thousand Others - 14 thousand Total - 1014 thousand

V. Zheryavich gives a slightly different breakdown of the dead by nationality (in brackets - the number of deaths in the territory of Yugoslavia):

Serbs - 530 thousand (497.33 thousand). Croats - 192 thousand (178.14 thousand). Slovenes - 42 thousand (36.6 thousand). Montenegrins - 20 thousand (20 thousand). Muslims - 103 thousand (100.3 thousand). Macedonians - 6 thousand (6 thousand). Other Slavs - 7 thousand (7 thousand). Albanians - 18 thousand (18 thousand). Jews - 57 thousand (33.24 thousand). Gypsies - 18 thousand (18 thousand). Germans - 28 thousand (28 thousand). Others - 6 thousand (6 thousand).

In total - 1027 thousand (947 thousand).

He also distributes the losses among the republics of Yugoslavia as follows.

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It seems to us that V. Zheryavich underestimates the losses of the NOAU by almost 70 thousand people, which, according to our estimate, together with the losses of the Yugoslav royal army in 1941, amount to about 306.2 thousand people. On the other hand, the losses of the collaborationist formations, taking into account also their losses outside Yugoslavia, in particular on the Soviet-German front, practically coincide with our estimate - 215 thousand people.

The losses of the Yugoslav royal army in the war against the Germans and their allies in the 1941 war are not exactly known. The hostilities that began on April 6 ended on April 17 with the surrender of the Yugoslav army. 343.7 thousand Yugoslav servicemen were captured. Most of them were sent home, but several thousand, mostly Serbs, died in German camps. About 300 thousand more Yugoslav soldiers went home and escaped capture. The Germans lost 151 killed, 15 missing and 392 wounded in battles against the Yugoslavs. With this in mind, Yugoslav losses are unlikely to exceed 500 people killed.

Subsequently, a breakdown of the losses of NOAU by years and categories of losses was given, which confirmed the figure named by Tito*®. The underestimation of partisan losses by the Germans could be formed due to the losses that the partisans suffered in the fight against the Italians, Bulgarians, Chetniks and some other formations, when they acted without interaction with the Germans.

NOAH LOSS FROM JULY 7, 1941 TO MAY 16, 1945

losses

Killed in battle

5600 7800 | 28923

Total 55 123 | 66 394 | 123454 | 365 420 | 218 525 | 705 552

The total number of dead and missing is 305,672. Note that, most likely, the category "died from wounds" also includes those who died from diseases, since these two categories of casualties hardly differed in partisan hospitals. The main losses occurred in 1944 and 1945, which is also quite natural. In 1944, the Germans carried out a number of large-scale punitive operations against the Yugoslav partisans, and for the last three months of this year, Tito's partisan army was forced to conduct not a partisan, but a conventional front-line struggle against the German-Croatian troops, who had heavy weapons and used under- holding aviation, which the partisans did not have. The losses of the NOAU were especially great in 1945, when the fighting lasted only four and a half months. The losses of this year turned out to be only 1.7 times less than the losses of 1944, while if the level of losses of 1944 had been maintained, then the difference should have been almost 3 times. The losses of 1945 were undoubtedly affected by the fact that the NOAA had to fight mainly against regular German formations.

The Red Army, which came to the aid of the NOAJ, also made a small contribution to the losses of the civilian population of Yugoslavia. Soviet troops stayed in Serbia for only a month, at the end of September and in October 1944, but this time was marked by mass rapes and murders. One of the leaders of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, an ally of Tito, and later a well-known dissident Milovan Djilas testifies in his memoirs:

"After the breakthrough of the Red Army into Yugoslavia and the liberation of Belgrade in the autumn of 1944, there were so many serious attacks by the Red Army against Yugoslav citizens and military personnel that this turned into a political problem for the new government and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." Since the Soviet command did not want to talk about this topic, and the head of the Soviet military mission in Yugoslavia, General N.V. Korneev called the accusations against the Red Army

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slander. And when they pointed out to him that, unlike the Red Army, English officers did not commit such excesses, Korneev exploded:

"I protest in the strongest terms against the insults inflicted on the Red Army by comparing it with the armies of the capitalist countries"

According to Djilas, the communists collected statements from residents, according to which there were 121 rapes, 111 were accompanied by murder. The number of rapes that left the victim alive must have been much higher, but they were not reported. In addition, there were 1,204 cases of robbery with bodily harm. The Yugoslav communists tried to complain about the rapists of the Red Army soldiers to Stalin, but he actually took them under protection, saying: "Imagine a man who fights from Stalingrad to Belgrade - thousands of kilometers across his devastated land, seeing the death comrades and closest people!

Can such a person react normally? And what's the harm in it if he fools around with a woman after such horrors? " * 10

Following V. Zheryavich, we estimate the total losses of Yugoslavia in the war at 1027 thousand people. Of this number, we estimate casualties among military personnel at 521.2 thousand people, of which 306.2 thousand people died fighting on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition.

Bulgarian losses

The losses of the Bulgarian troops during the occupational service in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941-1944, mainly as a result of clashes with local partisans, amounted to about 3 thousand people. According to the Bulgarian communists, more than 15 thousand people died in the partisan detachments fighting against the tsarist government of Bulgaria in 1941-1944? According to the official data of the tsarist government, the number of casualties among the partisans and the communist underground was significantly less - 2320 were killed in battle and 199 people

treasury

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but*!3. These data seem to us closer to the truth. The Bulgarian army and police also suffered losses in the fight against the partisans, but they were probably smaller due to the superiority of government troops in weapons. We conditionally estimate the losses of the Bulgarian army in the fight against the partisans at one third of the losses of the partisans killed, i.e. in 770 people. The losses of the Bulgarian army in 1944-1945, when it acted on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, amounted to 10,124 killed and died from wounds and diseases, and 21,541 wounded. In addition, in 1941, Soviet submarines sank the Bulgarian ship Shipka and the schooner Success. The casualties among the crews could amount to several dozen people. Bulgarian patrol ships sank one Soviet submarine, and two others hit mines and sank in Bulgarian territorial waters. The civilian population of Bulgaria suffered significant losses during the Anglo-American air raids on Sofia and other Bulgarian cities. Thus, on January 10, 1944, which the Bulgarians call "Black Monday", during the raid of American and British "flying fortresses", 750 people were killed and 710 people were injured, 4100 buildings were destroyed. After that, 300 thousand inhabitants left Sofia. An equally strong raid on the Bulgarian capital was carried out on March 30, 1944, when about 2 thousand fires were noted in the city. There were almost no basements and bomb shelters in Sofia, which increased the number of victims. In total, in 1943-1944, allied aviation made about 23 thousand sorties over the territory of Bulgaria. 45 thousand tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on 186 Bulgarian settlements. 12,000 buildings were destroyed, 4,208 people died and 4,744 people were injured. Bulgarian air defense, primarily fighters, shot down 65 Allied aircraft and another 71 aircraft were damaged. During sorties over Bulgaria, the Allies lost 585 people, of which 329 were captured, 187 died and 69 died of wounds. The losses of the Bulgarian aviation amounted to 24 fighters, another 18 aircraft were damaged. 19 pilots were killed. One of the goals of intensive allied air raids on Bol

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Garius in the first half of 1944 was to give the Germans the impression that the landing of the main Allied forces should follow in the Balkans. Starting from September 1944, in the battles against the Germans, the Bulgarian aviation lost 15 aircraft and 18 pilots. After the communists came to power on September 9, 1944, 2,618 people were killed and executed - army, police and civil servants, as well as representatives of the propertied classes. Assuming that there were equal numbers of soldiers and civilians among the victims of repressions, the losses of the Bulgarian army from terror should be increased by 1.3 thousand people. The total losses of Bulgaria can be estimated at 23.5 thousand people, of which the military and partisans account for about 18 thousand dead.

Greek losses

According to the official Greek data of the National Council for Reparations, the losses of the Greek armed forces amounted to 13,327 dead, 62,663 wounded and 1,290 missing during the Italo-Greek war of 1940-1941 **, 1,100 dead in the Greek units who fought alongside British troops in the Middle East and 20,650 dead guerrillas. Losses among the civilian population amounted to 56,225 shot by German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation authorities, 105 thousand died in German concentration camps, 7120 people who became victims of German and Anglo-American

bombings, 3.5 thousand sailors of the merchant fleet who died on sunk German aircraft and submarines, as well as 600 thousand who died of starvation. The number of those who died from starvation, in our opinion, is many times overestimated, in order to increase the amount of reparations due to the country. The number of victims of the Holocaust in Greece is estimated at 69.5 thousand dead Jews." G. Frumkin doubted the official Greek figures, considering them to be significantly overestimated in terms of civilian casualties and estimated the losses of Greece at 20,000 military dead during the Italo-Greek war, 60,000 civilians repressed

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non-Jewish persons (probably including partisan losses), 20,000 non-Jewish deportees (probably also dead), 60,000 Jews exterminated by the Nazis, and 140,000 famine victims*20. The grounds for Frumkin's assessment are as obscure as those for the official assessment. It seems to us that the official data on the losses of the armed forces and partisans may be close to reality. But they must be increased by a number of categories of losses not taken into account by the National Reparations Board. They do not include, in particular, losses during the fighting in Crete in May 1941. During the unsuccessful reflection of the German landing on the island, the Greek troops located there lost 426 dead (including those who died from wounds), up to 850 wounded and 5255 captured. In addition, during the fighting in Crete, up to 3 thousand civilians were killed"?! The large number of wounded compared to those killed during the war in mainland Greece, at a ratio of 4.7:1, suggests that deaths from wounds are not included in the death toll here. If we take the proportion of those who died from wounds as 10% of the total number of wounded, then the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 6.3 thousand people, and the total number of regular Greek army soldiers who died during World War II, we estimate at 22 4 thousand, including all the missing in the number of those killed. We estimate the total losses of the military, taking into account the losses of the partisans, according to official data, at 43 thousand people, assuming that the official figure of 20,650 dead partisans also includes the victims of the struggle of the communist partisans ELAS (Greek National Liberation Army) against British troops in Athens in December 1944. It should be noted that most of the partisans were former soldiers of the Greek army, sent home by the Germans. The total number of Greeks who fell into German and Italian captivity in mainland Greece was estimated by Hitler at 210,000 soldiers and 8,000 officers*22, and taking into account the prisoners taken in Crete, at 223,000 people. All of them were soon sent home. Hitler declared in the Reichstag on 4 May 1941,

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THAT "all Greek prisoners were released immediately after the surrender, in view of their heroic struggle"423.

We also tend to accept the number of victims of the Holocaust given by Martin Gilbert. There was indeed a famine in Greece during the winter of 1941/42, which was greatly facilitated by the British naval blockade. Before the war, Greece did not starve, because it was able to import the necessary amount of food. Therefore, all the victims of the famine must be attributed to the military losses of Greece, but it is very difficult to determine their number. The autumn of 1940 was unusually dry in Greece, the summer of 1940 was extremely hot, and the winter of 1941/42 was unusually cold. All this has significantly reduced the yields of the main food crops. Under pressure from the Greek government in exile, England eased the blockade in the spring of 1942, allowing food supplies to reach Greece. Türkiye and Sweden also provided assistance to Greece. From the summer of 1942, the International Red Cross was able to establish significant food supplies to Greece, including through the supply of Canadian and Argentine grain. But even earlier he provided significant assistance to Greece with the assistance of the Axis powers. In the winter of 1941, at the height of the famine, the IWC distributed 800,000 bowls of free soup and set up 450 feeding centers for 100,000 children over the age of seven and 130 care centers for younger children. According to the Red Cross, about 250,000 people died from starvation and lack of warm clothes"?*. This figure seems to us the closest to the truth, as given by a neutral institution whose representatives actually worked in

Greece during the famine. It should also be taken into account that at the time of the publication of the report, the IWC was not interested in either exaggerating or downplaying the scale of the famine and was not going to blame either the Axis states or the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition for its occurrence. Of course, we do not know what primary statistics the ICC had and what the method of estimation was. Probably, the accuracy of the number of 250 thousand dead lies within plus or minus 50 thousand people.

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We estimate the total number of losses of the armed forces and partisans of Greece, taking the figures of the National Council for Reparations, at 43 thousand people, the number of victims of repressions and deportations to concentration camps by the occupation authorities, taking the total figure of G. Frumkin, but subtracting of which the loss of the partisans, 100 thousand people, and the number of victims of hunger, taking the estimate of the IWC, 250 thousand people. In total, this gives Greece a loss of 393 thousand people.

Finnish losses

In the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, War in November 1939 - March 1940, the Finnish army lost 18,139 killed, 1,437 died from wounds and diseases, 4,101 missing and 43,557 wounded, surviving, out of 337 thousand people. called to the army. Of the 4,101 missing, 847 returned from Soviet captivity, and 1,820 were officially declared dead. 1,434 Finnish soldiers are currently listed as missing. Since 16 Finnish prisoners of war died in Soviet captivity, 847 returned to their homeland, and 20 remained in the USSR", the total number of those killed among the missing can be estimated at 3218 people. The total number of those killed then will be 21,357, those who died from wounds and diseases - 1,437, those who died in captivity - 16. The total irretrievable losses of the Finnish armed forces in the Winter War can be estimated at 22,810 dead. In addition, foreign volunteers fought on the side of Finland. Of the 8,680 Swedish citizens, 33 were killed and 185 were wounded. Of the 695 Norwegians, 2 were killed. Of the 1,010 Danes, 5 were killed. Of the 72 American Finns, 3 were killed and 5 were wounded. 346 Hungarians who fought on the side of Finland suffered no losses. Also in the Finnish army were about 350 former subjects of the Russian Empire - the White Sea and Olonets Karelians and Ingrian Finns. Of these, a partisan battalion was formed, which never entered the battle. In addition, other volunteers fought in the Finnish army, who did not suffer combat losses. These are 56 Estonians, 51 Belgians, 18 citizens of Germany, 17 Dutch, 13 English, 7 Italians, 6 Poles, 6 seamstresses.

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Tsartsev, 4 citizens of Latvia, 3 citizens of Luxembourg, 2 citizens of France, 2 citizens of Spain and 1 each from Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Portugal, as well as 15 Russian emigrants with Nansen passports of stateless persons. It is possible that Russian emigrants were also among the citizens of European countries who came as volunteers to Finland. The Finnish ground forces lost 17,005 killed, 3,781 missing, and 44,414 wounded, the fleet, respectively, 1,013, 282, and 2,204, and aviation 47, 28, and 54. In addition, 33 people died and 44 were wounded in rear units, and the casualties of the troops of the Reserve Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief were 41 killed, 10 missing and 78 wounded. Finnish researchers estimate the losses of the civilian population in the Winter War at 1029 people. This number includes the main victims of Soviet air raids on Helsinki and other cities, as well as 65 sailors of the Finnish merchant fleet who died on sunken ships, and 68 female nurses. Soviet losses in the Winter War are estimated by us at 164.3 thousand killed and died from wounds and in captivity out of more than 1 million Soviet military personnel who participated in the war. The Finnish command estimated Soviet losses at 200,000 dead and missing. Higher estimates of the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops at 230-270 thousand dead" seem to us to be significantly overestimated. According to various estimates, from 5546 to 6116 Red Army soldiers fell into Finnish captivity. Of this number, 5465 returned to their homeland (of which 158 were shot on charges of espionage and treason), up to 111 prisoners may have died in captivity, and some, not precisely established, the number of prisoners remained in Finland. Therefore, it is impossible to establish the exact number of Soviet prisoners who died in captivity⁴²⁹.

In the continuation war with the Soviet Union, which Finland waged from June 1941 to September 1944, 475 thousand people were drafted into the Finnish armed forces. During the continuation war from June 15, 1941 to September 30, 1944, the Finnish armed

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the force lost 38,677 killed on the battlefield, 13,202 died of wounds, 6,577 went missing and 259 were captured. The total number of dead and missing was 58,715 people. Soviet losses in killed and missing were estimated by the Finnish command at 265 thousand people, not counting the prisoners. Died in captivity 997 out of 3114 prisoners, or 32.0%⁴³. Thus, the total losses of the Finnish armed forces in the continuation war in killed and dead can be estimated by subtracting from 58,715 dead and missing 2,117 surviving prisoners, to 56,598 people. 64,188 soldiers of the Red Army ended up in Finnish captivity. Of these, 18,677 died, or 29.1%⁴³². It should also be taken into account that 1,407 Finnish volunteers served in the SSI troops, 256 of them died"³³.

In the Continuation War in 1941, the irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops amounted to 26,355 people, in 1942 - 7,552 people, in 1943 - 3,779, in 1944 until May 31 - 1,297, and from June 1 to September 30 - 19,732. In addition, the loss of the wounded amounted to about 158 thousand people.

Civilian casualties in Finland in 1941-1944, mainly as a result of Soviet bombing, amounted to just over 900 people killed and 2,700 wounded during Soviet bombing, and another 190 people were victims of Soviet partisan attacks in Northern Finland.

1036 Finnish soldiers died, went missing and were captured in battles with the Germans during the so-called Lapland War from October 1, 1944 to May 31, 1945. Of this number, 774 are killed and died from wounds, 224 are missing and 38 are prisoners of war who survived. Thus, the total number of deaths can be estimated at 998 deaths. Losses of the wounded in the Lapland war amounted to about 3 thousand people. This war took place in northern Finland, where German troops held part of the Finnish territory. Of the total number of losses in the dead and wounded in the Continuation War and the Lapland War, the fleet accounted for only 2.27%, or 4.7 thousand people, and the Air Force - 0.5%, or 1100 people. In the fleet 86% of

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casualties fell on the coastal units, which most often fought as infantry. In the land army, 90% of the losses were in the infantry.

We estimate the irretrievable losses of Finland during the Second World War at 81.8 thousand people, of which 2.1 thousand people account for civilians.

Swedish losses

In the Second World War, 8680 Swedish volunteers served in the Finnish army, of which 33 died. About 1.5 thousand Swedish citizens also served in the Finnish army during the Continuation War of 1941-1944. Taking into account the fact that up to about 11.9% of all conscripts died in this war in the Finnish army, the total number of Swedes who died in the ranks of the Finnish army could be about 190 people. They are included in the losses of the Finnish army. According to various estimates, from 145 to 315 Swedish volunteers served in the SS troops, of which 30 to 45 people died⁷. Taking into account the fact that by January 31, 1941, there were only 101 Swedes in the SS troops,³⁸ the lower estimates of both the number and losses of Swedish volunteers are probably closer to the truth. 72 Swedes ended up in Soviet captivity"⁷. How many of them died in captivity is unknown. Obviously, the Swedes who died in captivity are included in the estimates of the total number of dead. 33 Swedish sailors died after the Swedish submarine Ulven hit a German mine and sank in the Baltic Sea on April 16, 1943. 391 sailors of the Swedish merchant fleet became victims of attacks by German submarines, and 187 people became victims of attacks by Soviet submarines. This number includes 7 people from the ship "Beng Sture", which sank on October 29, 1942.

The submarine Shch-496 that sank them delivered 7 rescued sailors to the island. Lavensari and handed them over to the Soviet military commandant. Further, their traces are lost. The Swedish Red Cross ship Stureborg was attacked by an Italian aircraft in the Mediterranean in July 1942. As a result, 19 Swedish sailors and a representative of the Red Cross were killed.”

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The total losses of Sweden in World War II can be estimated at 851 people, of which about 253 military people.

Iceland losses

The losses of Iceland amounted to 229 sailors of the merchant fleet, who died on ships sunk by German submarines or blown up by mines during the Battle of the Atlantic.

Norwegian losses

According to G. Frumkin, the losses of the Norwegian army and navy in the campaign of 1940, as well as during subsequent actions as part of the Anti-Hitler coalition, are estimated at 1.3 thousand people. Approximately 700 more Norwegians died fighting in the SS troops, and 1.5 thousand Norwegian Resistance fighters became victims of German repressions. In addition, 1,800 civilians died during the hostilities, and 3,600 sailors of the merchant fleet died during the Battle of the Atlantic on ships sunk by German submarines and aircraft. 700 Jews of Norway became victims of the Holocaust “?. According to official figures from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, a total of 10,262 Norwegians died during World War II, including 3,670 merchant mariners on 706 Norwegian ships sunk. The number of Norwegians executed by the Germans for participating in the Resistance is estimated at 366 people. Another 39 members of the resistance movement died during the investigation. 658 political prisoners and underground workers died in concentration camps in Norway, and another 1,433 died in concentration camps outside Norway. About 6 thousand Norwegians served in the German army, and 709 of them died. After the war, 37 death sentences were carried out on Norwegian collaborators and representatives of the German occupation administration. 728 Norwegian Jews* became victims of the Holocaust. During the 1940 campaign

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the Norwegians lost 1,335 killed and missing, the British lost 1,896 killed, missing and seriously wounded, and the French and Polish troops combined 530 dead. Another 1.1 thousand Norwegians died as part of the Free Norway Army as part of British troops in 1940-1945. The German ground forces lost 3,692 dead and missing. 101 Norwegians ended up in Soviet captivity, of whom 18 died*®. According to other sources, 104 Norwegians were taken prisoner in the USSR, of whom 71 were repatriated by the beginning of 1949, 18 died, 12 remained in prisoner of war camps. – to the GULAG” 7. It is probably due to these 3 people that the difference in figures was formed. It is possible that these people died in captivity. The number of victims of hostilities in Norway in 1940 and 1944, as well as German and Anglo-American bombings, can be estimated at 1028 people.

We estimate the total number of dead Norwegians at [0.3 thousand people. Of this number, 2,749 are military personnel, including 405 resistance fighters.

Denmark losses

In Denmark, losses during the German occupation amounted to 39 Danish army soldiers (including 13 during the German invasion on April 9, 1940, and 26 during the dissolution of the Danish government on August 29, 1943), 797 executed resistance fighters and 1281 merchant marine sailors who died on ships sunk by the Germans during the Battle of the Atlantic. In addition, 102 people were shot by the Germans for various crimes, and another 11

people were killed by the Gestapo without trial during the investigation. 417 Danes fell victim to the air bombardment of the Anglo-American aircraft, and 10 - to the Soviet aircraft on the island of Bornholm. 472 Danish Jews were deported to the Theresienstadt concentration camp. 52 of them died. About 6.5 thousand Danish Jews managed to emigrate

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roam to Sweden. About 6,000 Danes were deported to German concentration camps, of which 463 died. Thus, 3,172 Danish residents became victims of the German occupation and hostilities on the territory of Denmark and the Battle of the Atlantic, of which only 39 were military personnel. In addition, about 3.9 thousand Danes died in the German army. 546 Danes fell into Soviet captivity, of whom 3549 died. The total losses of Denmark in World War II amounted to about 7.1 thousand dead, of which 3.9 thousand were military personnel.

Losses of Estonia

According to the official Soviet Estonian estimate, during the first Soviet occupation in 1940-1941, 2,400 inhabitants of the country were killed in Estonia. This includes both those shot by the NKVD even after the start of the Soviet-German war, as well as several hundred "forest brothers" killed during clashes with Soviet troops in July-August 1941. The death toll among the 10,000 deported and arrested deported to the USSR (actually 6,700 people were deported) is estimated at 6,000 people. It is also assumed that 12,000 Estonians died in the ranks of the Red Army (out of 34,000 drafted) and another 12,000 died in labor battalions, the conditions in which differed little from those of the Gulag. Approximately 6.1 thousand more civilians evacuated to the USSR died or went missing⁵¹. It seems to us that the number of deaths in the labor battalions, the surviving soldiers of which were sent to the Red Army as "volunteers", in this case is overestimated. According to our estimates, in the winter of 1941/42, no more than one third of 12 thousand died in the labor battalions, and the remaining 8 thousand died already in the Red Army, the total number of deaths in which we determine at 20 thousand people. It is possible that this number, as well as the number of those mobilized into the Red Army, is significantly underestimated, since after the return of the Red Army to Estonia in 1944, many local residents could be called up directly to Es

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Tonsk corps of the Red Army. According to the official Russian estimate, 21,200 Estonians died in the Red Army⁵². In general, the data on Soviet irretrievable losses in the collection "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century" are underestimated by about a third. However, the number of 21.2 thousand is too small to be able to say with certainty that it must necessarily be significantly lower than the true number of Estonians who died in the ranks of the Red Army. It is possible that in this case it is close to the truth.

During the German occupation of Estonia in 1941-1944, according to the official Estonian estimate, 7,798 Estonian civilians died who were executed by the invaders and died in prisons and camps. Among these victims are 963 Estonian Jews and 243 Gypsies. Another 3,000 Jews from other European countries were exterminated by the Nazis in Estonia. Out of 7798 Estonian victims on the territory of Estonia, 5634 were shot, the rest died in prisons and camps." Another 1,040 Estonians out of 4,000 deported died in German concentration camps outside Estonia, and approximately 200 out of 800 people died while serving their labor service in Germany⁵⁴. During the Soviet bombing of Estonian cities, about 800 people died. About [0 thousand Estonian citizens, of whom at least 6666 people are known by name⁵⁵, out of about 70 thousand volunteers and mobilized, died in the German army. By the beginning of 1949, there were 6,398 Estonians in the USSR as prisoners of war. Of these, 1292 people had died by this time and 2 people remained in prisoner-of-war camps. 49 Estonians were repatriated to other states, 734 were released, 19 people were recognized as civilian prisoners, 11 were convicted by military tribunals, 4291 were transferred to the Gulag and to prisons." Before

In the mid-1950s, when most Estonians were released, another 400-450 people could have died.

During the second Soviet occupation, which began in 1944, according to the official Estonian estimate, 10,000 of the 30,000 arrested and 3,000 of the 23,000 deported died⁷. However, the vast majority of these

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The number of casualties refers to the post-war period, so we exclude them from the Estonian military losses.

The total number of civilians who died in Estonia as a result of the first Soviet occupation can be estimated at about 24 thousand people, and during the German occupation - at 9 thousand people. Estonia's total losses can be estimated at 63,800 dead, with about 30,000 casualties among the military (20,000 in the Red Army and 10,000 in the German). It should be noted that in Estonia, as well as in other countries of the Baltic basin occupied by Germany - Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark and Norway, no famine was observed during the war. This was facilitated by both the high level of agricultural development before the war and the rather benign occupation regime in comparison with many other countries, such as Poland, Belarus or Ukraine.

Losses of Latvia

Approximately 110,000 Latvians served in the German armed forces and police formations during the war years. 52 thousand of them fought against the Red Army in the 15th and 19th infantry divisions of the SS troops. Volunteers among them were only a small minority - about 15%⁴⁵⁸. Up to 75,000 inhabitants of Latvia and Latvians fought in the Red Army, who until 1940 lived in the USSR. Of this number, 57,540 men were mobilized in 1944.¹ The Latvian SS divisions suffered significant losses. So, for example, the 15th SS division only fought on the Velikaya River in the Pskov region in the period from | March to April 14, 1944 lost a total of 365 killed, 1,120 wounded and 307 missing." By the beginning of 1949, 3354 Latvians were taken into account in Soviet captivity. Of these, 507 people had died by that time, 9 people remained in prisoner-of-war camps, 28 people were repatriated to other states, 864 people were released, 1,897 people were transferred to the Gulag and prisons, and 1 person was convicted by a military tribunal. Only 48 Latvians were recognized as civil

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were captured by me and transferred to internment camps *!, Of the Latvians who remained in prison in 1944 until the mid-1950s, when most of them were released, 100-200 people could die.

But according to Soviet estimates, about 15,000 Latvians died as part of the German formations, and 10,000 as part of the Red Army⁴⁶². The latter estimate seems to us to be considerably underestimated. Based on our general assessment of Soviet losses in the dead, which amounted to about 60% of the total number of those mobilized, among those 17.5 thousand who were mobilized back in 1941, irretrievable losses could be up to 50%, or up to 8-9 thousand people (here it should be taken into account that part of the servicemen of the former army of the Republic of Latvia preferred to go over to the side of the Germans). Among those mobilized in 1944, 87% were drafted into the infantry, where losses were especially high. They had to participate in battles from 6 to 9 months. Their losses in the dead during this time could be up to 10% of the total number, those. about 7.5 thousand people. The total loss of servicemen from among the natives of Latvia, who served in the Red Army and did not go over to the side of the Germans, we estimate at 16 thousand dead. This obviously includes the losses of the few Soviet partisans in Latvia, who were practically all professionals sent from the mainland. According to the official Russian estimate, 11.6 thousand Latvians perished in the Red Army." The overall official estimate of Soviet irretrievable losses is underestimated by about a third. However, since the number 11.6 thousand is too

small, it is impossible to determine the total number of Latvians who died in the Red Army by multiplying this number by 3. It must also be taken into account that not only Latvians, but also residents of Latvia of other nationalities served in the Red Army.

Between June 14 and 22, 1941, 15,424 inhabitants of Latvia were deported, of which 5,263 were arrested. In total, during the period of the first Soviet occupation of 1941-1945, 7292 people were arrested. Of this number, about 700 people were shot, and 3,441 of those arrested died in custody. In addition, more than 1.9 thousand deported

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died in places of special settlements. We estimate the total number of dead inhabitants of Latvia during the first Soviet occupation at 6.1 thousand people.

During the second Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1944-1945, due to the ongoing hostilities until the surrender of Germany, the scope of political repressions was limited. Their main scope fell on the post-war period. Therefore, we do not include their casualties in the military losses of Latvia.

During the Nazi occupation of 1941-1945, 2.5 thousand people became victims of the genocide of the Roma in Latvia." As part of the final solution of the Jewish question, the Nazis destroyed, according to M. Gilbert, 80,000 Jews in Latvia." This estimate seems to us to be overestimated and also includes Jews from other European countries who were deported to Latvia during the German occupation (out of 25,000 deported Jews, 20,000 were exterminated). 68. Latvian historians and their Israeli colleagues estimate the number Jews of Latvia exterminated by the Nazis, including about 500 Jewish refugees from other countries who remained in Latvia by June 22, 1941, amounted to 65-70 thousand people. At the same time, they proceed from the fact that approximately 94 thousand local Jews lived in Latvia before the Soviet occupation, that 1700 Jews were deported from Latvia to Siberia before the start of the Soviet-German war, and among the approximately 40 thousand inhabitants of Latvia who managed to - Qualified before the arrival of the Germans, could be up to 20 thousand Jews*6?. It should be added here that up to 5,000 Jews of Latvia could have been drafted into the Red Army or entered it as volunteers. It is known that before October 1941, 30,000 Jews were exterminated in Latvia. At the end of November and beginning of December 1941, another 25,000 Jews were exterminated in the course of two mass actions in the Rumbula Forest. After that, only 6,000 Jews remained in Latvia\70. According to the Latvian historian Aivars Stranga, only 1,182 of the local Jews and those deported to the territory of Latvia survived the war." Assuming that approximately 500 of the survivors were local Jews, the total Holocaust ev

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Latvian rey, including 500 refugees from other countries, can be estimated at 60.5 thousand people. If we proceed from the fact that before the German invasion, 94.5 thousand Jews lived in Latvia, including refugees (94 thousand - the number of the Jewish population of Latvia in 1935, and, according to the assumption of Latvian historians, by 1941 it did not grow, since all natural increase was compensated by emigration), then the number of Jews in Latvia remaining under German occupation should have been not 61, but approximately 69.5 thousand people. The difference could be formed mainly due to the fact that the proportion of Jews among the evacuees could be larger than Latvian historians suggest, and also due to the fact that not 5 thousand Jews served in the Red Army, as we assumed, based on volume of mobilization in 1941, and somewhat more. We believe that the number of Latvian Jews who died as a result of the Holocaust can be estimated at 60.5 thousand people. This is 19.5 thousand people, or 24.4%, less than the most common estimate of the number of victims of the Holocaust in Lithuania at 80 thousand people, given by M. Gilbert, and about 7 thousand people, or 10.4%, less than the assessment given by Latvian historians. Latvian historians estimate the total number of victims of the Nazi occupation at 80-100 thousand people""?2. Based on our estimate of the number of deaths as a result of the final solution of the Jewish question of the Jews of Latvia, we tend to consider the lower estimate of the total number

civilian casualties of 80,000 people is closer to reality, including also the victims of German and Soviet bombing and ground fighting. It should be noted that within the framework of the euthanasia program for the mentally ill, carried out by Nazi Germany, 2271 mental patients were killed in Latvia." These victims are also victims of war.

We estimate the total number of inhabitants of Latvia who died during the Second World War at 117.1 thousand people. Of this number, 31,000 people are accounted for by military casualties, and approximately the same number of Latvian residents died on the German and Soviet side — 15,000 and 16,000 people, respectively.

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Losses of Lithuania

Since until 1943 the Lithuanians, due to their cultural and racial proximity to the Poles, were not recognized by the Nazis as the Aryan people, until that time, unlike the indigenous population of Latvia and Estonia, they did not form combat units and subunits to participate in battles in the Soviet Union. - German front. Until that time, only police battalions were formed from Lithuanians, which were used for operations to finally resolve the Jewish question and to fight against Polish partisans of the Home Army in southern Lithuania (in the area of the Vilna corridor) and against Soviet partisans in Belarus and Pskov region, as well as against Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage units thrown into Lithuania. By the end of 1941, about 7 thousand people served in the Lithuanian order police, and at the end of 1943, another 886 Lithuanians served in the criminal police and the security police. In September 1943, local self-defense detachments of about 8 thousand people and auxiliary police of 1636 people were also created. In the largest clash between the AK and the Lithuanian police in 1942 in the town of Nemenchyn, the Poles killed 60 Lithuanians, and those taken prisoner were stripped and released to their own in what their mother gave birth *⁵. In addition to the order police, 26 Lithuanian police battalions were formed (there were also 26 such battalions in Estonia, and 51 in Latvia). Some of these battalions were called self-defense battalions, and they included many former soldiers of the Soviet 29th Lithuanian Territorial Rifle Corps and 8,400 partisans who had taken part in the June uprising. Of the 26 Lithuanian battalions, 10 participated in the Holocaust to one degree or another. They were located not only in Lithuania, but also in Latvia, Ukraine, Russia and Poland. In 1943-1945, four Lithuanian battalions took part in the battles on the Soviet-German front. The number of all battalions was up to 20 thousand people. Part of the fighters of these battalions in 1944 were included in the 19th Latvian SS division "6. A significant part of the former Lithuanian police after coming

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In Lithuania, the Red Army led a partisan struggle against the Soviet troops. In March 1945, the number of anti-Soviet resistance fighters was about 30 thousand people*⁷. In addition to police battalions, 5,400 Lithuanians served in the German ground forces and 12,000 in the Luftwaffe. By January 24, 1945, there were 36.8 thousand Lithuanians in the police battalions and in the Wehrmacht." In total, in the fight against Soviet and Polish partisans and regular units of the Red Army, about 1 thousand Lithuanians who served in the German army and pro-German police formations were killed. As of January 1, 1949, there were 955 Lithuanian prisoners of war in Soviet captivity, of which by that time 89 had died, 492 were released, 26 were repatriated to other states, 1 was convicted by a military tribunal, 25 were transferred to civilian internee camps, 300 people were transferred to the Gulag and prisons and 22 remained in POW camps. Even taking into account the fact that some of the Lithuanians who served in the German army could later die in the Gulag, the overall mortality of captured Lithuanians seems low enough to accept the total number of deaths in the ranks of the German armed forces as 1 thousand people. close to reality.

Lithuanians also served in the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division of the Red Army. Initially, out of 15,000 personnel in this division, 10,000 were Lithuanian Jews. On May 22, 1942, out of 12,398 people, only 4,499 were Lithuanians, 6,000 were Jews, and the rest were Russians or representatives of other Soviet nationalities. At the beginning of 1943, the number of Jews in the division was reduced to 2971 out of 10,251 personnel, and at the beginning of 1944 the share of Lithuanians in the Lithuanian Soviet division was reduced to a minimum - 32.6% of the personnel strength. According to Lithuanian historians, about 40,000 Lithuanians died in the Red Army, including those Soviet citizens who moved to Lithuania after June 1940, as well as those who served in two armies of the Polish Army, formed in USSR". Most of them were mobilized after their return.

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of the Red Army to Lithuania. Probably, many of those Lithuanians who worked in the Reich as Ostarbeiters were also mobilized. Most of them served in the 16th Rifle Division.

But according to the authors of the book "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century", only 11.6 thousand Lithuanians died in the ranks of the Red Army." Taking into account the fact that, on the whole, the estimates of this collection underestimate Soviet irretrievable losses by about three times, and that not only Lithuanians, but also natives of Lithuania of other nationalities served in the Red Army, the figure of 11.6 thousand dead Lithuanians does not, in principle, contradict an estimate of 40 thousand dead residents of Lithuania. However, since the number of 11.6 thousand is too small, it is impossible to say with certainty whether they are underestimated three times or by a small amount.

The victims of the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940-1941 are estimated at 5,665 arrested and 10,187 deported*4. According to estimates by Lithuanian historians, approximately 2,000 Lithuanians died in the course of a broad anti-Soviet uprising that swept Lithuania after the start of the Soviet-German war and was led by the Front of Lithuanian Activists, and this number includes those arrested, shot by the NKVD in Lithuanian prisons. We estimate the number of deaths among the deportees at about 2,000 people, given that in Latvia, approximately the same number of deportees account for more than 1,900 deaths.

The total number of Lithuanians who died in the struggle against the Soviet authorities or as a result of political repressions before 1956 is estimated by Lithuanian historians at 20 thousand people. world war, the death toll until mid-1945 hardly exceeded 1 thousand people.

The number of victims of the Roma genocide in Lithuania is estimated at 1,000 people." Probably about the same [thousand people] was the total number of soldiers of the Home Army and civilian Polish and Lithuanian residents who died during the war between the Home Army and the Lithuanian police.

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tion. The number of victims of the civilian population and Soviet partisans in the course of clashes with the Lithuanian police and German troops, we estimate at 2 thousand people, and repressions against the civilian population were carried out by both belligerents.

During the implementation of the final solution to the Jewish question, according to the most common estimate, 141,000 Jews perished." There are also higher estimates of 210,000 Jews killed in Lithuania." But they are clearly overestimated and include also Jews deported to Lithuania for extermination from Germany and other countries of Western Europe. However, it seems to us somewhat exaggerated. The fact is that the activities of the German Einsatzkommandos in the liquidation of the Jews of Lithuania are very well documented. Thus, in a report dated December 1, 1941, the head of the Einsatzkommando of the 3rd Einsatzgruppe A, SS Standartenführer Karl Jaeger, who operated on the territory of the General District of Lithuania, reported on the destruction of 99,804 people in the period from July 2 to November 30. From this number

only 740 people were non-Jews (mostly they passed as Lithuanian and Russian communists, and 573 people from among those shot in Daugavpils were simply called "active communists" and, probably, were Russians, Belarusians and Latvians by nationality). In addition, the 99,804 executed include at least 4,934 Jews deported to Lithuania from Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt am Main, Breslau, and Vienna, while 9,012 Jews shot in Dünaburg (Daugavpils) apparently, were Jews of Latvia, not Lithuania. Thus, the total number of Lithuanian Jews killed between July 2 and November 30, 1941 can be estimated at 85,118 people. After that, according to K. Jäger, only about 34,500 local Jews remained in Lithuania in the ghettos of Siauliai, Kaunas and Vilna (Vilnius), employed in various jobs.' And according to the report of the head of Einsatzgruppe A, Brigadeführer Walter Stahlecker on the activities of the Einsatzgruppe until October 15, 1941, it follows that before the beginning of July, when Jaeger's team arrived in Lithuania, about 5 thousand Jews were killed there. This destruction was carried out

Lithuanian

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mi "partisans" (irregular police formations) on the orders of the Germans, but in such a way that it looked like spontaneous pogroms initiated by the local population. Almost all local Jews who remained in Lithuania by December 1, 1941 were also destroyed. Survived, according to various estimates, from 2 to 3 thousand Jews of Lithuania, liberated by the Red Army from concentration camps, and about 1.5-2 thousand Jews who managed to escape from the Kaunas and Vilnius ghettos. If we take the average number of surviving Jews in Lithuania as 4.25 thousand people, then the total number of killed Lithuanian Jews can be estimated at 120.25 thousand people, which is 20.85 thousand people, or 14, 8%, below the most common estimate of 141,000 Jewish dead in Lithuania. Considering that before December 1, 1941, only 167 non-Jews were killed by the Germans and their Lithuanian accomplices, the total number of victims of Nazi repressions among the non-Jewish and non-Gypsy population is no more than [thousand people.

We estimate the total number of Lithuanians who died in World War II (including the Vilna region) at 171.25 thousand people, of which the military accounts for no more than 45

thousand people.

Austrian losses

Austrian losses are included in German losses. According to some estimates, up to 1,306,000 Austrians served in the German armed forces." If this estimate is correct, then the share of Austrians in the draft to the Wehrmacht turns out to be approximately equal to 7.3% of the total number of mobilized 17.9 million people compared to the share of the Austrian population (6.65 million people) of 8.25% of the total population of the Reich by the beginning of 1939 (including the Sudetenland) was 80.6 million people. The difference probably formed due to the fact that in the interwar period, due to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, conscription into the Austrian army was not carried out and by the beginning of the Second World War in Austria there were no contingents of trained

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servists. Therefore, the proportion of conscripts in Austria was lower than in the Reich as a whole.

According to post-war estimates, in the ranks of the German armed forces, 143 thousand people died on the battlefield and died from wounds, diseases and in captivity, and another 85 thousand were reported missing." Based on the proportion that we have adopted for the German armed forces, out of approximately 2.2 million missing, 0.9 million people, or 40.9%, are killed. Then the number of dead Austrians from among the missing can be estimated at 35 thousand people, and the total irretrievable losses of the Austrian population in the Wehrmacht (including the SS troops) at 178 thousand people. According to official Russian data, 10,891 of the 156,681 captured Austrians died in Soviet captivity."

The losses of the civilian population of Austria are estimated at about 24 thousand victims of air bombardments, 2.7 thousand anti-fascists executed by the Nazis, about 32 thousand Austrians,

who died in prisons and concentration camps, including 6.5 thousand gypsies. Approximately 65,000 more Jews in Austria became victims of the "final solution of the Jewish question"⁴⁹⁶. More than half of the 200 thousand Austrian Jews managed to leave the country in 1938-1940.

Thus, we estimate the total losses of Austria at 302,000 dead, of which about 178,000 are military personnel.

Czechoslovak losses

The losses of those who were called up to the Wehrmacht and the SS troops from the territory of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and from the Sudetenland are included in the losses of the German armed forces. Considering that there were about 3.5 million Sudeten Germans, the losses among them in the Wehrmacht could reach up to 150 thousand people, taking into account that they lived in industrial areas, where the proportion of conscripts was lower. How many Czechs died in the Wehrmacht is unknown. It is only known that 69,977 Czechs and Slovaks fell into Soviet captivity, of which 4,023 people died in captivity"⁷.

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According to the Czech historian K. Pacner, 4,570 Czechs and Slovaks died fighting in the Red Army, and 3,220 died in the troops of the Western Allies. In addition, approximately 5 thousand Czechs died in the Wehrmacht, and 7 thousand Slovaks died in the ranks of the allied Germany of the Slovak army (including those who died in captivity). The victims among the Czech partisans amounted to 450 people, and among the Slovak ones - 1720. Among the participants in the uprising in Prague and other Czech cities in 1945, from 5 to 8 thousand people died, including in Prague, according to various estimates, from 2 to 5 thousand people. About 7.5 thousand Roma also died on the territory of Czechoslovakia." Of the civilian population, 10,000 Czechs and 5,300 Slovaks were killed during punitive operations and executed in prisons. In addition, 7,000 Czechs and Slovaks died in concentration camps⁵⁰ About 277,000 Jews were exterminated in Czechoslovakia as part of the Holocaust"[!] We tend to accept the upper estimate of the number of victims of the 1945 uprisings, assuming that civilian casualties are also included here. We estimate the total number of deaths of Czechs, Slovaks, Jews and Gypsies at 335,000, of which only about 20,000 were killed by servicemen. Those who died during the uprisings of 1945, we classify as civilian casualties.

population.

Polish losses

The modern official figure for Poland's losses in World War II is 5.62-5.82 million people within the borders as of September 1, 1939. This figure was released by the Polish Institute of National Remembrance in 2009. Previously, the figure of 6028 thousand dead Poles and Polish Jews was adopted, put into circulation by the communist regime in 1946. We will try to estimate Polish losses within the borders on September 1, 1939, i.e. with the inclusion of the Vilna region, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. According to a 2009 estimate, approximately 150,000 Polish citizens, including the victims of Katyn, died at the hands of the Red Army and the hands of the NKVD. This obviously includes fighters of the Home Army and fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent

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armies that died in clashes with Soviet troops before May 9, 1945, as well as the loss of civilians. The 2009 estimate also includes approximately 3 million dead Polish Jews. Note that here we simply take the most common estimate of the number of victims of the Holocaust in Poland at 3 million people, including 1 million in the territories occupied by the USSR.

According to a breakdown by category of losses of the total number of 6,028,000 people published in 1947, 123,718,000 people were accounted for by the loss of military personnel, 3.2 million people were lost by Jews, and 2.7 million were lost by Poles. from among civilians 4.

It must be emphasized that due to the extremely significant change in the borders of the Polish state in 1939-1945 and significant population migrations, no demographic assessment of the total value of Polish losses in the war based on a comparison of data from pre-war and post-war population censuses is in principle impossible. Estimates of Polish losses were dictated mainly by political considerations. Thus, the estimate of 6028 thousand dead was dictated primarily by the consideration that the victims of ethnic Poles at least slightly exceeded the victims of Polish Jews (3.028 million and 3 million, respectively).

The Polish emigrant Franciszek Proch estimates the loss of Wormwood at 6,090,000 people, of which 5,040,000 people were killed as a result of German actions, and 1,050,000 people were killed as a result of Soviet actions. The military losses in the war against Germany, according to F. Proch, account for 295 thousand dead, including 32 thousand Jews. This estimate seems to us to be significantly overestimated. Taking into account the fact that Jews made up no more than 13% of the population of Poland, and their share in the army, especially in combat units, was even smaller, no more than 7,000 Jews could have died in the 1939 campaign. The losses of the Polish armed forces, mainly the Home Army, in the fight against the Soviet troops are estimated at 65 thousand people, including the victims of Katyn. Losses of the civilian population of Poland during the Polish-German

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wars in September 1939 are estimated at 500,000 people, including 50,000 Jews, and civilian casualties during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 at 100,000 people. F. Proch estimated the casualties of the Polish civilian population as a result of the actions of the Soviet troops in 1944-1945 at 50 thousand people. He considers 4,145,000 civilians, including 2,350,000 Jews, victims of Nazi terror, and 935,000 people, including 100,000 Jews, victims of Soviet terror. The total number of Polish Jews who died during the war is estimated by F. Proch at 2,532,000, of which 2,350,000 may be considered victims of the Holocaust⁵.

Another Polish researcher, Tadeusz Piotrowski, adheres to a lower estimate of Poland's losses of 5.6 million people. He estimates the number of victims of the German occupation and the Holocaust at 5150 thousand people, the number of victims of the Soviet occupation of 1939-1941 at 350 thousand people, and the number of victims among the Polish population during the Ukrainian-Polish war in Volhynia and Galicia in 1943-1944 in 100 thousand people. According to T. Piotrowski, 3.1 million Jews died, 2 million Poles, and 500,000 Ukrainians, Belarusians and Germans⁶.

Of the losses of the civilian population of Poland, according to the American Bureau of the Census, 3 million fall on the modern territory of Poland, and 2 million on the territory of Poland annexed by the USSR⁷.

Polish researcher Czesław Luchak estimates Poland's losses at 5.9–6.0 million killed and dead, including 2.9–3.0 million Jews. He estimates the losses of the Poles at 2 million people, including 1.5 million people on the territory of Poland occupied by Germany, and 0.5 million people occupied first by the Soviet Union and then by Germany. C. Luchak believes that about 1 million Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived within the Polish borders of 1939 also died. They made up about 20% of the population of pre-war Poland,”

Significantly, none of the Polish estimates of Poland's losses in World War II single out the losses of the Germans who lived in Poland before 1939. According to German estimates, about 108 thousand former civilians died in the Wehrmacht

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dan Polyshy, mainly Volksdeutsche, but also a few ethnic Poles. The total German population of Poland, according to the 1931 census, was 741 thousand people, including 90.2 thousand in the territories subsequently annexed by the USSR⁸. In 1939-1941, most of the Germans from these territories returned to the German-occupied Polish General Government. By the end of 1939, the German population of Poland

could increase to 822 thousand people. The number of victims among the civilian German population during the deportations of 1945-1948 could be up to 50 thousand people. 60,277 Poles who served in the Wehrmacht fell into Soviet captivity. 3128 of them died in captivity!. Obviously, these dead are included in the 108 thousand dead Wehrmacht soldiers called up from the territory of Poland.

Polish researcher Andrzej Paczkowski estimates the number of Poles who died as a result of Soviet repressions at 120-130 thousand people, assuming that out of {1 million deported Poles, 90-100 thousand people died, and about 30 thousand more were killed. was shot. However, the number of deportees here is overestimated by almost three times, and not all of them were ethnic Poles. The number of those executed is probably approximately true, but this includes not only Poles, but also Belarusians, Ukrainians and Jews. 21,857 Poles, including 14,552 officers and policemen and 7,305 civilians, were executed by decision of the Politburo of March 5, 1940, in May-June of the same year in Katyn and other places¹³. In addition, during the retreat of Soviet troops from Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in the summer of 1941, the NKVD shot at least 6348 people during the evacuation of prisons, including 2464 people in the Lvov region, 1101 people in the Drobych region, 1000 people in the Stanislav region, 692 people in the Tarnopol region, 230 people in the Rivne region, 231 people in the Volyn region and at least 630 people in prisons in Western Belarus. According to Russian researcher Pavel Polyan, in 1940–1941, approximately 276,000 Poles and refugees from Poland were deported from Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

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shi, among whom there were also a certain number of Jews, as well as approximately 11 thousand Ukrainians and 21 thousand Belarusians. However, NKVD documents give higher figures. In a certificate dated May 1, 1944, signed by People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria noted that as of September 1, 1941, 389,382 Polish citizens deported from Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were counted, including 25,314 in prisoner of war camps. Since almost all of them were released under the amnesty of August 2, 1941, in this case we are talking only about Poles and Jews. Mortality among the deportees was high. Until July 1, 1941, 12,313 Poles and Jews died. Taking this into account, the mortality among Ukrainians and Belarusians should have been about | thousand people. The total number of deportees from the former Polish lands can be estimated at 434 thousand people. Another 11,516 Poles and Jews died between 1 July 1941 and the end of 1943. Taking into account the fact that before that 119,855 soldiers of the Anders army and members of their families were released to Iran, and 36,510 people were transferred to the pro-Soviet Polish army of Zygmunt Berling, the mortality rate among the remaining Poles and Jews was about 4.9%⁵⁶. With this in mind, the death rate among Ukrainians and Belarusians deported from Eastern Polyp should have been about 1.5 thousand people. In total, the victims of the Soviet repressions of 1940-1941 were approximately 26.3 thousand who died in prison and exile, and approximately 28.2 thousand who were shot. In total, this gives 54.5 thousand victims, including at least 14.6 thousand military personnel.

In total, about 2 million Poles fought in regular military formations and partisan detachments. The losses of the Polish armed forces, according to modern Polish official data, amounted to:

About 70 thousand killed and missing, 250 thousand prisoners during the battles with German troops from September 1 to October 5, 1939.

6-7 thousand dead and missing, 250 thousand captured in battles with Soviet troops on September 17-30, 1939.

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34 thousand soldiers of the Home Army who died before the start of the Warsaw Uprising. Even up to 6,000 dead could have been the losses of partisans of the communist People's Army and other groups not directly connected with the Home Army.

10,000 fighters of the Home Army and the insurgents from the People's Army and other detachments who joined them died, 7,000 went missing during the Warsaw Uprising of August 1-October 2, 1944. 17 thousand rebels were captured. 150,000 civilians in Warsaw were killed, and 520,000 residents were deported from the city.

20-30 thousand soldiers of the Home Army, interned by Soviet troops and exiled to Siberia.

2.1 thousand soldiers of the Polish army died in battles in France in May-June 1940 and in Norway in April-June 1940.

2.6 thousand Polish soldiers died in battles in North Africa in 1942-1943 and in Italy in 1943-1945.

5.3 thousand Polish soldiers died in battles on the Western Front after landing in Normandy in June 1944 - May 1945.

17.5 thousand Polish soldiers died and 10 thousand went missing as part of two armies of the Polish Army on the Soviet-German front in 1943-1945.

In addition, about 12,000 Poles died in German POW camps?! . Such a small number of victims among the Poles who found themselves in German captivity is explained by the fact that they were under the protection of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Germans did not use mass repressions against them.

In October 1945, in the camps and prisons of the NKVD there were "27,100 Polish citizens, Poles by nationality, who were arrested and interned in 1944-1945 on the territory of Poland in order to clear the rear of the active Red Army." 12,289 of them were supposed to be released, and 14,725 people, including the command staff of the Home Army, to remain in custody. It can be assumed that most of those who remained remained in prison until the mid-1950s. Assuming that mortality

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During this time, they have no less than those who were deported in 1940-1941, then about 0.9 thousand AK fighters should have died in Soviet captivity. Probably no less | thousands of AK fighters died in 1943-1945 in skirmishes with Soviet troops and partisans.

The total losses of the Polish armed forces can be estimated at approximately 199.9 thousand people, including the officers who were shot at Katyn.

According to Polish estimates, by the beginning of 1939 the population of the territories annexed by the USSR was 13,299,000, of which 5,274,000 were Poles and 1,109,000 were Jews. In addition, 138,000 Poles and 198,000 Jews arrived in these territories as refugees. Some of them returned to the General Government before 1941. By the middle of 1941, taking into account the natural growth of 1940-1941, up to 1,340,000 Jews could have ended up in the Polish territories annexed by the USSR. Of these, up to 50 thousand could have died in the ranks of the Red Army.

The total non-Jewish and non-Polish population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus at the end of 1939 can be estimated at 6916 thousand people. By the middle of 1941, due to natural growth, its number could have increased to 7.1 million people. Their losses during the Great Patriotic War, based on our assessment of the total Soviet losses, can be estimated at 0.6 million people, including those who died both in the Red Army and in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Soviet partisans and pro-German collaborationist formations, as well as as a result of repression by the German occupation authorities.

According to the 1931 census, 3,130.6 thousand Jews lived in Poland. It is assumed that due to emigration, the number of the Jewish population did not increase by 1939 due to the high level of emigration of the Jewish population. Thus, from 1921 to 1937, 395 thousand Jews left Poland for the USA, Latin America and Europe; From 1923 to 1937 more than 270 thousand Polish Jews moved to Palestine²¹!. It can be assumed, that

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in 1932-1938, about 289 thousand Jews left Poland. And if the growth rate of the Jewish population were equal to the average Polish, then by the beginning of 1939 it would have grown by 340 thousand people. Thus, by the beginning of 1939, the Jewish population of Poland could have increased to no more than 3,192,000 people, and by the end of 1939, due to natural increase, it should have increased to 3,237,000 people.

If we accept the traditional estimate of the number of victims of the Holocaust in Poland at 3 million people, then about 131 thousand people managed to escape the Holocaust. However, as we have already established in relation to Lithuania and Latvia, where the number of victims of the Holocaust was calculated quite accurately according to German documents, the true number of victims turned out to be lower than the most common estimate by 14.8% and 24.4%, respectively. If we apply the coefficient obtained for Lithuania, where the number of Jews is much larger than in Latvia, and the conditions of the Holocaust were close to those in Poland, then the number of victims of the Holocaust in Poland can be estimated at 2.56 million people. Then the approximate number of Jews who escaped the Holocaust can be estimated at 681,000 Jews. Of this number, according to our estimates, about 7,000 died as part of the Polish army, and at least 50,000 died as part of the Red Army. In addition, several tens of thousands of Jews evacuated to the eastern regions of the USSR could die from starvation and disease.

In this work, we do not set ourselves the goal of determining the total number of victims of the Holocaust and their distribution by country. This requires a very serious and necessarily international monographic study. Based on the general overestimation of the traditional number of Holocaust victims of 6 million people by at least 15%, we estimate the total number of victims of the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe at 5.1 million people. This number does not include those Jews who died in the armies of the fighting states, and in the territory not occupied by Germany from starvation and disease.

It is much more difficult to assess the losses of the Polish civilian population, both in the General Government and on the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Vilna.

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Losses from Soviet deportations and repressions probably amounted to at least 37.2 thousand people (including Poles and Jews). But as for the repressions of the Germans in relation to the Polish civilian population, there are no reliable numerical data. In particular, there is no data on exactly how many Poles were sent to concentration camps and how many of them died there. It is also unknown how many Poles were shot as hostages or died as a result of German punitive actions against partisans and the Polish underground. There are also no consolidated data based on primary sources on the number of Poles who became victims of hostilities in 1939 and 1944-1945.

years.

The official figure of 150,000 civilians from Warsaw who died during the Warsaw Uprising raises doubts. It is based on the assertion of Hans Frank, the German governor in Poland, who, in his report on the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, claimed that 200,000 insurgents had been killed. Later, as we have already noted, much more realistic figures of insurgent losses appeared. As for the loss of 150,000 civilians, it seems absolutely fantastic. By the beginning of the Warsaw Uprising due to the extermination of local Jews, losses during the first siege in 1939, the presence of a significant part of the Varsovians in prisoner of war camps or in Polish troops outside the country, as well as the relocation of many residents of the capital to the countryside in search

There were fewer people left in Warsaw than in Budapest by the beginning of the street fighting on December 24-25, 1944. The fighting in Budapest lasted 51 days, only 12 days less than the fighting in Warsaw, and the Soviet troops dropped an order of magnitude more bombs and shells on the Hungarian capital than the German troops on Warsaw in August-September 1944. But the victims of the civilian population of Budapest are estimated at only 38 thousand people, and for the most part these were deaths from starvation, and not from hostilities. In Warsaw, there could also be famine due to the cessation of the supply of food, but the total number of victims among the civilian population of the Polish capital was unlikely to exceed 40,000 deaths both from starvation and from hostilities.

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At the same time, it should be emphasized that there was no famine in Polyn during the war years. Agriculture, despite the requisitions, produced enough food. The famine was artificially created only in the Jewish ghettos, but it was part of the Nazi policy to exterminate the Jews.

The number of victims of partisan and underground struggle in the ranks of the Home Army before the Warsaw Uprising, as we have already noted, is estimated at 34 thousand dead and executed. With casualties among the partisans of the pro-communist Guard of Ludowa, the total number of deaths probably reaches 40 thousand. It can be assumed that approximately the same number of civilians became victims of German punitive operations and the execution of hostages.

The number of victims of hostilities among the Poles in 1939 and 1944-1945 we conditionally estimate at 50 thousand people. It should be said that no reports of this type of losses were made without delay, therefore all existing estimates of the number of civilians in Poland who died during the hostilities are conditional.

As a result of the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1943-1944 in Volhynia and Galicia, Poles' casualties are estimated at between 35,000 and 60,000 people. To date, 33,454 Polish victims have been identified by name in Volhynia? - in 20-25 thousand people. The most probable total estimate is 85,000 dead. The losses of Ukrainians, which are estimated at 15-20 thousand people in Volhynia and Galicia, are included by us in the sum of Ukrainian and Belarusian losses of 0.6 million people. Of this amount, up to half are those who died in the Red Army.

The number of victims of the Roma genocide in Polyn is estimated at 35,000 people²³. Perhaps this estimate is also exaggerated.

In 2006, the Polish non-governmental organization Karta began to create a database of war victims. By the summer of 2009, the bank had about 1.5 million names, and the founders of the bank hope to double this number in the next three years.

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One of the project leaders, historian Andrzej Kunert, believes that the total number of deaths during the Second World War within the borders of Poland in 1939 is significantly less than the figure of 6,028 thousand deaths put into circulation by the communists (28 thousand were added to 6 million to give the figure of losses appearances of accuracy) and in reality amount to about 4.5 million victims. Although the historian theoretically admits that the death toll could reach 7-8 million people²⁴. An estimate of the total losses of Poland at 4.5 million people seems to us the closest to reality. If we accept this value, then a rough estimate of the number of Poles who died in German prisons and concentration camps, as well as in forced labor in Germany, can be obtained by subtracting from the figure of total losses all other categories of losses, namely: losses of the Polish armed forces and partisans in 199.9 thousand people; 2.56 million victims of the Holocaust; 50 thousand Jews who died in the ranks of the Red Army, 39.9 thousand victims of Soviet deportations and repressions among the Polish and Jewish civilian population; 65 thousand - the victims of the Poles in the war with the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine in 1943-1944; 0.6 million — losses of Ukrainians and Belarusians; 50 thousand - victims

Poles as a result of hostilities on the territory of Poland in 1939 and 1944-1945; 40 thousand - victims of the civilian population of Warsaw during the 1944 uprising; 40,000 victims of the Polish civilian population as a result of anti-partisan actions and executions of hostages; 35 thousand victims of the gypsy genocide; 108 thousand people are Poles and Polish Germans who died in the ranks of the Wehrmacht: 50 thousand are Polish Germans who died during the expulsion from Poland in 1945-1946. Then the Poles who died in concentration camps and as a result of forced labor accounted for 567 thousand deaths. The total losses of the Poles reach 1.23 million people, if we assume that among the dead in the Wehrmacht, the Germans accounted for two-thirds, and the Poles - one-third.

Thus, we estimate the losses of Poland at 4.5 million people, of which at least 550 thousand people fall to the share of dead military personnel.

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Hungarian losses

The losses of the Hungarian army in the Second World War amounted to 110-120 thousand killed and died from wounds²⁵. We will accept the upper estimate of 120,000 dead.

28,000 people became victims of the Roma genocide²⁵. The number of Jews living in Hungary within the borders at the beginning of 1939, those without the territories of Romania and Yugoslavia annexed in 1940-1941, but with the inclusion of Transcarpathian Ukraine and Southern Slovakia, it is estimated at 200 thousand people²⁶. On the territory of the so-called Trianon Hungary (within the borders of 1920, without annexed territories), the decline in the Jewish population in 1941-1946 amounted to 169.4 thousand people²⁸. T. Stark estimates the number of victims of the Holocaust in Hungary within the borders for the middle of 1941 at 450-540 thousand people. We take as the most probable the lower estimate of Stark, i.e. We proceed from the fact that 450,000 Jews perished in Hungary within the borders of 1941. From this figure it is necessary to subtract approximately 20-25 thousand Jews who died in the labor battalions of the Hungarian army.²⁷ Here we will also use the lower estimate of 20,000 dead. Also, approximately 8,000 Jews who died during the siege of Budapest in December 1944-February 1945 must be subtracted from this number. Approximately 7,000 more Jews during the siege of Budapest became victims of massacres by German and Hungarian soldiers and members of the Hungarian far-right Arrow Cross party and should be counted among the victims of the Holocaust³¹. Then the victims of the Holocaust itself, i.e. representatives of the peaceful Jewish population of Hungary, exterminated by the Nazis, will amount to 422 thousand people. In Soviet captivity were 10,173 Jews and 383 Gypsies³². Almost all of them were members of the Hungarian army. By June 27, 1945, only 5,016 Jews remained in Soviet captivity. It can be assumed that, given that 1,225 Jews were released from Soviet captivity before mid-1945, at least 3,800 Hungarian Jews died in Soviet captivity. The victims of the Roma genocide in Hungary are estimated at 28,000 people³³. 383 tsy were in Soviet captivity

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ghana⁵³⁴. They probably all served in the Hungarian army. In Soviet captivity, as we will see later, 51 gypsies died. The increased mortality of Hungarian Jews in Soviet captivity was apparently due to the fact that almost all of them were captured in the harsh winter of 1942/43. Taking into account Jews and Gypsies, the total number of prisoners of war in the Hungarian army can be estimated at 524.3 thousand people. According to official Russian data, out of 513,767 captured Hungarians, 54,755 people died in captivity³⁵. As the Hungarian researcher Tamas Stark notes, the total number of Hungarian prisoners in the USSR is about 600 thousand people, of which 40% were civilian prisoners who did not serve in the army. He estimates the size of the Hungarian army in the fall of 1944 at almost 1 million people, of whom by February 1945 almost half deserted and ended up on the territory already occupied by Soviet troops - 65 thousand soldiers and officers with weapons in their hands went over to the side of the Red Army. Most of them fled from the spare parts or, having received summons, did not appear at the assembly points. These people have never been to the front. Obviously, a significant part of the deserters after the end of the war were declared prisoners of war and sent to camps. By November 1944 the ministry

The defense of Hungary estimated the number of those who were in Soviet captivity at 70 thousand people. Under the onslaught of the Red Army from November 1944 to April 1945, according to T. Stark, almost 1 million Hungarians, including 580 thousand servicemen, retreated to Germany (and to Austria). This number obviously includes the Hungarian Germans who served in the 25th and 26th Hungarian SS infantry divisions. These divisions almost did not participate in hostilities and suffered only minor losses. Two more Hungarian SS divisions, the 22nd and 33rd cavalry, were destroyed in Budapest. Approximately 300 thousand servicemen, according to the post-war estimate of the Ministry of Defense, reached the western zones of occupation. The remaining 280,000 servicemen and 350,000 civilians were taken prisoner by the Red Army. In Transcarpathia, about 30,000 Hungarians and Germans of military age were deported to the USSR, of which about 5,000

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died in the course of deportation, according to a statistical report compiled back in July 1945. From the rest of Hungary (excluding Transylvania and Budapest) 179,608 civilians were deported to the USSR. Also, according to Stark, out of 110 thousand prisoners in Budapest, the capture of which was announced by the Soviet command, there were no more than 30 thousand German and Hungarian prisoners of war each, and at least 50 thousand were civilian prisoners. According to Stark, the Red Army captured approximately 380,000 prisoners of war from the Hungarian army, and approximately 440,000 were civilian prisoners. Part of the civilian prisoners, as well as approximately 20 thousand prisoners of war, were released on the territory of Hungary, and approximately 600 thousand Hungarian prisoners (360 thousand military and 240 thousand civilians) ended up in Soviet camps. Among the released 21,765 Hungarians, 1,225 Jews, 992 Ukrainians from Transcarpathia and 4 Gypsies" 6, probably, those who expressed a desire to serve in the pro-Soviet Hungarian formations prevailed. Of these formations, only the Buda Dob managed to take part in the battles for Budapest - Regiment of Volunteers Out of 2.5 thousand fighters, the regiment lost about 600 killed and died from wounds. Obviously, in the USSR, a significant part of civilians of military age were considered Hungarian prisoners of war. Taking into account the death rate of Jews and Gypsies, the total number of Hungarian military personnel who died in Soviet captivity can be estimated at 58.8 thousand people, or 16.3%. Every sixth of the soldiers of the Hungarian army who ended up there died in Soviet captivity. It is more difficult to estimate the losses of civilian prisoners. According to Shtark, there are personal files on 526,606 prisoners from Hungary in the Soviet archives. This is very close to the total number of prisoners in the Soviet camps that we have determined. The difference of 2.3 thousand could have been formed at the expense of prisoners released to participate in pro-Soviet military formations, in the same Buda regiment. In connection with this, they could start separate cases against them, even if they were not sent to the

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vet camps. In the first batch of prisoners sent home in October 1947 and numbering 100,288 people, there were 90,723, including 817 Jews - fighters of labor battalions and 9,565 civilians, including 16 children born in prison. All in all, according to Stark, out of approximately 600,000 Hungarian prisoners, at least 200,000 never returned to their homeland, and almost all of them died? 38. Probably, approximately 25,000 surviving deportees from Transcarpathia, who, most likely, returned to their homeland, which was already the Soviet Union, should be subtracted from this number. Then the total number of prisoners of war who died in Soviet captivity can be estimated at 60.1 thousand people, and the number of civilian prisoners who died in the USSR is at least 115 thousand, including at least 5 thousand natives of Transcarpathia.

Stark's assessment is indirectly confirmed by some documents from the archives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, by February 1, 1947, only 477,478 Hungarian prisoners of war had passed through the Soviet camps, which is significantly less than the figure of 513,766 people declared in 1956. The document of 1947 specifically stipulated that the number of prisoners of war did not include 12,032 civilians who were registered as internees, and 10,352 people who were detained during raids in Budapest and released on the spot by the front command. Out of 477,478 prisoners of war to 1

February 1947, 47,966 people died, 194,246 people were released and repatriated due to disability, 21,820 people were transferred to the formation of national military units and partisan schools. In addition, 1699 Soviet citizens were identified among the Hungarian prisoners of war, of which 1688 were released, and 11 were transferred to the tribunal. Another 129 citizens of the USSR remained among the prisoners of war. It is not clear whether we are talking about Hungarians, natives of the Transcarpathian region, or about Soviet citizens of another nationality. Excluding Soviet citizens, the total number of Hungarian prisoners of war can be reduced to 475,450. In addition, on February 1, 1947, there were 20,189 civilian internees. Another 8,466 internees were repatriated during the period

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from January 1945 to February 1947, and 4260 died??. But it is quite possible that there were civilians among the repatriated Hungarian prisoners of war. Most likely, the Soviet authorities considered all men who served in the army during the war as prisoners of war, regardless of whether they were in the service at the time of detention. It is also worth noting that among the 20,189 civilian internees, there were 7,493 women. There were 15,503 Hungarians among the civilian internees from Hungary, 4,508 Germans, 100 Jews, and 68 others. It is possible that one of the 110 Jews who remained alive was the famous Raoul Wallenberg, unless, of course, he had already been killed by that time.

Nevertheless, according to the certificate of the GUPVI of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR dated January 28, 1949, at the beginning of this year, 526,604 Hungarians were registered as prisoners of war, including 10,352 released in Budapest shortly after the raids. Of those who remained, only 10 people were registered as civilian internees. Among them, there are already one and a half times more liberated citizens of the USSR than in 1947 - 2922 people. The number of dead Hungarians by that time had reached 51,005 people, and only 8,021 Hungarians remained registered in the camps. It follows from this example that the categories of civilian and military prisoners were a very arbitrary concept, as a result of which the total number of Hungarian prisoners of war fluctuated quite significantly from year to year. It is worth remembering that in the message of L.P. Beria, head of the NKVD V.M. Molotov of June 6, 1945, stated that on June 4, the NKVD took only 2,641,246 prisoners of war, of which only 422,145 were Hungarians. Of this number, after the surrender of Germany, 1,366,298 prisoners of war were taken. It is doubtful that after June 4, 1945, the Red Army would have been able to capture any significant number of Hungarian prisoners of war. But already in the certificate of the NKVD dated June 27, 1945, it was said about 3,120,944 prisoners of war during the years of the Great Patriotic War!

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Danish prisoners. The vast majority of them were taken in 1945 and declared prisoners of war. Interestingly, it was only on June 6, 1945 that the GUPVI NKVD issued a directive on the separate accounting of prisoners of war and internees. But it can also be assumed that the difference arose mainly due to the released and deceased prisoners of war. By June 27, 1945, there were 462,465 such people, including 318,489 who died. By that time, 31,820 people had died, and 21,787 were turned to the formation of their national units. In total, this gives 475,752 Hungarian prisoners of war, which is all equal to almost 51 thousand less than the number of 526 thousand prisoners that appeared later.

The document dated January 28, 1949, featured 10,165 Jewish prisoners of war, the vast majority serving in the Hungarian army. Of these, 645 were registered as civilian internees, 3645 died, and only 9 people were listed in the camps at the beginning of 1949. Note that the death rate of Jews after January 1, 1949 could increase only due to the deaths among 645 civilian prisoners and 22 transferred to the Gulag and 3 transferred to prisons (among these latter, probably, was R. Wallenberg), as well as account of 14 people who left for other reasons. The total number of Hungarian Jews who died in Soviet captivity hardly exceeded 4,000. It can be assumed that the majority served in the Hungarian army

5354 Western Ukrainians were recorded in the document of 1949, of which 319 people were considered civilian prisoners, and only 2 people died. There were 370 gypsies, also likely to have served in the Hungarian army, in 1949. Of these, 49 were recognized as civilian prisoners, and 51 died. It is possible that there were actually 64 Roma who died, if we assume that the dead account for the difference in the number of 383 Roma in 1956. At the expense of Jews, Gypsies and Ukrainians, the total number of those who were listed as prisoners of war in the Hungarian army at one time or another increases to 543.5 thousand.

Human.

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During the fighting in Budapest, about 38,000 civilians were killed. Of these, 13,000 died from bullets and shrapnel or were littered with collapsed buildings, and 25,000 died of starvation and disease or were shot. bear the brunt of the street fighting that took place in Budapest from December 24, 1944 to February 13, 1945. Some 330,000 more residents of Budapest left the city before December 1944, mainly due to Anglo-American bombing. these bombings destroyed or damaged up to 38% of all city buildings. The total number of deaths during ground combat operations and Anglo-American bombings is estimated at 44.5 thousand people. "This includes victims of crimes committed by both German and Soviet Red Army soldiers "distinguished themselves" in Hungary by mass rapes, but, unlike in Germany, the victims of rape were killed only in very rare cases. Mass rapes and robberies provoked protests even from the Hungarian communists.

Hungary lost 788.9 thousand people in World War II, including 179.4 thousand military dead. Of these, only 600 people died fighting on the side of the Red Army.

Romanian losses

Romanian losses in World War II are calculated by us within the borders on September 1, 1941, with Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were again included in Romania at the beginning of August 1941 and again taken from it by the Soviet Union in August 1944, as well as without Northern Transylvania, ceded by Romania to Hungary by decision of the Vienna Arbitration on August 30, 1940. The losses of the armed forces of Romania amounted to 71,585 killed, 243,625 wounded and 309,533 missing during the war against the USSR in June 1941-August.

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1944. During the war against Germany and its allies in August 1944-May 1945, Romanian losses amounted to 21,735 killed, 90,344 wounded and 358,443 missing. The Romanian land army in the war against the USSR lost 70,406 killed, 242,132 wounded and 307,476 missing. Its losses in the fight against Germany amounted to 21,355 killed, 89,962 wounded and 57,974 missing. The Romanian Air Force lost 4172 people, of which 2977 people during the fighting on the side of Germany (972 dead, 1167 wounded and 838 missing) and 1195 people during the fighting against Germany and Hungary at the final stage of the war (respectively 356, 371 and 468). The losses of the fleet in the fight only against the USSR amounted to 207 killed, 323 wounded and 1219 missing, and in the fight against Germany - respectively 24, 11 and 1. The total losses of the Romanian armed forces in World War II amounted to 92,940 killed, 333,966 wounded and 331,357 missing 54%. Of the missing, about 130,000 are prisoners taken in the Yasso Kishinev pocket, in fact, already after Romania sided with the Anti-Hitler coalition. In total, 187,367 Romanians ended up in Soviet captivity, of which 54,612 people died. In addition, 14,129 Moldovans who served in the Romanian army fell into Soviet captivity. Mortality among Moldovans who were in Soviet captivity is unknown. It can be assumed that most of the Moldavians were drafted into

Red Army. In total, according to some estimates, 256.8 thousand residents of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were drafted into the Red Army, of which, according to official Russian data, up to 53.9 thousand people died. Since we have established that this source underestimates the losses of the Red Army by about 3.1 times, the number of Moldovans who died in the ranks of the Red Army could be estimated at 167 thousand dead, and taking into account the irretrievable losses of Ukrainians, Jews and Russians drafted into the Red Army from the former Romanian territories, the total loss of residents

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Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the ranks of the Red Army could be estimated at 200 thousand dead. However, the figure of 53.9 thousand is too small, and the coefficient obtained for the total amount of deadweight losses cannot be applied to it, since the number of 53.9 thousand is much less than the possible statistical error. Therefore, we will proceed from a general estimate of the number of mobilized residents of the former Romanian territories at 256.8 thousand people. According to our estimates, up to 60% of all mobilized people died in the ranks of the Red Army. The overwhelming number of Moldavians fought only in the last nine and a half months of the war, which, formally speaking, reduced the likelihood of their death in comparison with all those mobilized, many of whom entered the battle as early as June 1941. On the other hand, most of the inhabitants of the former Romanian territories were mobilized directly into units, and the losses among them were especially great. The last 9 1/2 months of the war account for approximately 22% of the losses in killed and dead from wounds, or 4.9 million people." The average listed number of ground forces and aviation at the front was 6,135,300 people for the 1st quarter of 1945, and 6,714,300 people for the 1944 quarter of the PR. Suppose that during the period from August 1944 to May 1945, almost all the wounded and sick managed to return to duty, and the new call-up was only to replace irretrievable losses, as well as approximately 100 thousand prisoners. At that time, about 4.4 million conscripts were supposed to enter the Red Army during this period. In total, during this period, about 11.1 million military personnel were to pass through the formations located at the front. The probability of dying for them was approximately 44%. Then the number of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina who died at the front can be estimated at 113,000 people. This is very close to the current Romanian and Moldovan estimates of 110,000 conscripts from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina who died in the Red Army. For the formation of the pro-Soviet division "Tudor Vladimirescu" and other parts of the Romanian army in 1943-1945,

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20,374 Romanians and 7 Moldavians were released. Taking into account the fact that 201,496 Soviet servicemen fell into Soviet captivity, the total number of those killed in action among the missing in the war against the USSR can be estimated at 129,139 people. If we take the death rate from wounds in the Romanian army at 7%, given that the number of wounded exceeds the number of those killed by only 1.2 times, then in the fight against the USSR, the Romanian troops could lose about 17 thousand dead from wounds, and in the fight against Germany - about 6.3 thousand people. In Germany, 229 Romanian prisoners died. About 1,500 Romanian soldiers are buried in the Czech Republic, and 15,077 in Slovakia. In total, this gives approximately 25,372 people, which is 3,637 more than the number killed in the war against Germany and Hungary. However, the Romanians also suffered significant losses in the battles in Northern Transylvania. Assuming that the number of Romanian soldiers killed there is equal to the number of those killed in the territory of modern Hungary, the number of those killed in Northern Transylvania can be estimated at 8.6 thousand people 554. Assuming that all those who died from wounds in August 1944 - May 1945 years were buried in Romania, we estimate the total number of those killed in the war against Germany and Hungary at 34 thousand people, and together with those who died in German captivity - at 229 people. Then the total number of dead from among the missing in this war can be estimated at 12,494 people. Then the number of Romanian soldiers who survived the German and Romanian captivity, we can estimate at 45,949 people.

We estimate the total losses of the Romanian army in the fight against the USSR at 272.3 thousand dead, and the losses in the fight against Germany and Hungary at 40.5 thousand dead.

36,000 Romanian Gypsies became victims of the genocide⁵⁵. The victims of the Holocaust, including the Jews of Northern Transylvania, are estimated at 469,000 people, including 325,000 on the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina⁵⁶. The number of victims of the Holocaust in Northern Transylvania is estimated at 135 thousand people. It should be emphasized that the Romanian official figures for the number of dead Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina are significantly less -

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about 90 thousand out of 147 thousand⁵⁷. They seem closer to reality. The total number of murdered Jews in Romania within the borders on September 1, 1941, we estimate at 233,000 people. It is possible that some of the Jews of this region were drafted into the Red Army in 1944 and died in its ranks. 7,693 civilians were killed as a result of Allied bombing raids. During the first Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940-1941, on June 12-13, 1941, 30,839 people were deported and arrested. Of this number, 25,711 people are deported. How many of these people were shot or did not survive imprisonment or deportation is not known exactly. It can be assumed that this number was at least 5 thousand people. N.F. Bugay estimates the number of those shot in | thousand people, which seems to us close to reality, and the number of those who died in the camps and at the place of deportation was 19 thousand people, which also seems to us a quite realistic estimate⁶⁰. By mid-September 1941, there were 22,848 immigrants from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in places of special settlement and imprisonment." With this in mind, the total number of those shot and dead by that time can be estimated at 8 thousand people. Of this number, approximately 1 thousand executed were found in the prisons of Romania and Northern Bukovina, including 450 in Chisinau, after they were liberated by the German-Romanian troops in July 1941⁶². Since the main death rate of the deportees occurred in the winter of 1941 /42 years, we estimate the death rate among those deported from Bessarabia and Bukovina from mid-September 1941 until the end of the war at 12 thousand people, and the total number of victims of the first Soviet occupation at 20 thousand people. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, who died during the hostilities in 1941-1944, are estimated by Romanian and Moldovan historians at 55 thousand people. This latter estimate seems to us to be considerably overestimated. Conventionally, we accept the number of those who died during the hostilities at 25 thousand people.

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According to a former German liaison officer with the Romanian troops, "we assessed the Romanian units as the best of our allies", although the level of their command staff in comparison with the German one left much to be desired: "My impression of ordinary soldiers was positive, but, unfortunately, , it did not concern the officers. Most of the soldiers were simple sons of farmers, because in those days, as now, Romania was a fertile agricultural country. The officers came almost exclusively from the big cities, and Francophilia was extremely common among them. None of these officers was eager to be in combat. When I told the Romanian officers that their headquarters were too far from the front line, they replied that they "had enough telephone cable" ...

Several times I was invited to dine at the command post of the Romanian division. Each time it was a big meal of several courses, and it could last for many hours. Yet I have never seen ordinary soldiers eat anything but one dish, which consisted mainly of large beans.

The German officer corps had a different attitude towards this issue. The German company commander was the last in line at the field kitchen. It was a tradition!" 564

On the Eastern Front, the Romanian army played an important role in the Second World War, in many respects comparable to that which the Austrian-Hungarian army played here in the First World War. And the ratio of casualties to the Red Army in the Romanian army in 1941-1944 was close to 1:1.

We estimate the total losses of Romania in World War II at 747.5 thousand dead, including 425.8 thousand military personnel, of which 153.5 thousand died fighting on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition. In addition, a certain number of Germans from Romania, not exactly identified, died in the German army, in particular in the 11th SS Motorized Volunteer Division "Nordland".

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[6]

The ratio of losses of the parties in the African-European theater of operations

We will try to calculate the ratio of casualties killed and those who died from wounds, i.e. the main combat irretrievable losses between the Wehrmacht and its opponents in the African-European theater of operations. In the period from September 1, 1939 to April 20, 1945 (at the end of April 1945, there were practically no hostilities outside the Soviet-German front and the Balkans in the African-European theaters), the losses of the German land army in the West amounted to 109,046 killed and 772,460 missing, including some 250,000 encircled in the Ruhr Pocket, most of whom had already given up resistance. In the South-West, the losses amounted to 48,750 killed and 215,525 missing, respectively, and in the South-East - 22,370 and 24,62,055. collaborationist and anti-fascist formations and where it is difficult to determine the losses of the parties. At the same time, we will add to the total of the loss of the German land army during the Polish campaign of 1939 and the Norwegian campaign of 1940. They amounted respectively to 16,343 killed, died of wounds and accidents, and 320 missing, and 4,975 killed and dead, and 691 missing. If these figures are cleared of those who died from wounds and accidents, then the losses killed in the Polish campaign can be estimated at 12,163 people, and in the Norwegian campaign - at 3,703,567. The total number of German ground forces killed during the fight against the Western Allies can be estimated 173,662 people and 998,996 missing.

It is also necessary to determine the losses of the main German allies - the Italians. We will also exclude from the comparison the specific East African theater where the colonial troops played the main role. The losses of the Italian army in France in June 1940 amounted to about 1 thousand killed. Losses of the Italian army in Northern

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Africa amounted to 20,776 killed and missing. 37,152 people were killed or missing by the Italians in the battles in Sicily in the summer of 1943. The losses of the Italian land army as prisoners in North Africa and Sicily totaled no less than 250 thousand people. During the fighting in Italy that followed on September 8, 1943, 5927 Italians died fighting in Italian units on the side of the Anglo-American allies, and 13 thousand people died fighting on the side of Germany. Another 17,488 Italians died in the anti-fascist resistance movement. In general, the losses of the Italian land army in the fight on the side of Germany can be estimated at 72,000 killed and 250,000 captured.

But what were the losses of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition. The French army lost in the struggle against Germany and Italy in 1939-1940 and 1944-1945 130 thousand killed and 1540 thousand prisoners, including 67.4 thousand Moroccans and other immigrants from North Africa (24.6 thousand . French soldiers died in German captivity). In addition, about 20,000 members of the French resistance movement were killed. The losses of the Dutch army in the struggle against Germany in 1940 amounted to 2.2 thousand killed, and the losses of the Belgian army - 8.8 thousand killed. Dutch and Belgian prisoners taken as part of the general capitulations of these countries after the actual cessation of fighting, we do not take into account.

US Army casualties in the Euro-African theaters were 153,270 killed, 6,058 missing and 95,532

prisoners. Army Air Force losses in the Euro-African theaters were 34,140 killed, 1,133 missing and 34,856 captured. Consequently, the losses of the US ground forces proper in the Euro-African theaters of operations amounted to 124,055 killed and 60,676 captured.

We estimate the losses of the British ground forces in the African-European theaters of operations (with the exception of East Africa and the Balkans) at 80.1 thousand killed and 70.3 thousand

prisoners.

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We estimate the losses of the Canadian Army in the African-European theaters of operations at about 20,000 killed and about 6,000 captured. We estimate the losses of the Australian land army in the African-European theaters at 2.3 thousand killed and 5 thousand prisoners, and the losses of the New Zealand land army at 4.5 thousand killed and 6 thousand prisoners? .

We estimate the losses of the Indian land army in the African-European theaters of operations at 3,000 killed and 12,000 prisoners.

The loss of the Norwegian land army in 1940 and during subsequent hostilities as part of the British armed forces, we estimate at 2 thousand killed. We estimate the losses of the Brazilian army during the Italian campaign at 0.5 thousand killed.

The total losses of the German and Italian ground forces in the African-European theaters of operations (with the exception of East Africa, the Balkans and the Soviet-German front) in the period from September 1, 1939 to April 20, 1945 amounted to about 245.7 thousand killed and about 1249 thousand captured. The number of prisoners may be somewhat overestimated, since we conditionally consider as prisoners all the soldiers of the German ground forces who are listed as missing in those theaters where they fought against the Western Allies, but this does not affect the final result. Total losses of the ground forces of England and the US and its allies in the African-European theaters (with the exception of East Africa) can be estimated at 420.9 thousand killed and 1699.4 thousand captured. The overall ratio of losses of ground forces killed and captured is 1.42:1 in favor of Germany. If we take only the ratio of losses killed, then it will also be in favor of Germany and Italy - 1.71: 1. In reality, the German advantage may be somewhat smaller, since some of the German missing, whom we attributed to prisoners, could actually die in battle. The German advantage was formed almost exclusively due to the huge losses of the French troops killed and captured. This was a consequence of the catastrophe that the French army suffered

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sang in May-June 1940. Then the French land army lost 85,310 killed (including 5,400 Moroccans) and about 12,000 missing, the vast majority of which should be attributed to those killed. years were 48,185 killed and 968 missing, which, probably, in the majority should be attributed to those killed? 72 Given that the Germans suffered losses in battles not only against the French, but also against the British, Belgian and Dutch troops, on losses in the fight against the French troops hardly account for more than two-thirds of the total losses. Then the ratio of losses killed will be 3.0:1 in favor of the Germans. The low fighting qualities of the French army in World War II were due to the desire of the French political and military leadership to adhere to a purely defensive and positional course of action in order to prevent a repetition of the huge losses of the First World War, when about 1.4 million French soldiers and officers died⁷³. The government of France sought to avoid war at all costs, and the unwillingness to fight was transmitted to the broad masses of the population, not excluding soldiers and officers. This led to a catastrophic ratio of German and French losses. If we exclude from the calculation the losses of France and

the estimated losses of Germany and Italy suffered in the fight against France (up to 34 thousand killed in 1940 and about the same in 1944-1945), then the overall ratio of losses will already be in favor of the Western allies 1426.7 thousand to 450 thousand. , or 3.17:1. In the losses of the dead, in this case, the preponderance will remain on the side of Germany, but it will decrease to 1.64:1. This ratio reflects a certain qualitative superiority of the German army over the Anglo-American troops, which, however, was more than offset by their numerical and technical superiority, as a result of which the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses in prisoners. This superiority was a consequence of both the general industrial superiority of the USA over Germany and the presence of the Soviet-German front, where Kras

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The Naya Army forced Germany to keep the bulk of its land army and tank formations.

Interestingly, the losses of Italy do not play a fundamental role in the ratio of the losses of the armies of the Axis powers and the Anti-Hitler coalition. This is due to the relatively small role of the Italian army in the war. In all the main theaters of operations, she fought alongside the German troops, who always played a leading combat role, even if they were numerically inferior to the Italians.

The low combat effectiveness of the Italian army finds its historical and genetic explanation in events dating back to the origins of the Roman Empire. Then the Roman legions began to be completed with volunteers. At the same time, the legions were no longer deployed on the territory of Italy, where only a few Praetorian guards remained, guarding the emperor. The legions were concentrated mainly in the border provinces. Legionnaires, retiring, usually settled there, having received a piece of land. Thus, the most militant people and the "militant genes" they carried were flushed out of Italy. On the contrary, artists and artists serving the emperor and the Roman nobility were concentrated there. Italy became a country of musicians, singers and artists, but in the post-Roman period it never shone with military success. In order to equip the relatively small air force and navy, there were still enough people with the "militancy gene". And in World War II, Italian pilots and sailors fought relatively well. Suffice it to recall the famous 9th MAS flotilla (small anti-submarine weapons) of Prince Valerio Borghese. But in order to adequately equip the large land army, suitable human material was sorely lacking. It is no coincidence that the most combat-ready in the Italian army were the Alpine riflemen, who were largely descendants of the Lombards, a warlike Germanic tribe that invaded Northern Italy in the second half of M]

century.

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The German army, on the contrary, in the Second World War relied on a rich military tradition, primarily Prussian and Bavarian, on a strong militaristic spirit that persisted in the country, despite all the restrictions of the Versailles Peace Treaty. A major role in the qualitative superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Western allies was also played by the fact that from the moment Nazi leader Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Germany purposefully prepared for aggression, creating a powerful army as its main tool, while the Western allies the war became poorly prepared for the conduct of hostilities, both materially and morally.

respect.

Notes

1 The classification has been removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, combat operations and military conflicts. Nod ed. EF. Krivosheev. M.: Voenizdat, 1993. The second, supplemented edition of this book, see: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Statistical research. Ed. G.F. Krivosheev. Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. The book of losses. Ed. G.F.

Krivosheev. M.: Veche, 2010. In addition, the section of this book devoted to the Great Patriotic War was republished as a separate book: The Great Patriotic War without a secrecy stamp: The Book of Losses. Ed. G.F. Krivosheev. M.: Veche, 2009. No new figures related to World War II appeared in the 2009-2010 editions compared to the 2001 edition. Therefore, we will henceforth cite either the first edition of 1993 as "The Classification Removed" or the 2001 edition as "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century." And in the text, for convenience, we will refer to this study by its first title — "The classification has been removed." For criticism of the underestimation of Russian losses in this edition and the overestimation of enemy losses in relation to the Russo-Japanese War, see: Chornovil N. Russian statistical studies of the war with Japan (review of the book by G.F. Krivosheev "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. Losses Armed Forces") // VR://aaKiz.pagod.pl/roler/p4ex.W.

2 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. S. 236.

3 Results, 2005, May 10, No. 19.

4 See: Osipov G. The truth about our losses in the Great Patriotic War // Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2010, April 27.

5 Dugas I.A., Cheron F.Ya. Erased from memory. Soviet prisoners of war between Hitler and Stalin. Paris: UMSA-Press, 1994, pp. 405, 402-403; Setin F. How much did we lose in the war? // Russian Life, 1991, May 25.

6 Nier: // die. luga/oma/mt/ogb_tasht.tash?r_pe\uz_Che_14= 76043 &r_pe\uz_ga24e! 19=102&r_razepit=16

7 Ibid. S. 285, 286.

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See, for example: Ivanov S. Defensive Operation of the Voronezh Front // Military Historical Journal. 1973. No. 8. S. 22.

3 See: Sokelov B. How much we lost in the Great Patriotic War and how history is falsified // Novaya Gazeta, 2009, June 22.

0 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. S. 310.

And Achiomra Mother, 5saez Sote [, Sgachipom Spzvap. Tsha Ahv Roiv Apu. Catashap Appea. Rogsez 1 Fe Eugorean Uyg 1941-1945. Hopdop: Ans ap4 Agtosg Prez, 1995, p. 71. The figure of 16 thousand prisoners captured by the Romanians in the battles for Odessa is confirmed by the fact that when in 1943 Romania officially annexed Transistria (Odessa region), 13,682 natives of Transistria (Shneer A. Plen, T. 1. Jerusalem, 2003, pp. 222-223). There is no doubt that most of them were captured during the battles for Odessa.

12 The contribution of Poland and the Poles to the Allied victory in World War II 1939-1945. Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 2005, p. 34.

13 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. S. 305.

ÿ The contribution of Poland and the Poles to the victory of the Allies in World War II. S. 34

15 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. S. 307; The contribution of Poland and Poles to the Allied victory in the NY World War. 1939-1945. S. 34.

16 Even in the last operation of World War II, Soviet troops were tactically losing to the Wehrmacht. Marshal I.S. After the war, Konev criticized Marshal G.K. Zhukov for the fact that he, commanding the 1st Belorussian Front, underestimated the "available

data on the deliberate withdrawal of enemy troops to the Seelow Heights, located 6-8 km from the front line. As a result of an incorrect assessment of the situation, the troops of the front, having approached the heavily fortified Seelow Heights, were forced to storm them without sufficient preparation, which entailed ... a slow-paced breakthrough of the enemy defenses in the offensive zone of the 1st Belorussian Front "(Ko- nev Ivan S. The strength of the Soviet Army and Navy in the leadership of the party, in inseparable connection with the people // Pravda, 1957, November 3.). As a result, a powerful artillery preparation came almost from scratch. However, the same mistake was made on the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Konev, as on Zhukov's front. As V.R. Kabo, artillery gunner in parts of the 4th Guards Tank Army D.D. Lelyushenko of the 1st Ukrainian Front, "on the night of April 16, we received an order

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advance to the starting line and occupied a forest area on the high bank of the river. On the opposite bank, the Germans dug into the ground. At the signal, the rockets hit our guns and rocket launchers, artillery preparation began. I have never witnessed anything like this - it was a continuous howl and roar, in which it was impossible to distinguish individual shots, the air trembled, a glow of fire stood over the river valley, and all this lasted, as it seemed to me, for several hours. The crew of my gun fired and fired, emptying one ammo box after another. As soon as dawn broke, our troops went on the offensive and crossed the river. Tanks were the first to go there, then a bridge was built, and a stream of vehicles moved along it - artillery and infantry. The opposite bank was plowed up with funnels of breaks. It seemed that there was not a single square meter of land left that would not have been swept over by an infernal tornado of fire and metal. There were no signs of life there, but there were no dead either. The Germans are gone "(Cabo V.R. Road to Australia. Memoirs of M.U.: Eyese Rab iv, 1995 feast: //abopcrta!5.pagoda.gi/dotor_u_AuzgaShi9.Vit).

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37 Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. S. 512 tab. 198.

348 (Satzsen, oore!: Napipwep, Cage|. 210 dihepa oopozzatiyege. \$.5. 53-55. There is also a higher estimate of the victims of the famine in Belgium - 18 thousand people (Van deg Pee, Nepp A. Tve Nipweg Uisheg: Ossired No[and 1944-1945, Markiu og Mebgazka Prezz, 1998. P. 304-305].

34 Kepatsk Popa. Tve Oesipu oG Epgor'5 Surzez. R. 183.

350 Az M. 7. Larap'5 Soyuta|zt apd pdopecha. R. 170.

351 Sagochep, Loore! Nagtzep, Sage!. 210 ashtepd ooporzastoyeg. \$.5. 53-55.

270

35? At that moment, 2,399 Danes, 1,180 Finns, 1,883 Norwegians, 39 Swedes, and 135 Swiss and Liechtensteiners were also in the SS troops. sh U\Uyuya Uvg P // Tve N@dep apa Rofa4ep N!5yugu oYo Gala ipdeg Zou1e{ ap@ Ma71 ossiraNop\$ 1940-1991 Nogu oYo Gaga, 2005. P 125). We believe that this source made a typo in the number of Flemings - 15,721, while it should be 5,721. The presence of almost 16,000 Flemings in the SS troops by the end of 1941 seems incredible.

353 Müller-Gillebrand B. Land Army of Germany, 1933-1945. S. 420.

35% RuitKi Stegoth. RorShanop Svapeez w Eigore Ztse 1939. P 107.

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357 Prisoners of war, 1939-1956. S. 176.

358 Prem Muppt. ACaz oGpe Noosatsya. R. 244.

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360 Foer Spizorier. Gahetboite t \uya Uyg Timo.

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364 Prisoners of war, 1939-1956. S. 176.

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33 RuitKt Stevog. Rorchanop Svapeez w Eigore Ztse 1939. P 60-65

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"Out of a hundred enemy soldiers who attacked us, two hundred were killed." This historical anecdote is not so
far from the truth: at all times, in all wars, enemy losses are considered "in the Suvorov way" - they say that when,
after another victory, the adjutant asked Alexander Vasilyevich how many dead Turks should be included in the
report to mother - Empress, he replied: "Write more! Why pity them, adversaries!"

During the years of World War II, the bloody Stalinist regime applied this principle to its own people — the Red Army fought as if the “fathers-commanders” had set the goal of exterminating as many Soviet soldiers as possible by the hands of the Nazis...

Taking into account all the known data, including recently declassified ones, using original methods for calculating the losses of the USSR and the Third Reich (both the armed forces and the civilian population), the author of this sensational book comes to shocking conclusions, clearly, in numbers and facts, demonstrating who fought in numbers and who fought with skill. In addition, for the first time, full information is published about the losses of other countries - not only the allies of the Soviet Union and Germany, but also those that did not officially participate in hostilities, but their volunteers fought in the armies of the warring states, their merchant ships died from submarine attacks, so that almost all countries suffered losses in the Second World War, although these figures are not comparable - from 3 people in Ceylon to more than 40 million in the USSR! But this monstrous truth continues to be hidden until now ...

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